DEVELOPING A COMPASSIONATE SENSE OF PLACE: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL CONSCIENTIZATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

(Spine title: Developing A Compassionate Sense of Place)

(Thesis format: Integrated-Article)

by

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Graduate Program
in
Education

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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Developing A Compassionate Sense of Place: Environmental and Social Conscientization in Environmental Organizations

is accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

Addressing future sustainability in the face of environmental degradation will involve a transformation of our understanding of the material world and our human place. One form of such "transformative imagining" is a compassionate sense of place – a place-conscious ethos of care. This study used Bourdieu's "theory of practice" as a sociologically robust set of tools to provide an empirical basis for re-imagining socio-ecological relations.

An analytic ethnography was conducted among people active with environmental organizations in the city of Thunder Bay, Ontario. Despite diverse ways of living out their environmental concerns, a number of common dispositions of an environmental habitus surfaced. Since they live in a social milieu in which routinized environmental sensitivity is contrary to the dominant logic of practice, for the participants of this study to live in an environmentally-active manner required reflexive self-awareness and social analysis. Furthermore, both 'place' and 'caring' were conceptualized and operationalized by the participants of the study in ways that were practical, performative and experiential.

Thus, such embodied dispositions could be linked to cognitive praxis of social movement theory, leading toward developing an ecological habitus. Environmental organizations could become the social space in which an ecologically more appropriate logic of practice could be acquired through such incidental learning as occurs as a result of participation with social movement organizations.

In addition, a compassionate sense of place appeared to give guidance to environmentally sound practices. Environmental practice attempted to extend attention to relations beyond social space to the entirety of "place" (understood here to be socially constructed but distinctly material). As the analysis developed it, a compassionate sense of place is a "field of care involving the intersection of self-awareness and practical attentiveness to the flourishing of socio-ecological relations." A compassionate sense of place may indeed serve as a logic to orient contemporary environmental practice.

KEYWORDS: environmentalism, Bourdieu, social movement learning, habitus, ethic of care, compassion, sense of place, ethnography.

Dedication

For Taryn and for Ethan

You had to do with less of your father's time for this to get done.

Hopefully you see this as part of a father's effort to help the world in which you are growing up be a better and more compassionate place.

Now, let's go play!

Acknowledgements

Many people helped along the way. Wow, it has been a long way! I most gratefully acknowledge my colleagues at The King's University College, who waited and prodded for this to get done and supported me amidst considerable personal turmoil. Special thanks to David Long, John Hiemstra, and John Wood who offered their feedback and their counsel. Thank you also to Mom for the financial help.

Thank you to my supervisor, Marshall Mangan (University of Western Ontario) who helped develop my sociological understanding. Thank you to Sharon Haggerty (University of Western Ontario) and Connie Russell (Lakehead University) who served on the supervisory committee and provided provocative independent study courses and sound advice.

The research was begun while I held a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. Other funding was received from the Faculty of Education at the University of Western Ontario, and The King's University College Research Committee. Appreciation is due to each of these institutions.

Thanks most of all to my kids - Taryn and Ethan Haluza-DeLay – for whom it has also been a long journey. The coupons – for "one hour of uninterrupted work time" and "five minutes back rub" – were a big help. So were your patience, joy and energy.

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Introduction: Placing the Research

This project is one of "transformative imagining." It is an "imagining" because it begins with a meaning-layered and evocative phrase – ***a compassionate sense of place***. It then seeks to speculate in a disciplined and empirically informed manner as to how this conceptual innovation can help transform contemporary socio-ecological relations. Re-imagining socio-ecological relations will involve a transformation of our understanding of the material world and our human place. Can a compassionate sense of place be such an imagining?

In particular, two assumptions drive this project:

- That "place" can be conceptualized in a way that acknowledges its experiential importance in human lives, and its utility for environmental activity, and be relevant in a world that is globally interconnected.
- That "compassion" can give meaningful direction for engagement in environmental social issues.

Following the two assumptions stated above, the papers in this dissertation orchestrate a coordinated probe of the following two research questions:

- What evidence is there of a place-conscious ethos of caring – a compassionate sense of place – among environmentalists?
- Can a compassionate sense of place serve as an environmentally effective logic of practice?

This dissertation consists of three interrelated papers and several chapters of supporting material. The dissertation fits the integrated article format, meaning that each of the papers in this dissertation is complete in itself and was intended to be independently publishable. Collectively they present an integrated exploration of the topic. Because of the paper-based format, a reader who reads the dissertation in its entirety may experience some repetition as conceptual foundations are re-explained. Each paper or chapter has its own references. Furthermore, because of that paper-based format,

only that data and discussion relevant to the three papers is presented. A reader should not expect a "thick description" of the entire field site. Nevertheless, although the intent was for these papers to be stylized and formatted for journal publication, the conventions expected for traditional dissertations maintained a presence. These papers are longer than journal articles in the attempt to present more data about the environmental field in the community of the study. Footnotes sprinkled throughout the papers extend the discussion even further. In some cases they point out further directions for research with the data collected for this project.

The project draws heavily on sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's (1990) "theory of practice" and his sociological tools. The concept of an ecological habitus is used in *The practice of environmentalism: Creating an ecological habitus* (Paper 1) to suggest how there can be such a disjoint between all the attention to the environment, the evidence of significant environmental degradation, and yet relatively little change or effort to improve the situation. *The practice of environmentalism* argues that the solution involves environmental social movements (ESMs) engaging in the development of an ecological habitus. *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* (Paper 2) and *Caring for place? Possibilities for a compassionate sense of place among environmentalists* (Paper 3) are devoted to analysis of this process within the environmental organizations of one community, that of Thunder Bay, Ontario. A methodological interlude before Papers 2 and 3 explains the ethnographic orientation used in those two papers. The dissertation begins with *Education, social movements and environmental learning*, an analysis of education from the standpoint of educating for an ecologically oriented society.

Fertile Ground for the Research

In the introduction to a recent volume on environmental policy, Parson (2001) began by questioning whether incremental improvements or paradigmatic change are required to deal with environmental problems. He concludes the volume by pointing out the considerable barriers to environmental improvement due to current social, economic, political and psychological structures. Similarly, in *The Ingenuity Gap*, Thomas Homer-

Dixon (2000) laid out the immense problems facing the world in terms of political instability, environmental scarcity, skyrocketing global poverty and material consumption, along with the slower paced capacity of human beings to marshal the ingenuity to create and implement new ideas to handle or solve the problems we have created. Given this, can a new imaginary of the human relationship with the rest of the earth be constructed?

From long involvement as an environmental and peace educator, researcher and activist, my belief is that paradigmatic change is required and that education thus far has been woefully inadequate to the task. Studies and opinion polls show a generally high level of pro-environmental support. Yet there is little question that local environments and the global environment are changing at an increasing rate (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Somehow, there has been a disjoint between the environmental changes, the educative efforts, and the results. One leading environmental education (EE) journal recently devoted a special issue to this gap between environmental knowledge, environmental awareness, and pro-environmental behaviour ("Minding the Gap," *Environmental Education Research*, 8 (3), 2002). These details point to a need for a deeper, sociological analysis. In the classic formulation of C. Wright Mills (1959), where a problem shows a widespread pattern, it is a collective, public matter rather than an individualized one.

Scholarship that deconstructs existing social forms is important but insufficient. "Our analyses may be right as rain but they have little or no ability to move people about such a deeply resonant array of experiences as are implied in 'the relation to nature'" (Neil Smith, 1998, p. 280). More important is that new social forms be liberated during the deconstruction. This is often the task of social movements. As Lofland (1996) evocatively put it:

> In one sense, social movement organization beliefs stride out on the existential plains of the universe in daring to say that mainstream reality is not the only 'real' reality or that it is not 'really real.' Most often, this striding on those existential plains is not likely striding at all but timid tiptoeing, mild and cautious adversarial probing.... Nonetheless, some social movement organization Explorers do

> exuberantly bound into new universes of meaning.... pressing for cognitive possibilities [of alternative realities]. (p. 112)

This is a process of imagining – of alternatives and (so as not to be abstracted utopianism) of ways to get there. The work of social change is a process that is not rational and cognitive only.

When sociologists have examined environmental concerns they have typically done so in a manner that could be characterized as a "sociology of environmental issues." Sociologists have tended to study the social aspects of specific issues or the parameters and demographics of environmental attitudes. They have rarely applied a sociological consciousness to the taken-for-granted social structures and modes of thought relative to consequences for the Earth's environment. Three decades ago, Catton and Dunlap (1978) charged mainstream sociology with a "human exemptionalist" mentality that limits the discipline's ability to discern the interplay between social and environmental issues. They concluded, as one of the authors has recently summarized,

> Mainstream sociology has developed a set of traditions and taken-for-granted assumptions that led our discipline to ignore the biophysical environment.... We also outlined an alternative paradigm... that highlighted the fact that even modern, industrial societies are dependent on their biophysical environments... (Dunlap, 2002, p. 330).

Nevertheless, environmental sociology remains a peripheral influence in the discipline (Dunlap, Buttel, Dickens & Gijswijt, 2002).

Human societies are grounded in the ecological, and to exempt humans from analysis in this context is faulty – as faulty as exempting gender or race or class from the analysis of social relations. Ignoring the environmental basis is to miss important foundations for social relations. Yet "the very idea of sociology as a separate disciplinary field is dependent upon the reification of a nature/culture dichotomy," Mick Smith (2001) maintains (p. 17). By this criticism, sociology is inherently anthropocentric. In an ecological context, humans do not inhabit places alone. Nor will sociology be able to meaningfully engage environmental degradation until it engages in a reflexive epistemic analysis of its own deeply held traditions (Meisenhelder, 1997, p. 170). Critiquing the

field of education in a similar way led Bell and Russell (2000) to query, "What meanings and voices have been preempted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a human-centred epistemological framework?" (p. 189). If prognostications of the future are even partially accurate, the environment will become a more significant part of social analysis simply because the physical world is profoundly changing.

Numerous other commentators on the current socio-environmental situation suggest that Western cultural ways of thinking about the environment and the human place on earth are at the centre of the problem. Deep ecology, social ecology, ecotheology, stewardship, ecofeminism and indigenous epistemology are among the ecophilosophical approaches trying to reformulate ways of thinking and being in recognition of eco-social interrelationships (see Hay, 2002 for an excellent overview of various strands). Although focusing on varying elements, each of these approaches also describes the "exemptionalist" hubris derived from Western culture. Together, these philosophical approaches suggest that there has been a dominant exploitative and anthropocentric worldview, to which an ecologically oriented worldview is to be preferred. The former worldview has manifested itself in the social forms and institutions of "modernity" with considerable ecological impact (York, Rosa & Dietz, 2003).[1] Other elements of this dominant worldview include a reason-driven, techno-managerial orientation wherein the world is conceptualized as machine-like and teleologically inert,

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[1] Charles Taylor (2004), although not addressing ecological implications, calls the modern worldview the "modern social imaginary" and described how it has manifested itself in the development of the institutions of the market, the public sphere and civil society. Taylor, Gaonkar and the other scholars associated with the Center for Transcultural Studies struggled to describe the social imaginary. It is "an enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within which a people imagine and act as world-making collective agents" (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 1); it is "ways of understanding the social that become social entities themselves, mediating collective life... embedded in the habitus of the population" (p. 4).

Gaonkar asserted, "It is only through the mediation of the imaginary that we are able to conceive of the real in the first-place" (p. 7). It is this view of imagination that I want to emphasize. The metaphor of "the social imaginary" replaces "social construction" for me, since the latter analogy conveys something of an orderly, planned, and rational process – we construct highways and buildings. But both metaphors emphasize that things could have been different – the renovations to the house, or the perturbations of our imagination have variants – an important precursor to facilitating social change. Without such a belief, the existing shape of society appears inevitable, reified, determined by history. The emancipatory thrust of sociology is that society can be liberated from determinism. Imagination is part of this process. See also the special issue of *Globalisation, Societies and Education* (Fahey & Kenway, 2006).

and a tendency for the natural world to be limited to instrumental valuation for human purpose such as resource utilization or aesthetic appreciation. Western epistemological traditions privilege abstracted and presumably universal facts and theories constructed as "knowledge" contrasted to local, traditional, experiential, or contextualized knowledge (Goonatilake, 2006). Critics argue that this epistemic orientation further contributes to human "alienation" from the rest of the earth (Bowers, 1993; Naess, 1989). Preston (2003) drew forth this argument, showing how the imaginary that is the mind detached from embodiment has dominated modernity. As he described it, "place" has been ignored in locating the processes and means of knowing. And although proponents of knowledge as situated have highlighted epistemological standpoints generated by social locations such race, gender, sexuality and class, the physical environment has been largely ignored.

The majority of social theory currently offers little direction or guidance in developing sound human-earth relationships (Smith, 2001). Critical social scientists have been adept at examining the diverse social, cultural, economic, political, and discursive conditions that marginalize on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, disability and other factors. But they have been less open to a political ecology that also links such conditions of oppression with the relatively voiceless earth. Referring to education generally and higher education specifically, the editor of the American journal *Educational Studies* observed,

> The institution is not open to supporting such an endeavor. Even those utilizing critical perspectives and working hard to get their students thinking about and responding to the structured relations between schooling and racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty miss the boat when it comes to making clear connections between social injustice and the degradation of biodiversity in our communities and across the globe (Martusewicz, 2001, p. 395).

In contemporary North American society we have: high public support regarding various environmental measures; decades of considerable media attention about environmental issues; weak or nonexistent governmental and business responses; significant environmental change and degradation. The intersection of these trends is puzzling and contradictory. Even acknowledging that the pace of environmental change

is slow and the consequences can be diluted by technological innovation or displacement, that most social theorists and the general public minimally attend to the fundamental challenges presented by burgeoning environmental problems appears peculiar. One way out of the puzzle, I suggest, and corroborated in this research, is a compassionate sense of place. I conceptualize this place-based ethos of care as "a field of care involving the intersection of self-awareness and attentiveness to the flourishing of socio-ecological relations."

Why a Compassionate Sense of Place?

Planting the Idea.

Nicky Duenkel's (1994) phenomenological study of eight consciously ecocentric wilderness guides resonated powerfully with my own experience. Her research showed how difficult it is to maintain that philosophy and a corresponding lifestyle in a society with a very different orientation and structure. The individuals described their slipping back toward the "separated and superior" attitudes of the dominant milieu. To use terms that will figure prominently in this dissertation (and which will be explained later), as a *cognitive* praxis (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991), they bought the deep ecological worldview. The difficulty was maintaining this at the level of lifestyle *practice*. The social *field* mitigated against the possibility, enforcing an unecological *logic of practice*.

My own previous research – an in-depth, ethnographic study of a wilderness-based environmental education program and how the participating youth were using their experience to act and think about the environment in the months afterwards – was particularly illuminating (Haluza-DeLay, 1996, 1999a, 2001a). Despite what was an otherwise conventional, well-run, intensive experience, the youth adapted the experience to their existing social context and socio-cultural values, practices and beliefs such that they maintained little concern for the environment afterwards. They used the word "Civilization" to refer to all human objects, and in other ways maintain a very clear Human/Nature dichotomy (Haluza-DeLay, 1999a). Building their construction of "the environment" on "nature," and nature as unfamiliar, pristine and wilderness-like, the

teens generally concluded, "No nature at home, so nothing here to care about" (Haluza-DeLay, 2001a). This research led me to conclude we needed a very different type of environmental education (Haluza-DeLay, 2001b). Furthermore, it was clear: being concerned about the environment was swimming against the tide of an unecological society.

As a result of this research, I began looking for more structurally-oriented theoretical grounds than the independent phenomenological, constructivist epistemology in which I had been trained as an experiential educator and researcher (Haluza-DeLay, 1996). But neither did I want to lose all the notion of agency by people. Although situated within a social context, the educational enterprise is mostly comprised of individuals combining their old and new knowledge. In a way, these socio-cultural paradigms are the mental "relations of ruling" (D. Smith, 1999). The desire then is to break such oppressive and environmentally malignant shackles. It was in this period that I encountered the sociological theories of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.

Bourdieu described his sociological approach as trying to undermine some of the standard sociological dichotomies, such as objectivism-subjectivism, structure-agency, theory-practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, Reed-Danahay, 2005). In a recent analysis of the state of social theory, Camic and Gross (1998) listed Bourdieu as the exemplar of the project of "construction of general tools for use in empirical analysis" (p. 455). Camic and Gross asserted favourably that Bourdieu, unlike others so engaged, "concentrates on a limited set of concepts: most famously, 'habitus'... and 'field'" (p. 456). Bourdieu (1998) himself explained that the concepts he uses should not be studied in themselves – he is not developing a grand theory of society – but are conceptual tools to be used in research. Appropriately for this dissertation, Bourdieu conceptualized society as space, both symbolically and substantively. He posited that actors negotiate within interlocking and multilayered social "fields" and that the field positions of actors create "habitus," or embodied but unconscious dispositions that generate a "logic of practice" or *sens pratique*, by which persons operate in the specific field. Habitus is a middle ground in the structure-agency tension, and seems to be particularly useful as a way of describing the

challenges involved in routinizing environmentally aware lifestyles and social structures.

At the same time, I was interested in "place." Numerous educators have suggested a place-based focus would be particularly productive for environmental education (Elder, 1998; Gruenewald, 2003a, 2003b; Nabhan & Trimble, 1995; Orr, 1994; Sobel, 1998; Theobald, 1997; Traina & Darley Hill, 1995). Environmental scholars and activists also have argued for a place-based approach to political, social and economic valuation (Berry, 1972; Berthold-Bond, 2000; Greear, 2005; Kemmis, 1990; Norton & Hannon, 1997; Sauer, 1992) The basic argument of advocates of place-based environmental attention is that knowing one's place is a deeply experiential process that aids the individual and social group to develop knowledge and caring appropriate for the task of living well, that is, in a socially and environmentally conscious manner. Farmer-philosopher-poet Wendell Berry (1972) summarized this view: "Without a complex knowledge of one's place, and without the faithfulness to one's place on which such knowledge depends, it is inevitable that the place will be used carelessly, and eventually destroyed" (p. 44). Ideally, for such thinkers, effective place-based learning or place-based socio-political systems require long residence, or "rootedness" (Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977).

While having intuitive appeal, such a conceptualization of place did not fit my personal history and seems unlikely or even luxurious in increasingly mobile societies in a globalizing world (Cuthbertson, Heine & Whitson, 1997). Community is weakened in these contexts or must be constructed differently than the traditional *gemeinschaft* of nostalgia (Young, 1990). Furthermore, it is unclear how a sense of place of a locale can "scale up" to the larger realms of national or global, both of which are important sites of environmental and social policy-making (Aberley, 1993; Massey, 1997; Parson, 2001). However, the intuitive appeal of place-based environmentalism is worth following, albeit in a hard-nosed, disciplined and realistic inquiry.

Germinating the Concept.

The term "compassionate sense of place" was coined in mid 1995, during an offhand conversation over fair-trade coffee. Brent Cuthbertson said something to Mike Heine that included those words. I was not really paying attention until the phrase "a compassionate sense of place" leapt out from the coffee-shop hubbub – like that movie special effect where the camera burrows in to concentrate on the subject and everything around goes completely out of focus. There was depth of meaning in the term! It said a lot of what I was looking for, although I wasn't sure what the meanings were. It captured a number of things: that we humans are relational, embodied, corporeal beings embedded in our environments/places; it implied that a "sense" was important, rather than the overly cognitive emphasis of most education. It had something – compassion – that gave direction to this sense of place.

Since that time, the term has been used to describe variously the aims of outdoor education (Haluza-DeLay, 1999b), wilderness guiding (Cuthbertson, 1999; Haluza-DeLay & Cuthbertson, 2000), environmental education (DeLay, 2001b), and community development (Curthoys & Cuthbertson, 2001). Cuthbertson and Curthoys (2002) used a parallel of the deep-ecological formulation of Self to show how Place[2] is a site of signification and moral consideration. I have consciously applied the notion to built environments, that is, to "remystify the city" (Haluza-DeLay, 1997).

Cuthbertson and I considered the role of "compassion" to be essential, which might overcome some of the deficits of place-based environmental thought and education (Haluza-DeLay & Cuthbertson, 2000). We were careful to articulate "compassion" in line with historical moral traditions and not the more common connotation of "pity." We were also careful to consider place in ways that did not reify rootedness. Still, the concept has never had a decent treatment. The task of this dissertation is to imagine and examine this idea in the operations of environmentally active people within environmental organizations.

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[2] The capitalization is intentional, following Curthoys and Cuthbertson (2002).

The dissertation does this through the papers that follow. First comes a review of *Education, social movements and environmental learning*. It concludes, following David Orr and C.A. Bowers, that other venues besides formal education may be more productive in internalizing environmental awareness into practice. It reviews experiential learning, place-based education, and social movements as sites of learning. Ultimately, the review shows the validity of investigating the internalisation of an environmental logic of practice, associated with involvement in environmental organizations. *The practice of environmentalism: Creating ecological habitus* (Paper 1) begins this process with explanation of Bourdieu's concepts, and a thorough, theoretical analysis of an "ecological habitus." *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* (Paper 2) and *Caring for place? Possibilities for a compassionate sense of place among environmentalists* (Paper 3) are grounded in an ethnography of environmental involvement in the specific geographic region of Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. An interlude preceding them explains in detail the ethnographic method used in these two papers. *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* examines the dispositions of an environmentalist habitus and its relationship with cognitive praxis. *Caring for place?* interrogates "caring" and "place" within the environmental logic of practice generated by an ecological habitus. *Caught not taught: Growing a compassionate sense of place...* concludes the study with consideration of educative dimensions for this internalized *modus vivendi* and whether compassion can be sufficient to serve as an effective logic of practice. Together, these papers enable us to consider whether a compassionate sense of place functions in practice and can orient environmental concern for the production of more beneficial socio-ecological relations.

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Education, Social Movements and Environmental Learning

One may ask: why pay attention to learning in environmental organizations? For an answer, we begin with critiques of the field of education's ecological dispositions. These critiques suggest that looking for other avenues of environmental learning in contemporary society may be desirable. Sociological and learning theory point out that much learning is tacit and incidental rather than explicit and conscious. Accordingly, we consider "learning from experience" and place-based education. Social movements provide alternatives to the existing social system, and in some cases project transformation of that system. Therefore, this introduction concludes with a review of the literature on learning in social movements. Cumulatively, the review suggests that it would be productive to attend to how environmental practice is "learned" through involvement in environmental organizations.

Education, Place, and Experience

The Field of Education's Unecological Disposition

David Orr argued that all education is environmental education. By this he meant that our ways of teaching, and the subjects themselves, say something about the environment and the human role. This is not necessarily good. Orr (1994) stated, "If one listens carefully, it may even be possible to hear the Creation groan every year in late May when another batch of smart, degree-holding, but ecologically illiterate, *Homo sapiens* who are eager to succeed are launched into the biosphere" (p. 5). Environmental destruction – like Auschwitz said Orr – "is not the work of ignorant people. Rather it is largely the results of work by people with BAs, BSs, LLBs, MBAs, and PhDs" (p. 7). Education is complicit in ongoing environmental degradation.

Orr's focus is on ecological literacy – that humans know the ecology of their places just as standard literacy means that we know the mechanics of writing. Ecological

literacy goes beyond environmental "awareness." As it is obvious that ecological literacy is not happening, Orr strenuously criticized education of all levels. The problem is not *in* education, he writes, it is a problem *of* education (Orr, 1994). Our educational systems are simply not set up to teach the sort of knowledge that one needs to know how to live well on an imperilled planet.

C.A. Bowers is another well-recognized critic of present education and environmental education. In numerous books and articles, Bowers has criticized most education as exacerbating the environmental crisis. In Bowers' critique, education in the overdeveloped Western world, imbued with the cultural values that he says are part of the problem, cannot produce the literacy or ecological orientation adequate for an environmentally sustainable society.

Bowers' (1993, 1995a) critique began with the idea that we humans create and are shaped by cultural patterns, and that these patterns dispose us to certain ways of understanding and acting in our world. At least they place limits on what "makes sense" as we act, feel and think in the world. Most of these cultural patterns operate at the taken-for-granted level. Bowers described the dominant Western worldview in ways that are by now familiar: an emphasis on new ideas and technologies, universalized knowledge abstracted from context, newer is "progress" and progress defined as economic development. Other cultural patterns include a sense of time, identity as a function of material consumption, nature as commodified, the primacy of individualism over community, and notions of space, privacy, and corresponding dwelling size. These cultural patterns shape our dispositions and, consequently, the ways in which we live and the social structures we build. For example, with less experimentation with new ideas, we might more highly value traditional wisdom on how to interact with the land. If progress were defined as human development, we might favour simpler lifestyles, art or leisure.

Bowers described how culture tends to reproduce itself, encoding certain patterns of relationships between human and environment through mechanisms such as language (Bowers, 1993, 1996). Education is one of the most salient mechanisms of cultural replication. "By setting the socially sanctioned boundaries for discourse and reflection as

well as communicating the myths and assumptions of the dominant worldview, the curriculum performs an important social control function" (Bowers, 1993, p. 9). Thus, the standard curriculum has the effect of decontextualizing humans from the rest of the earth. Bowers' frustration further showed when he stated,

> That most subject areas continue to teach a destructive form of environmental education (or an attitude of indifference) can be seen in how little the nonscience areas of the curriculum have changed in the face of the constant stream of media coverage about our deepening environmental problems. (Bowers, 1996, p. 9)

Nor has the science curriculum changed much, still encoding Enlightenment faith in progress, technological management, and confidence in human ability.

Like Orr, Bowers suggested that education as currently practiced is fundamentally anti-ecological. However, Bowers (1993, 1996) extended Orr, especially by implicating the Enlightenment heritage of liberalism. He finds three strains of liberalism in education which he labels technocratic, romantic, and emancipatory liberalism. Technocratic educational liberalism serves primarily to train members of the social order as workers for the system. Its orientation toward the earth is one of technocratic management and utilization; the earth becomes something to be controlled and used. Romantic educational liberalism acknowledges the role of learners in creating their knowledge and values, thereby reinforcing individualism and humanism. Its orientation to the earth is one of human-centredness, heroism and romanticizing "nature." Emancipatory educational liberalism (represented by Freire, Dewey and others) focuses on critical inquiry, rational discourse and transformation of consciousness on the road to replacing oppressive social orders. Critical pedagogy's orientation to the earth has been one of benign neglect and, again, a human-centred focus inadequate for environmental restoration. In addition, the emphasis on rationality leads to managerial hubris.

Bowers also criticized most so-called environmental education as being piecemeal, scientistic, unlike that done in ecologically sustaining cultures, and embedded with the rationalistic, individualistic, managerial, technocratic and *progress*ive [sic] cultural values that are linked to environmental destruction. Even emancipatory pedagogy is unlikely to have the effect desired. In a recent book *Rethinking Freire:*

Globalization and the Environmental Crisis, Bowers and collaborators developed this further (Bowers and Apffel-Marglin, 2005). They argued that Freiran pedagogy is founded in anthropocentric, individualistic, and rationalistic ways of being that are most predominantly a function of Western (European-derived) civilization. If Western ways of being-in-the-world are at the root of domination that surfaces as colonialism and massive global environmental destruction, then more Western-styled education – which these critics assert is implicit in Freiran pedagogy – is unlikely to uncover alternatives to the current globalizing and anti-ecological path (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b).

It is this latter critique that led McLaren (1994) to dismiss Bowers as a "patrician critic" (p. 156). McLaren said many critical pedagogues are concerned about the environment, then suggested Bowers was over-concerned. McLaren seemed to have missed the point about ecological literacy and the consequent oppression of the earth by culturally conditioned anthropocentric education. In "rethinking" Freire, Bowers does seem to have moderated his views on critical pedagogy a little. Gruenewald (2003a) has effected an interesting synthesis of critical pedagogy and place-based education (or place-conscious education as he prefers to say, in order to avoid the implication that other forms of education are not somehow embodied or emplaced) that draws heavily on both approaches (and both McLaren and Bowers).

Bowers (1995a) described his fruitless efforts to get the mainstream teacher training establishment to address these issues,

> Even educational theorists who have been writing for the last twenty years about how schools continue to reinforce economic and political disparities between social classes have ignored the impact of the dominant economic, [cultural,] and technological practices on the environment. (p. 81)

Teacher educators have responded poorly to the ecological crisis (Martusewicz, 2001). Morgan (1996) argued that educational institutions "actively maintain the divide" between humanity and the natural world. "Education is still considered a strictly social process that takes place essentially apart from and in opposition to the non-human environment. These are the assumptions that have left educational philosophy largely unresponsive to ecological thought" (Morgan, 1996, n.p.). Teacher-training reproduces

thought patterns that are unecological, and maybe even anti-ecological. For example, educational institutions have fragmented knowledge into disciplines, when a holistic knowledge base is needed for ecological problems, and societal problems as well.

Stables (2001) called environmental education a modernist response to the crisis of modernity. Stables and Scott (1999) made the point that modernity – implicated both as an historical period in which environmental destruction has occurred and as a "grand narrative" with defining institutions of capitalism, faith in empirical science and social progress, and rejection of the metaphysical – is underlain by Western cultural and philosophical humanism. Humanism is "sets of belief which are anthropocentric" (p. 146), leading to "an overriding concern with human experience in scientific enterprise and artistic subjectivity" (p. 147).

Ironically, although Stables and Scott critiqued the humanist tradition, they also replicated it. Although they critiqued the critical social pedagogies and schools, they also suggested that "critical environmental literacy" is needed. Although they described how our language itself reproduces alienation from the discourses of the natural, their own language was schooled in the elitist (and alienating) discourse of the academy. Although they described the humanist tradition as overly rationalist and reliant on human experience, including thought, the authors dropped a potpourri of names and notions from a wide set of disciplines. Little in the article actually called the reader to rediscovery of alternative ways of knowing, or alternative formulations of the human-environment/earth/land/nature/land community relationship.

On this analysis then, environmental education – notwithstanding that it is having little impact on the dominant dispositions of the education field – has missed the point. Societal constraints have a large impact on the construction of knowledge. Efforts to teach individuals are weak or partial successes at best, because of the root metaphors and social structures of our society that mitigate against ecologically applicable lifestyles. Bowers noted this when he asserted that alternative models are needed because in these culturally alternative settings we have an opportunity to re-code our dispositions. This is the impetus behind Bowers' (1993, 1995a; Bowers & Apfell-Marglin, 2005) insistence

on considering different cultures and these worldviews and practices vis a vis the land. Urban Canadians will not take on the concrete practices of the Kukoyon, the Balinese or the Inuit, but cross-cultural awareness does generate the sociological consciousness that our taken-for-granted is not the only way. It disrupts the normalized practices that solidify personal dispositions. The anthropologist Kay Milton (1996) made the same point in her review of cultural interrelations with the environment, although she is clear that anthropological research does not give any society the "best sustainability" award.

These alternatives may be too far removed from the experience and structure of contemporary modern societies to be taken seriously by most people, or else romanticized into idealism (Krech, 1999). Therefore, it is within contemporary social forms that we must look for opportunities to reimagine socio-ecological practices. In later chapters, I will argue that environmental social movements may produce social learning outcomes that can lead to the goal critics have argued is lost to contemporary education. But, given the emphasis in some environmental thought about place-conscious education, we will look at that first.

Place-Conscious learning

A solid body of research in human and cultural geography has investigated the role of meaningful locales in fostering a "sense of place" (Cresswell, 2004; Hay, 1988; Relph, 1976). According to Sack (1993), three realms influence the construction of placeness – the physical world (including built and natural objects, nonhuman and human others), the social world (including social, economic, political, race, class, gender and bureaucracy), and the realm of meaning (the ideas, values and beliefs that make up the forces of the mind). Thus, "places" are locations that are specific, distinct, and have a particular identity. Place is a human construction of a location; these characteristics are constructed through intersubjective human experience of the location itself, and not simply appropriated as if there is a singular essence of a place. For Escobar (2001) "place" meant "the experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries (however, permeable), and

connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed" (p. 152). However, an emphasis on "rootedness" or long-time living in a place in the development of a sense of place has been supplanted by the recognition that everyone has their own sense of the place, and if the place does not have a singular identity, duration of inhabitation will only generate changing senses, but not "correct" ones. Furthermore, recent scholarship has begun to emphasize how specific places and senses of place are associated with other places and larger scales (Cresswell, 2004; Escobar, 2001; Massey, 1997). While many contemporary environmental problems are global in scope, the local variability in their manifestation can be significant: global temperature rise, for example, is greater in northern latitudes where ecosystems are also less resilient. Attention to global environmental phenomena, perhaps counter-intuitively, draws the researcher toward the limits of universalizing tendencies within globalization discourse (Escobar, 2001). Specific places are affected by extra-local relations, but they also recursively shape these extra-local "connections, forces and imaginations" into particularized forms (Gille & O'Riain, 2000). For environmental scholars, it is very important to include ecological factors in places and their extra-local relations.

Many works of writing in environmental studies begin or are based upon personal recollections and anecdotes about meaningful places (Elder, 1998; Sauer, 1992). Similarly, many environmental educators insist on the importance of grounding environmental education in specific places, and often in the experience of the natural world (Gruenewald, 2003a, 2003b; Hutchison, 2004; Nabhan & Trimble, 1995; Orr, 1994; Schlottman, 2005; Woodhouse & Knapp, 2000). Advocates of place-based education recognize that leaning is an action on the part of the learner. They establish that there is a link to be made between knowledge and a specific context, both in terms of content and the learning process (Bowers, 1995b; Sobel, 1998). This place-specific learning "aims to work against the isolation of schooling's discourses and practices from the living world outside the increasingly placeless institutions of school" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 620). Grounded in the personal, experiential process of learning, "knowledge for" would presumably be better than decontextualized "knowledge-about." Place

awareness, in this formulation, is seen as necessary in developing this link in a way that eventually becomes environmental awareness. Place-based education has been linked most frequently to rural education, outdoor education and environmental education (Haas & Nachtigal, 1998; Theobald, 1997; Woodhouse & Knapp, 2000).

Descriptions of place-based education have tended to focus on the type of program that Hutchison (2004) labelled as "community studies."

> Community study advocates argue that learning how communities function as ecosystems can help students to appreciate more fully the biological and cultural interdependencies that sustain their living space and the living space of others (including other species). To know one's place is to have an intimate knowledge of the local environment (both natural and built) and the various professional roles, shared histories, and interdependent relationships that sustain the community over the long term. (pp. 41-42)

The problem is that most place-based descriptions have a simplistic concept of "place" that does not begin to approach the complexity of research on place in cultural geography, sociology and phenomenology (Ardoin, 2006). "Place" is a deeply experiential thing, filled with diverse and contradictory meanings that may vary widely among people (Cresswell, 2004). Many writers on place-based education seem to idealise place and community, and

> valorise a view of space based on a conception of the local as bounded place, and with that a stable and bounded identity. In many ways, this is a particular view of traditional society disrupted by the modernising process of industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalism and out of which emerged discourses of alienation, isolation and anomie. (Usher, 2002, pp. 45-46)

David Gruenewald (2003a, 2003b) is one of the most deliberate current advocates of place-based or place-conscious education. In his synthesis with critical pedagogy, Gruenewald (2003a) observed that both orientations focus on the situatedness of learners. He also noted that educational theory that integrates both ecological concerns and social justice is still early in development. He commented, approvingly, that in their overview of place-based education Woodhouse and Knapp (2000) observed that "many current approaches to place-based education emphasize the ecological dimension and lack a cultural studies perspective" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 648).

For both Hutchison and Gruenewald places are meaning-full, composed of physical and cultural characteristics. In addition, places operate back on us – they "teach" us and "make" us – in a non-deterministic sort of intersubjective encounter. While Hutchison emphasized personal and social meaning and experience as he uses "place" to analyze education trends, Gruenewald drew a more complex conceptualisation.

Gruenewald explained that places are complexes of perceptual/phenomenological, sociological, ideological, political and ecological aspects. He acknowledged that "the meaning of place will shift and blend, from cultural formation, to personal experience, to ecosystem. No matter what terms we use, human experience of geographical contexts is fluid" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 647). Places are not unproblematic, he pointed out; "diverse social experiences produce diverse and sometimes divergent perspectives" regarding the components and processes involved in places (Gruenewald, 2003a, p. 6). He pointed out that particular experience may legitimate particular forms of place.

> For example, although a farmer may be connected to the land, his or her experience of it may legitimate patterns of land use that are highly problematic, such as the application of pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides; promotion of erosion; compaction of the soil; and use of genetically modified organisms. Urban dwellers learn through experience the legitimacy of other forms, such as the ubiquitous pavement and all the extraction, consumption, and waste that it facilitates. (Gruenewald, 2003b, pp. 647-8)

Thus, place-conscious education must be conscious of all the discursive, political and economic forces involved in the place, and the relationship of particular places with other places, regions and the globe.

Haas and Nachtigal (1998) offered yet another framework for understanding place and "living well in place." However, I found the literature they reviewed to be predominantly rural-based and reliant on maintaining "community" as homogenous.[3] In particular, I question whether Haas and Nachtigal's framework alerts us to enough of the

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[3] Such constructions of "social cohesion" founded upon notions of shared values and commonality are extremely problematic and can reify differences themselves as the cause of problems, rather than our response to difference as the cause. This was a core conclusion in my research on racialization in Thunder Bay, Ontario and why it is important to problematize certain forms of community and social cohesion (Haluza-DeLay, 2002, 2006a).

drawbacks of place-boundedness and response to difference (Young, 1990). Gruenewald (2003a) notes the lack of multicultural awareness as a deficiency in most place-based education and a benefit of critical pedagogy. "Wherever one lives, reinhabitation will depend on identifying, affirming, conserving, and creating those forms of cultural knowledge that nurture and protect people and ecosystems" but not in exclusionary ways that privilege rootedness and tradition alone (Gruenewald, 2003a, p. 9).

Although we have complicated the notion of "place," there seems to be an important role in the development of environmental awareness for specific places themselves, based on the research into "significant life experiences" of environmentally active people (see the special issues on this topic, *Environmental Education Research*, 4 (4), 1998, and 5 (4), 1999).[4] Over and over in the environmental literature and among environmentalists, the importance of places and experiences in them is presented. For example, a longtime friend – a wildlife biologist turned professor of philosophy – commenting on my work, wrote,

> The subject ... intrigued me because of the importance my experiences of the natural world have had in shaping me. Some of my earliest memories (from ages 3-4) are of accompanying my dad to the marsh to hunt ducks and geese. I grew up with a deep sense of awe and wonder at the beauty of these places and the animals we hunted. (Personal communication, Peter Bergeron, November 9, 2000)

Kids will play, and find somewhere to do it. Pyle (1992) and Nabhan and Trimble (1995) represent the many writers that believe that with the loss of natural areas in which children can hunt frogs, build dams, and play freely, there occurs a general "extinction of experience" (Pyle, 1992, p. 61).[5] Nabhan and Trimble provided an accessible account of

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[4] These two issues are the original special issue on "significant life experiences" and a subsequent issue critical of that approach. I should be clear that there is no singular version of environmental education. Some EE is critical, some is not – probably most of what is actually conducted is not. Some focuses on nature, some on science, a little includes art or social studies. I observe that in practice a great deal of EE focuses on nature study or environmental science, without the societal analysis that I have increasingly come to see as crucial. Thanks to Dr. Connie Russell for pointing out that I may be setting up a straw figure of EE, the easier to knock down with criticisms.

[5] Another factor in the 'extinction of experience' is the increased perception of risk in society, such that children are less allowed to wander freely away from fenced backyards (Louv, 2005).

the value of special places in their collection of essays by two fathers reflexively considering their children's relationships with the natural world. Noting the significance of special places, these fathers described an essential role for direct experience of natural settings in the later development of environmental awareness. The importance of place on us as individuals is being demonstrated by the growing field of environmental psychology, as well as cultural geography. The question is whether it is places in which nature dominates, as Preston (2003) argues vociferously, or special places of any sort.

From this brief review, I make several observations. First, we live somePlace [sic]: "no one lives in the world in general" (Geertz, 1996). Second, Place is the ground of human experience; experiences shape our understandings and our practices. Third, Place is relational: a realm of actors, connections (including connections to other places), processes, and ideas and imaginations (Gille & O'Riain, 2002). This asks for theories of human ontology and being that are responsive to all relations in a place. Fourth, Place is deeply socio-cultural: a place is constructed, shared, and contested. Fifth, how then can we "live well in place" in such a complicated Place?

Experiential learning

Like place-conscious learning, experiential learning has been undertheorized, especially that which takes place outside formal schooling. Recently, Dillon (2003) complained about two aspects of Rickinson's (2001) review of environmental education: that Rickinson (and EE generally) ignored learning theory(s) and that he ignored "so-called" informal education. That experiential learning was relatively untheorized still in 2003 is of interest; motivated by the same concern seven years earlier, I had written an article on constructivist learning theory as the basis for experiential education (DeLay, 1996). Experiential learning is a learner-centred pedagogy, presumably built upon the primacy of learner experience in the forming of knowledge; constructivism highlights the active role of the learner in constructing her or his knowledge. Among the reasons for the ineffectiveness of environmental education is that its pedagogy has been theoretically uninformed, often focused on teacher-driven transmission of facts rather than either a

constructivist-like learning process or a more comprehensive socio-cultural analysis (Gigliotti, 1993; O'Sullivan, 1999; Robottom and Hart, 1993; Robertson, 1994; Russell, 1997).[6]

It is a commonplace to say that we learn from experience and that a great deal of learning occurs outside of formal institutions of education. Most of our beliefs, behaviours, thoughts and practices have been learned somewhere/somehow since birth, in a "time-consuming, cumulative process" (Falk, 2005, p. 269). Falk advocates more attention to "free-choice learning," those circumstances when the person has a motivation or interest, which can occur in a range of settings from formal education to the incidental. For creating effective learning situations we need a better understanding of how that learning occurs. Nevertheless, my intention here is not to extensively review theories of experiential learning; it is to lay out what resources can help us understand "learning" of socio-ecologically oriented relations or learning through social movement involvement. For the most part, such learning will not be formally educative. The learning is likely to be highly contextual, and the knowledge shaping will not necessarily have a pro-environmental orientation. Since my desire is toward developing the ecological society, useful learning theories have to be able to correspond with sociological theory, or inform development of the latter, rather than be individualistic.

Finally, since much of life's practices – toilet-training, reading comprehension, social interaction, recycling, not-littering, kissing – were once learned, then routinized and in a sense "forgotten" by the mind (but not the body), we need a notion of learning that does not rely only on thought. This latter point is one of the criticisms of constructivist theories of experiential learning, which are usually based on cognitive reflection focusing the learner's attention to that which is being learned (Fenwick, 2000). Furthermore, while no one would completely deny a role for cognition, since many of our practices operate at a routinized or "pre-logical" level (Wacquant, 2004), there must be

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[6] I do not dispute that there are some good environmental education strategies – such as the action oriented one espoused by Stapp, Wals, & Stankorb (1996) – just that much EE has been superficial and inadequate in practice.

room for other processes than reflection.

As should be clear by now, I maintain that there is no point to making a distinction between such types as formal, informal, nonformal, or incidental learning. These refer more to the site or provider of learning opportunities than the learning itself (Falk, 2005; Le Cornu, 2005). "Stated bluntly, there is no convincing evidence that the fundamental processes of learning differ solely as a function of the physical setting or the institution supporting the learning" (Falk, 2005, p. 271). It is a focus on the learner that we want, not the setting. In fact, the settings can be myriad and take all forms. The source of much learning is impossible to pinpoint. With this in mind, we move rapidly from Orr's "All education is environmental education" to "all life is environmental education," and closer to Bourdieusian insights about how our internalised and routinized orientations are learned in the social context of social conditions in which they "make sense." For this reason, Marsick and Watkins (2001) referred to "incidental" learning – learning as a byproduct of another activity – as a productive avenue.

In a similar fashion, Le Cornu (2005) built a model of experiential learning that emphasizes the process of internalisation. In all the experiential learning theories she reviews, "reflection" is invoked. Yet research shows that learning is multifaceted and complex, that it is not a sequential or linear process, and that we "learn" or are affected by all experiences, whether we think about them or not. So, whether conscious or unconscious to the learner (who is, by the way, fully immersed in a social context and not an independent, autonomous thinker of the Cartesian variety), learning "must be understood as the gradual transformation of knowledge into *knowing*, and part of that transformation involves a deepening internalisation to the point that people and their 'knowing' are totally integrated one with the other" (Le Cornu, 2005, p. 175, emphasis added). Much of what we know is part of our bank of tacit knowledge. This has considerable implications for the development of a routinely environmentally attuned lifestyle.

Le Cornu's focus on internalisation demonstrates that there are other theories of experiential learning than the reflection-focused, constructivist versions that

predominate. Fenwick (2000) did a masterful job of comparing and contrasting constructivism and four other contemporary perspectives on experiential learning. It is not necessary for us to review these approaches here; a summary will suffice as Fenwick concluded that all help explain portions of the experiential process and "producing a synthesis of these five perspectives in terms of their implications for educators is both impossible and theoretically unsound" (p. 265).

A *constructivist* perspective is the cognitive work of the (generally) autonomous learner, generally divorced from social context. A *psychoanalytic* perspective involves the "interference" of conscious, unconscious, emotion and thought so that learning is done by desire "working through these conflicts" (Fenwick, 2000, p. 251). The perspective of *situated cognition* is that all learning is contextual-dependent and communal (even if others are not present, social norms, conventions, and beliefs are), that we do not learn *from* experience, we learn *in* experience (p. 254). The emancipatory or *critical cultural* perspective "centers power as the core issue" (p. 256) under the view that without critical analysis learning would be oppressively conditioned by discourses and cultural capital that are accorded dominance as the appropriately "high-status" knowledge.[7] Finally, the *enactivist* perspective corporealizes knowledge, taking it further than mere situatedness. The learner and setting are co-emergent, individual ego is dissolved "for human processes apparently bounded by the individual body... can be considered subsumed within larger systems" (p. 262).

What this review of experiential learning shows is that ultimately we are embodied creatures, who do build knowledge upon the core of experience, and may incorporate it into our lives. Furthermore, learning is very complicated. And it does further validate the notion that learning can occur through something as informally educative as a social movement or involvement with an environmental organization. Insights from experiential education useful for this study are the significance of

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[7] I have intentionally used this term from Bowers' voluminous writing, thus placing him alongside this perspective despite his extensive criticisms of emancipatory and Freiran education. Methinks he doth protest too much sometimes (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b).

incidental learning, learning that is not reflection-driven, and knowing as an active and ongoing process rather than endpoint.

Social Movements and Learning

Social movements are often considered an important source of new thinking and a site of learning (Conway, 2004; Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Finger, 1989; Foley, 1999; Holford, 1995; Holst, 2002; Jarvis, 1998; Kilgore, 1999; Mayo, 1999; Welton, 1993). Oddly, this has been an under-researched area, particularly for social movement scholars, although a few adult educators have begun to examine it (Hall & Turay, 2006). In this research project I conceptualize social movements as "insurgent realities" (Lofland, 1996). The research draws on both the concept of social movements as "cognitive praxis" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991) and recent use of the sociological concepts of Pierre Bourdieu (1990a, 1990b) to rework social movement theory (Crossley, 2002) and environmentalism (Smith, 2001).

Social Movement Theory and Environmentalism

Social movement theory is varied (Della Porta, 1999; Yearley, 1994).[8] The term "social movement" has come to refer to a distinct process over time to alter perceptions, attitudes, and even laws around a specific theme. Social movements refer to broad sweeping trends. They aim to bring about change in a political or social sphere, and are typically more or less organized around a particular issue, often consisting of networks of interest groups, social movement organizations, and individuals. Examples include nationalism movements, the civil rights movement, women's and indigenous cultural movements, family values, labour and even self-help movements. Social movements are often "protest" movements that propose alternatives or resistance to socio-political hegemony. Although often seen as progressive, the examples above show social movements span the socio-political spectrum (Lofland, 1996).

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[8] This and the following paragraph are taken from Haluza-DeLay (2003).

A number of theories regarding the development and function of social movements have been proposed (Crossley, 2002; Della Porta, 1999). Now out of favour, collective behaviour theories involve the convergence of like-minded people, often motivated by social strain to protest for alternatives. Resource mobilisation theory focuses on movements as rational weighing of benefits and costs (social change versus marginalisation). Political opportunity theory focuses on social movements as contentions with authority in ways that fit the existing opportunities. New social movement (NSM) theorists argue that older social movements tended to be organized around class or direct political action (e.g., labour) while NSMs coalesce around symbolic construction of identity (e.g., multiculturalism, feminism). Some theorists argue that there is little "new" about NSMs except the involvement of new actors, especially women and people of other cultural backgrounds. One difference is that there is less expectation or attempt by organizations labelled as NSMs to try to capture political power as there was by organizations seen as old social movements.

Environmental groups are generally classified as NSMs, and some theorists have asserted that sensitivity to environmental concerns is a fundamental part of most current NSMs. As an example, Watts' (1998) case study of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria – founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa who was later hung by the Nigerian government – showed that environmental action was used as an organizing strategy in a way that incorporated cultural, political and social concerns that "far transcend even the most catholic sense of environment" (p. 261). Welton (1993) explained that NSMs react to incursions into the lifeworld, often supported by colonisation efforts of advanced capitalism, and that Nature has been most clearly colonized for the longest period of history. Other scholars have noted the "impressive staying power" of environmentalism and suggested it as a contemporary social movement with a high level of public support (Kempton, Boster & Hartley, 1995; Mertig & Dunlap, 2001). Several scholars have suggested that NSMs generally and environmentalism particularly have arisen in "post-material" societies. In this thesis, Inglehart (1990) proposed that societies shift from the promotion of material well-being

as they develop economically to higher order "post-material" values, such as protecting the environment and quality of life. Some studies have shown that supporters of environmentalism (defined and measured variously, such as membership in environmental organizations, recycling, attitude toward recycling, willingness to pay higher prices for goods, support for protected lands, and so on) tend to be middle income, white, well-educated and in white-collar occupations. From this perspective, environmentalism is a social movement of knowledge-oriented societies or value systems that no longer have survival needs as a primary focus. However, recent survey data from Mertig and Dunlap (2001) showed little support for this thesis. Much of the earlier survey research may have been limited because of how the researchers ascertained environmental support. Furthermore, environmental justice campaigns have expanded what has been socially constructed as an "environmental" issue and brought more people of colour or low income into "environmentalism" (Agyeman, 2005; Pulido, 2000; Taylor, 2000). Finally, environmental social movements in the developing world (such as MOSOP) also call this thesis into question (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans, 2002; Watts, 1998; Yearley,1994).

Most social movement theorizing has focused on what social movements do – exploit opportunities, mobilize resources, coordinate collective identity, frame messages – rather than the substantive components of what the movement stands for or what changes are specifically sought. Aberle's (1966) typology is still relevant (Lofland, 1996). The typology is organized according to the degree of change sought (partial/total) and the target of change (individual/group or society) (Figure 1).

Different forms of environmentalism fit into each of these categories. That which targets personal behaviour change, such as recycling, is *alterative*. Advocates of individuals going "back-to-nature" would be a *redemptive* movement. Proposals for "ecological modernization" of current practices, such as a carbon-tax, or car-free zones in cities, would be *reformative*. Paradigmatic change leading to revolutionary restructuring of social institutions, such as deep ecology or the novel *Ecotopia* (Callenbach, 1973)

would be *transformative*. As already noted, I believe that the degree of ecological impact being seen in the planet indicates that transformative change is necessary. Partial changes seem unlikely to be adequate to alter the rapacious practices of global capitalism. Furthermore, without "dropping out" it is hard to redeem an individual in an

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Degree of change</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td>Partial</td><td>Total</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Target of change</td><td>Individual</td><td>ALTERATIVE</td><td>REDEMPTIVE</td></tr>
<tr><td>Society</td><td>REFORMATIVE</td><td>TRANSFORMATIVE</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 1. Aberle's (1966) typology of social movements.

untransformed society. This becomes another reason for looking for theory that can bridge the agency-structure divide in sociological theory and for pursuing the learning potential of social movements. Yearley's (1994) conclusion is that given the vast heterogeneity of collective actions that can be classed as "social movements," description rather than definition is more meaningful.

Among the numerous approaches to social movements, Lofland's (1996) perspective is that social movements are "insurgent realities" that provide "collective challenges to mainstream conceptions of how society ought to be organized and how people ought to live" (p. 1). Social movements engage the social field (or fields), to contest what is dominant and communicate their alternative. Lofland quoted Blumer (1957), "A movement has to be constructed and has to carve out a career in what is practically always an opposed, resistant, or at least indifferent world" (p. 370). Blumer listed a number of characteristics of movements, including "the intelligent translation of ideology into homely and gripping form" (quoted in Lofland, p. 370). By this description, social movements are engaged in pedagogic activity as they teach their version of the

"better" reality and its knowledge. The pedagogical activity is several fold – with the membership as the committed, the supportive and the mildly interested learn more about the insurgent reality, with the general public outside the association of the social movement, and within the fields of power which the social movement engages. As Lofland (1996) explained,

> In asserting realities that challenge mainstream constructions, SMOs are highly intellectual affairs. They must develop rationales, defend against detractors, spell out preferred courses of action, and so on through the range of matters entailed in argumentation on the true, the moral, and the reasonable. (p. 39)

However, social movements do not incorporate theories, they incorporate discourses: "ways of conceiving of and talking about social experience that are often fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and frequently founded on only partially conscious assumptions" (Thayer, 1999, p. 208). Furthermore, learning goes beyond the framing actions done by movement intellectuals. Thayer researched how the American feminist book, seminar series and organization/movement *Our Bodies, Our Selves* was taken up by Latin American feminist activists. Over time, the Latina activists developed a manner of using the material that was more appropriate for the particular context, and for the women with whom they worked. Discourses became social practices, for both activists and less involved participants; learning occurred. Social movement scholars would do well to examine these processes.

Theorizing about Learning in Social Movements

Although social movements are sites of learning, there is limited research in social movement learning, especially environmental social movements. Foley (1999) asserted that educators tend to focus overmuch on individual learners, educational provision and formal content rather than the incidental learning more often present in social movements. Foley also asserted that politically oriented social movement scholars are not professionally attuned to the learning processes of transformative change. Holst (2002) argued that educational researchers generally dismiss learning through social movements. He provided three reasons: a) social movements are viewed as political

rather than educative; b) educational research often ignores the informal learning that occurs in everyday life; and, c) trends in adult education, such as professionalization and workplace training, limit researchers' attention.

Academic boundaries also mediate research into learning processes in social movements. Kilgore (1999) referenced only three items (two very peripherally) from the social movements literature in developing her theory of learning in social movements. Similarly, social movement scholars, despite all their talk about framing, collective identity and cultural change, appear to have paid little attention to the adult education literature on learning in social movements. In a book on knowledge production in a social movement, Conway (2004) cites no scholars of learning or even the sociology of knowledge literature. Sociologists have paid attention to the ways the movement messages have been "taken up" by others, but without calling that learning. Research on the debate about climate change, for example, show the sometimes mis-educative processes, as scientific "facts" are contested in political and epistemic arenas and denial is fertilized with doubt. This highlights the social production of knowledge and the "learning" aspects of the contentions.

Among the few sociologists who take seriously the idea of social movements as incubators of learning are Eyerman and Jamison (1991). They have suggested that a distinction between social movements and "mere" pressure groups is that social movements engage in "cognitive praxis" with members and the public. By cognitive praxis, Eyerman and Jamison meant "producers of knowledge," alternatives and innovations in thought and practice. In their analysis, social movements have particular ways for knowledge creation and dissemination, such that a social movement is its cognitive praxis. A key aspect of the movement, then, is the degree to which its ideas are "taken up" by the broader society. Movements are temporary, until their cognitive praxis is absorbed, coopted, rejected or splintered. If absorbed by the broader society, the movement will die out because it is not so different than the surrounding culture. If its cognitive praxis is rejected, the movement is reified in a marginal position. Therefore, social movements are not just sites of learning, but central to the development of society

through the production of social innovations and ideas. One of the case studies used for demonstration is the analysis of the American civil rights movement. Another was the environmental movement. This process of knowledge production "should be seen as a collective process" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 43). Similarly, Kilgore (1999) asserted that collective learning is the means by which knowledge is produced in social movements, as does Conway (2004) in a highly informative ethnography of the anti-globalization movement in Toronto in the 1990s. Social movements are "epistemic communities" according to Eyerman and Jamison.

Eyerman and Jamison elaborated cognitive praxis as the production of knowledge in three dimensions. The first dimension was basic beliefs, which they term *cosmological*. The *technical* dimension referred to knowledge of specific social movement activities, such as protest or speaking with politicians. The *organizational* dimension includes different forms of social relations, and democratization of social structures and knowledge production. An important further characteristic of Eyerman and Jamison's approach was the recognition that the cognitive praxis of the social movement develops and changes, in reaction to the social field in which it engages. Finally, as noted above, this trajectory leads to a final disposition of the knowledge generated by the movement, whether it is absorbed or rejected by the broader culture in which it is engaged.

Several criticisms of the emphasis on cognitive praxis are important here. Holst (2002) criticized an overemphasis on knowledge production, arguing that knowledge is to be a tool for political praxis – knowledge production in social movements is to change the world. "The concept of cognitive praxis provides a framework for a theory of adult education in social movements, yet it must be tempered by an analysis of the relationship between cognitive *and* political praxis" Holst wrote (p. 83, emphasis in original). However, it would appear to me that the instrumentality of the knowledge produced is apparent in the technological and organizational dimensions of Eyerman and Jamison's schema.

Holst is explicitly Marxist (even to the point of dismissing neo-Marxism). One of

several key points in the book was the difference between the progressivism of "radical pluralists" and the revolutionary nature of socialists. Radical pluralists are those social democratic progressives who espouse incremental social change or who engage in peace or environmental or feminist or multicultural "campaigns of the month" (the New Social Movements, and critical cultural educators exemplified by such as Freire and Giroux). Holst continued,

> Adult educators who base their social analysis on radical pluralist theory are developing theories of education within social movements that address identity and cultural formation, yet their theories will remain inadequate while they fail to problematize relations of power based in political economy. (p. 87)

Nonetheless, traditional Marxist analyses may also be insufficient for an improved ecocentrism in the humanity-earth relationship, despite recent attempts to demonstrate an ecological legacy in Marxism (e.g., Foster, 2002). Marxism rests on the same Enlightenment humanism and paradigm that saw the natural world as primarily natural capital for the economic engine. However, Holst's materialist analysis reinforced the importance of focussing on material practices rather than discursive practices. Although Judith Butler (1993) has highlighted how discourse can alter the social relations that constitute social fields, discourse and language are, in my view, one type of social practice, not necessarily to be privileged over others.[9]

A further criticism is that Eyerman and Jamison focus overmuch on the cognitive element of practice. As we have seen, learning includes noncognitive internalisations. Cognition is only one aspect, and not always central.

A final problem with highlighting the intellectual efforts of social movements is an overemphasis on the work of movement elites. While "movement intellectuals" have a

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[9] This is the flaw in Kilgore's (1999) theorization also. Kilgore correctly identified that learning in social movements is a collective effort rather than the typical formation of learning theory as individually centred. However, this process of collective learning – based on what Holst criticized as the "radical pluralist" tendency of NSMs – comes down to the collective learning of a collective identity. Holst did not believe that collective identity is a strong enough counter to the class-based political economic forces powers that he considered far more powerful and oppressive. Similarly, Foley (1999) argued that any social movement learning that does not situate itself in an analysis of the political economic context will be inadequate to develop transformative knowledge. He argued that discourse oriented "post-structural" movements and theorists reduce complex historical processes to changes in language or ideas.

role in social movements and socio-cultural change, focusing on them runs the risk of ignoring the organic knowledge production and logic of practice of social movements. Holford (1995) picked up on Eyerman and Jamison's idea of movement intellectuals, but as Foley (1999) criticized strongly, distorted it into an elitist position. In response to Holford's suggestion that we need research on the educative function of such intellectuals, Foley insisted we would be better studying the informal learning that occurs in the activities and practices of social movements. "People's everyday experience reproduces ways of thinking and acting which support the, often oppressive, status quo, but... this same experience also produces recognitions which enable people to critique and challenge the existing order" (Foley, 1999, pp. 3-4). The challenge is to help people learn to recognize how the existing order co-creates their experiences, and gain the ability for both personal and societal transformation.

This will be even more challenging given societal trends that reduce the transformative potential of social movement learning. Such trends in late modernity include increasing privatization of the lifeworld (even in the face of advanced capitalist incursion) and individualism – the "myth of self-actualization" (Jansen & Wildemeersch, 1998). Holst (2002) repeatedly emphasizes the significance and necessity of a clearly thought out ideology or philosophy of praxis. My assessment is that environmental social movements seem to be in reactive, short-sighted, and fragmentary campaigns to which this grander vision of sociological change is the antidote.

Finger's (1989) proposals showed exactly this deficiency. Although he wrote, "Faced with unprecedented threats to the whole biosphere, new movements seek ways to overcome what they see as the crisis caused by the failure of modernity" (p. 16), his solution is too limited. For Finger, the educative value of new social movements is foremost for personal transformation, which may later cause societal change. The social movement educative role Finger postulates seems an unlikely route to successful social change because it focuses on transformation of individuals irrespective of any social context that may support maintenance of such transformation. Without conscious analysis of the social structures and their internalisation, and without an alternative vision

of society in which to embed the personal transformation, the project seems doomed to frustration.

Welton (1993) improved on Finger by refusing to separate personal fulfilment from collective action. He emphasized that the NSM quest for liberation and autonomy is intended to open up democratization and participation. The animal rights movements could be seen as opposing "speciesism" that de-voices nonhumans as it disallows their participation in human socio-political and ethical systems that have such consequences on individual animals, species, ecosystems and biosphere. "They are trying to unlearn an older form of identity inherited from the Enlightenment; an anthropocentric conception of humankind's relationship to nature and each other" (Welton, 1993, p. 157). Thus the contrast with "older social movements" is not that NSMs reject political action, only that seizing control of institutional politics is less of interest than the "personal is political" politicization that comes from innovating new ways of relating across differences or identities.

Still, Finger did point out some learning facets of NSMs. Participants experience an engagement that is both phenomenologically and pragmatically experiential. That is, they engage such that identity concerns "cannot be separated from a person's experienced life, nor from his or her social commitment" (Finger, 1989, p. 21), and they learn from the doing of social activism. He did not otherwise articulate processes by which this learning occurs. Neither did Welton, Holford or other educational scholars, so we are left with no better guess as to which of the experiential learning facets briefly sketched above are productive.

Other sociological trends are even more challenging for those who would be interested in deliberately structuring social movement activism for pedagogical intent. Among the lessons of this stage of modernity is that "planning, rationality and education are insufficient to produce the utopian vision of the future" (Jarvis, 1998, p. 71). Rationality itself is questioned. Sociologists have picked up on this in the theories of reflexive modernization – essentially that the conditions of modernity lead to a continuous, and ultimately unmanageable, process of reorganization and rethinking how

to be (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). Furthermore, potential learners can access information much more directly via technology, bypassing educators. "It is now a learning society, even if it is not an educative one," wrote Jarvis (1998). But "What is the learning?" one may question, as it is likely to be guided by the dominant and already embodied paradigms, as Bowers and Orr argued. Bombardment by commercial mass media, including advertising, "teaches" many falsehoods. I have already pointed out the "miseducative" effects of climate change reporting. "We all know" that actors on social issues promulgate knowledge that serves organizational goals rather than free and open decisions on the issues, thus increasing cynicism and distrust (Holford, 1995). In addition, this information glut does not necessarily lead to knowledgeable security, as per Beck's (1992) assessment of the (perceived or actual) precariousness of life in late modernity as the "risk society."

Research on Learning in Social Movements

I do not want to make too much of the lack of research that takes an explicit "learning" angle on or in social movements. There is research on the intentional education that goes on in social movements, such as workshops and popular education. More useful for this project is research on incidental learning as social movements go about their operations. Other researchers have considered the socio-cultural impact of social movements, although less so than the research on political outcomes (Earl, 2004). However, to speculate on the learning or knowledge production aspects would be inappropriate on my part in the absence of detailed data and a comprehensive theory of social movement learning. In this part of the review I will only look at literature that bears directly on learning/knowledge in social movements. The two best studies are Foley's (1999) treatment of several case studies, and Janet Conway's (2004) book-length ethnography of a social justice network in Toronto.

Foley (1999), an adult educator, reviewed six cases studies he had conducted over his career in order to form some understanding of "learning in social action." The cases included organizing for women's rights in Brazil, contesting colonial racism in

Zimbabwe, fighting for a woman's shelter in the United States, and a worker's movement in Australia. Another chapter focused on environmental activists ten years after their fight to protect the Terania Creek rainforest. They described learning such things as how the political system worked, what human nature was like, how to create consensus and a different organizational structure among the protestors and how to maintain one's energy and self-awareness. Foley did not categorize the learning, although made a list of nearly twenty types of learning, that he said roughly fall into either "skills and knowledge" or "conscientization" or "perspective transformation" (Mezirow, 1991.) Unfortunately, Foley made little attempt to go beyond mere description in this case, or to address paradigmatic learnings or the intentional creation of learning occasions. Nevertheless,

> These learnings are significant and empowering. They are also incidental to, or embedded in, the action taken by the activists... We are talking here about *informal learning in social action*, or to put it in a more political way, learning in the struggle. (Foley, 1999, p. 39, emphasis in original)

Through these case studies, Foley makes a number of observations about such learning in social movements. It is typically incidental, latent and usually not recognized as learning by the participants. Some of the learning was previously acknowledged, but this tended to be the technical skills or technical knowledge, such as forest ecology, needed to communicate with media, politicians or foresters. Therefore, the participants in the study were reflectively aware of the knowledge production process, but a great deal was internalized. Foley wrote that they were often "surprised and delighted at the learning that was revealed" through the research process (p. 3). Finally, Foley highlighted the crucial role for the learning process of engaging with opposition in the learning process in social activism. It seems that the experience of opposition set conditions for a *desire* to figure out what was going on, the social context for the learning that needed to occur, and a crucible to test the knowledge being developed. These observations seemed to transcend the cases. Nevertheless, Foley concluded that learning in the struggle will always be connected to its context, a context that includes the socio-economic and political forces and discourses that affect places and link places (and struggles).

Despite the overwhelming focus on knowledge production in the study produced

by Conway (2004), the political scientist did not reference any of the adult education literature described above on social movement learning, nor refer to Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) work on cognitive praxis. Her research thesis was "Social movements such as the MNSJ [Metro Network on Social Justice] produce knowledges and in practice and through experimentation, these knowledges are forging post-neoliberal alternatives" (Conway, 2004, p. 2). The MNSJ was a coalition of activist agencies that organized in the City of Toronto against municipal and provincial restructuring of government, programs and finances. Conway detailed the movement's deliberations about tactics, organization, message frames, and vision during the approximate years of 1994-1997. A distinct tension in the organization was between those who sought more mass activism, and those who wished for the organization to engage in economic and political literacy (EPL) education. For a while, the MNSJ ran a number of deliberately educational programs. These involved workshops that sought to educate those outside the movement, as well as advanced, in-house seminars for committed activists.

Social movement knowledge is "largely tacit, practical and unsystematic," Conway concluded (p. 8). While many experiential education scholars have highlighted reflection as the key to knowledge production, Conway's detailed analysis showed that activist culture led to certain forms of knowledge productions. For instance, the movement nearly splintered over the challenge to the conventional practices of protest politics that would have occurred by formally emphasizing the EPL work. While the EPL faction sought to build a long-term grassroots conscientization about the socio-political climate (framed as "neo-liberalism"), this was considered contrary to the never-explicit practices of the coalition as protest workers, not "passive" educators. The culture of activism appears important. Ross (2005) also noted his expertise, even that of a seasoned activist turned scholar, had no impact on the "embedded ideas" of activists, and Meyer (2005), reflecting on his own activism, observed "ideology, habit and superstition substitute for information" (especially when information is provisional or missing) for activists, himself included. Thus, experiential learning in a social movement will not be all about reflection; internalisation, represented by tacit knowledge, will be significant

(Le Cornu, 2005).

> The practical implications of recognizing the nature and importance of tacit knowledge are enormous for understanding how social movements might more purposefully and effectively reproduce themselves and their politics, practices and knowledges beyond their immediate times and places. Recognizing tacit knowledges is also relevant for the nature of praxis within any particular activist context. (Conway, 2004, p. 164)

Conway pointed out that reflection occurred, and was important, but that it was "still very focused on the campaign at hand and on how to improve different aspects for future practice imagined in similar terms. There was little capacity or appetite... to tease out deeper implications" (Conway, 2004, p. 164). Even the understanding of the neoliberal frame of opposition was not particularly reflected upon, which made it harder for people with a social analysis that was different than this political economic masterframe of the left to become consistently part of the movement (p. 223). This may have contributed to the persistent inability to attract "diversity" to the movement.

Despite the intentionally educative workshops, advanced seminars and so on, Conway found that movement knowledge was still "largely tacit, practical and unsystematic." I do not mean to suggest that this is inadequate or a poorer condition. This finding demonstrates that knowledge has a social character, and the social movement forms a field in which an activist habitus is generated, which in turn shapes the movement field.

Conway identified three distinct "modes of knowing" anchored in activist practice. First, the tacit knowledge produced from everyday practice; second, praxis, that is, knowledge arising from practices systematically reflected upon and utilized; third, movement-based interpretation of the world. It was this last mode of knowing, which served as the MNSJ's chief contribution to social knowledge, and, in Conway's analysis, was rejected by an increasingly neoliberal city. Knowing Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) work, we could call these the MNSJ's cognitive praxis. The movement dwindled as its cognitive praxis was effectively rejected and became further marginalized.

Learning in social movements operates in several forms, which each scholar has

labelled differently. Conway's three modes of knowing are reminiscent of Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) three dimensions of cognitive praxis although there are differences. In fact, other research teams also proposed social movement knowledge systems with considerable similarity (Figure 2).

<table>
<tr><th>Eyerman & Jamison (1991)</th><th>Branagan & Boughton (2003)</th><th>Holst (2002)</th><th>Conway (2004)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Cosmological (basic beliefs)</td><td>Emancipatory</td><td rowspan="2">General</td><td>Movement-based interpretation of world</td></tr>
<tr><td>Organizational (altered forms of social relations)</td><td>Communicative</td><td>Praxis</td></tr>
<tr><td>Technological (movement specific activities)</td><td>Instrumental (skills development)</td><td>Technicist</td><td>Tacit</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 2. Comparison of terminology and knowledge types among social movement learning scholars.

Branagan and Boughton (2003) reflected on their self-learning in the Australian peace movement. They articulated three categories: *instrumental* (technical skills development), *interpretive or communicative* (people-related skills, such as communication, problem-solving and organizational), and *emancipatory* (changes to world view).[10] The latter category they compare to "conscientization" and "perspective transformation." Branagan and Boughton briefly referenced "situated cognition" as a learning theory, saying that it combines explicit knowledge with tacit knowledge of the context in which the explicit knowledge was learned, but they did not elaborate further. Presaging Holst's criticisms, Branagan and Boughton also argued that learning that

[10] Interestingly, these three categories follow Habermas' three types of knowledge interests, although Branagan and Boughton do not note this. Habermas was also one of the earliest theorists to label "new social movements" (NSMs) and speculate on their role in contemporary late capitalism.

includes all three dimensions is neither "pluralist, nor structuralist, reformist or revolutionary" and that these dichotomies are irrelevant, because such education is both.

Branagan and Boughton's categories were nearly identical to those developed by Eyerman and Jamison. Conway's categories were less about the content of the knowledge produced than the mode by which what is known is expressed. Therefore, since some learning was tacitly known and some was personally praxeological (practice reflected upon), Conway's categories combined categories used by others. Foley's case studies of learning in environmental activism tended to focus on what Eyerman and Jamison called the technological and Holst termed the technicist details of operating a social movement in protest and action. Holst did not elaborate on these forms of knowledge, but did emphasize that radical social movements must intentionally do technicist educating to enable the workers to manage the details when they gain power. For the most part, these categorizations refer to content of learning, and not to processes.

In the social movement literature, I'd like to highlight two chapters of a recent book that both address learning in ways that show the situation-contextual, incidental and multi-faceted nature of knowledge production in social movements. Feree, Sperling and Risman (2005) were engaged by a Russian women's network to help facilitate a conference and network development. Among the facets that the Russian federation wished to develop was a more participatory culture. The American academics realized that the existing culture of this group fell along lines of a "culture of lecture" while they were accustomed to a "culture of conversation." The Russians typically did not listen to each other, cut each other off, used a referee's whistle to signal the end of a speech turn, monopolized the floor and lectured didactically during open floor sessions rather than engaging in a more dialogue-like manner. Feree, Sperling and Risman observed that civil society depends on developing democratic skills and participation, and that social movements can be a space in which to learn these. In fact, the seemingly autocratic whistle was intended to lead to more participation. The authors noted that social movement scholars may overlook the important role of "cultural resources" for social movement groups and that this would be detrimental for effective understanding of the

movement and the member's operation and modes of knowing.

Charlotte Ryan (2005) was also engaged by an organization to help it develop techniques. In this case a Rhode Island network against domestic violence sought to better respond to current events and the media. Ryan developed ad hoc "media caucuses" at the organization; anyone available would take part for a short time whenever an event hit the news and collectively craft a response to the event. The results were several. First, it developed "a learning culture" in the organization. Second, a wider range of staff learned a wider range of skills through incidental participation in the media caucuses. Third, not only skills, but relational, discursive and ideological learnings took place. Fourth, the individuals forged a zone of "connected knowing" wherein "personal transformative and social transformative reinforce each other" (p. 132).

As Ryan assessed it, the process of collectively framing a message created a "counternarrative" that both presented a counter-hegemonic worldview, and established altered social relations, becoming a collective actor rather than collection of individual ones. "Tentatively, provisionally, participants in the framing process experience counterhegemony lived. Thus, the collective actor functions simultaneously within an existing culture and an imagined better world" (p. 133). Social movement learning is peculiarly collective (Foley, 1999; Kilgore, 1999).

There are a number of observations from this literature that move the present study forward. First, those scholars interested in learning in social movements have focused more on what was learned than how this learning occurred. Several types of learning have been articulated, including a paradigmatic component that may or may not include a critique of existing socio-cultural forces such as capitalism. Second, there has been an attempt to grasp both formalized and informal modes of knowledge production in the social movements, especially that which has been called incidental learning. Third, the situational context, organizational culture or collectiveness of the learning process is part of the process. As some scholars have argued, social movements can serve as sites of innovations, or social experiments, or public spaces for the imagination of alternatives to the dominant ways of thinking or being. These cultural facets have a dimension of tacit

knowledge, which points us toward interactions of social context and internalisations, especially as incidental learning in social movements. Fourth, the roles of reflection, tacit or incidental knowing, and internalisation are uncertain and clearly need further analysis. Finally, because of the social position of social movements, the significance of engaging with opposition is highlighted. This facet would seem meaningful for learning in social movements and might affect any of the other observations.

The disadvantage in all these studies is that they have for the most part focused on activists involved in campaigns, rather than the everyday learnings involved in a social movement, particularly an environmental one. The environmental movement has maintained that the everyday lifestyle of the citizen is part of the issue and part of the solution. And given the significance of the everyday habitus by which people's regular practices are organized, such learnings may be more important than the "heat of battle" environmental campaigning.

Conclusion

Socio-environmental stresses are substantial, yet much social theory has paid little attention to the environment in a substantive way, rather than as an off-shoot of social problems to be analysed as one might analyse any other mundane aspect of society. I have argued that education, as currently operating, is neither the only site for environmentally oriented learning to occur, nor the best site. Place-conscious, experiential and social movement learning were reviewed for understandings that may be useful in advancing a sociologically robust approach to the incidental learning that must precede the routinization of environmental practices.

A place-based approach has value because as human beings we are embodied and emplaced, rather than being disembodied thinking creatures (Preston, 2003). Place is the ground of human experience and practice as we all live somewhere. Place is also a complex set of socio-ecological relations, meanings and features (Cresswell, 2004). Place-conscious education has taken many forms. Its chief benefit is its contextualizing of the learning process and the knowledge formed, but it runs the risk of being place-

bound or simply inadequate for a globally interconnected world with highly mobile people, regardless of the potential importance of understanding the contextualization of ecology.

When coupled with an understanding of learning from experience, a place-conscious approach makes even more sense. Much learning is informal and incidental. Theories of experiential learning are generally "situated," with the social environment and context being important, rather than decontextualized knowledge. While most theories of experiential learning emphasize the role of cognitive reflection on experience, Le Cornu (2005) highlights the importance of internalisation. Since the intent of this project is to develop an understanding of routinized environmental praxis, this seems like a fruitful route. Recognition of learning from experience also validates the usefulness of researching other venues for learning, such as involvement in environmental groups or social movement organizations.

As insurgent realities, social movements are trying to educate about alternate realities with different values than the dominant habitus. This then is not a rational task because it does not depend on the reason of the prevailing logic of practice, or not a rational task only. In the words of Bauman, it is "not safe in the hands of reason," (quoted in Jarvis, 1998, p. 71). I suggest a need for transformative rather than individualistic or reform environmentalism.

Again, scholars have highlighted the often tacit nature of learning in this environment. This finding would seem to contradict Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) depiction of social movements as generative of a cognitive praxis, until we realize that cognitive praxis is at the level of the social movement while at the level of the involved member the cognitive praxis of the organization may very well be tacit (Conway, 2004; Foley, 1999). Scholars have described various types of knowledge forms produced by "learning in action" including basic cosmological beliefs, new organizational forms and movement specific practices. Implicit in much of this research is that learning is produced in opposition to dominant social paradigms and practices. The learning still occurs within the context of the "movement," including but not limited to movement

organizations. A weakness of much research on social movement learning is that the research has primarily focused on heavily involved activists, rather than "regular" environmentally active people. In conclusion, this review shows the validity of investigating social learning, or routinization of an environmental logic of practice, associated with involvement in environmental organizations. So, let's get on with it!

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The practice of environmentalism: Creating ecological habitus

This paper draws on Bourdieu's sociological approach to expand social movement theory, while offering a sociologically robust direction for movements themselves. Given the relatively ineffectual position of environmentalism in North America, I argue that the environmental movement would be better served by conceptualizing itself as working to create an ecological habitus. Co-generated within its social field, habitus conveys cultural encoding yet in a non-deterministic manner. The habitus of a less-than-environmentally-aware society are problematic. Bourdieu's theory of practice is compared with Eyerman and Jamison's notion of social movements as cognitive praxis, in order to develop a more useful synthesis for a broadly based habitus of environmental practice. In this approach, environmental social movement organizations become the social space in which this new, ecologically more appropriate, logic of practice can be "caught" through the informal or incidental learning that occurs as a result of participation with social movement organizations.

An obvious conclusion of the considerable environmental degradation now evident is that environmentalism has been less than effective in changing attitudes, lifestyles and social structures that constitute the rapacious appetite of contemporary society, despite considerable effort and evidence of environmental decline. This paper will draw on the sociological thought of Pierre Bourdieu to expand the way that we conceptualize social movements, with a focus on environmentalism. It draws on Bourdieu's concept of habitus to explain why environmental social change has been so difficult: in an environmentally unsound society transformation of the habitus in more ecologically appropriate ways will be very difficult. By building on Lofland's idea of social movements as "insurgent realities" and Eyerman and Jamison's description of the "cognitive praxis" of social movements, Bourdieu's sociological tools expand our understanding of the flaws and potentials of environmentalism. A Bourdieusian "theory of practice" suggests explicit attention to social movement involvement as a site of social learning that changes the habitus, that is, develops an environmentally-aware *modus vivendi*.

Parson (2001) began an edited volume on Canadian environmental policy by questioning whether incremental improvements (ecological modernization) or paradigmatic changes were required to address contemporary environmental needs. Environmental organizations vary widely in their orientations, and in what they perceive as organizational or movement goals. Saving particular natural areas, changing lifestyles, promoting an ecological worldview change, sustainability policy battles, sustainable development, recycling and green consumerism are among the foci for various environmental social movement organizations (ESMOs). Rucht (1999) described the effect of this diversity as the "paradox of success and failure" (p. 205) The environmental movement has shifted attention to environmental issues – although primarily just on individual levels – without having much impact on large-scale environmental degradation. Some analyses have seen the problem being deeper than movement strategy, implicating a cultural worldview that, they argue, permeates Euro-American societies (e.g., Leopold, 1966; Merchant, 1980; Naess, 1989; Orr, 1994). Environmental sociologists observe that the "structure-agency dilemma" is central to the study of environmental problems and their solutions (Dunlap et al., 2002, p. 9).

The problem is worsened in that analyses of environment-society associations and contemporary communication of environmental messages miss the link with 'practice' – what real people (CEOs, middle managers, students, truck drivers, and all the rest) do in real life, and how this constitutes societal structures and institutions. These questions require attention to a "theory of practice," and to the "learning" and unlearning of these practices and what underlies them. For Bourdieu, this underlying component is an embodied habitus.

The argument of this paper will unfold in several steps. First, I will argue that social movements aim to create social change, not just engage in political contention. However, such change is not only on the cognitive level, as evidenced by the research on learning in social movements that will be examined. This literature highlights the often tacit character of learning. That cultural knowledge has a considerable tacit dimension lends support to utilization of Bourdieu's approach, specifically that social movements

can be the "field" within which dispositions consistent with the new reality promulgated by movement framing can form and be maintained. Therefore, Bourdieu provides a robust theoretical framework for movement organizations to be more intentional about their informal learning strategies. Ultimately, the goal of social movements is to routinize practices in line with their movement praxis. In the case of ESMOs the goal is an ecologically sound logic of practice, underlain by the routinization embodied in an ecological habitus.

Social Movements

Dominant theories of social movements emphasize their contentions in the fields of politics (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). However, it is possible to conceive of social movements as trying to generate cultural change, that is, change the values, behaviours and symbols of the populace (Hart, 1996; Earl, 2004; Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Polletta, 2002). If changes are to be generated in the populace, social movements must be more than just political contentions, and theories of social change that cross the structure-agency divide would be productive (Crossley, 2002). People learn, meaning that they acquire movement beliefs, but how?

Among the numerous perspectives on social movements, Lofland (1996) describes social movements as "insurgent realities" that provide "collective challenges to mainstream conceptions of how society ought to be organized and how people ought to live" (p. 1). This implies a normative dimension. Lofland explains that in and through the personal and institutional decision-making done in society, some ideas and courses of action emerge as better and more "true" than others. Therefore, a socially sanctioned way-to-be and way-to-think, and a social order– a reality – is produced, and reproduced. The flipside of mainstream reality-producing is the reality-excluding of those who have a different version of the "way-to-be and way-to-think, and way-to-interact." In other words – to use Bourdieu's conceptual tool (which I will explain in detail below) – those who have a different habitus. Social movements aim to generate and sustain this alternate "reality;" by being more conscious of this aim of their practice, they may be better able to

deploy educative strategies that have more impact.

In Polletta's (2002, 2005) view, this is social movements doing culture work. While welcoming more attention in social movements to "culture," she bemoans the narrow conceptions that seem to dominate such attention. Culture is more than something carried by cultural actors, for example, values, normative commitments or discursive practices; culture also constitutes the structures, legitimate resources and actors themselves. For example, Bordt (1997) shows how feminist culture shaped feminist organizational forms, while Polletta (2005) demonstrated "how participatory democracy became white." Polletta concludes that we need a conceptualization of culture that does not see it as a contrast to structure, nor limit it to values and practices carried as resources by social movement actors.

As Eyerman and Jamison (1991) depict them, social movements are distinguished by the new thinking that they bring to the social scene. In fact, Eyerman and Jamison centre the "cognitive praxis" of a movement in their approach. By cognitive praxis, they mean social movements are "producers of knowledge." In their analysis, social movements have particular ways for knowledge creation and dissemination, such that a social movement *is* its cognitive praxis. As one example, the two analysts described the environmental movement across several countries in Europe.

> The movement provided, we might say, the social context for a new kind of knowledge to be practiced. There was no talk, before the environmental movement began to put its ecological cosmology into practice, of ecological living or ecological lifestyles... The movement made the space for those types of knowledge and experience to be able to emerge. (p. 73)

Eyerman and Jamison's perspective about social movements as cognitive praxis has some usefulness. However, their conceptualization needs expansion, primarily about the role of the "cognitive" in "praxis."

Social Movement Learning

Adult educators have theorized social movements as sites of learning (Finger, 1989; Foley, 1999; Holford, 1995; Holst, 2002; Jarvis, 1998; Kilgore, 1999; Mayo, 1999;

Welton, 1993). Social movement organizations do, of course, provide many deliberately educational programmes such as workshops or courses, but I wish to focus here on the informal or incidental learning that may occur through participation in the organization (Falk, 2005; Marsick & Watkins, 2001). Empirical studies have tended to be ethnographic in both adult education (e.g., Branagan & Boughton, 2003; Foley, 1999) and the social movements literature (e.g., Conway, 2004; Ryan, 2005). The latter has not drawn productively on the considerably more extensive education literature on learning in social movements (Hall & Turay, 2006).

From this literature, I draw four conclusions that lead me toward Bourdieu's concepts as assistance in understanding the experientially-based learning that may occur through social movement participation. First, there is not yet a comprehensive understanding of these sorts of learning environments or outcomes. Second, research has typically focused on learning as gleaned from activist accounts, and more attention needs to be devoted to ordinary members. Third, what is labelled as "learning" has become that which is conscious to the movement participants themselves, although upon reflection, they often express "surprise" (Foley, 1999, p. 3) at what they have learned. However, fourth, careful ethnographies consistently show that there is a tacit dimension to "knowledge" – that we act in ways and come to know (learn) in ways that are not fully available to our cognitive attention.

Janet Conway's (2004) study of a social justice network in Toronto over several years highlighted the interaction of identity, social location (which she termed "place"), and knowledge production in a social movement. She concluded "movement-based knowledge is largely tacit, practical and unsystematized.... This multifaceted praxis fostered new practices and emergent theories of knowledge production" (pp. 8-9). Social movements were sites of learning. Some of that learning was tacit or pre-cognitive.

Similarly, Mick Smith (2001) concluded that anti-roads protesters, tree-sitters and other "radical environmentalists" sought to develop a vastly different ethos, attentive and committed to an environmentally sound life lived in concrete relations of "place." Through this work, Smith also shows how the regular way of modern society is normally

reinforced such that it becomes conditioned, unreflexively taken-for-granted as the "genuine" way. In fact, he convincingly shows that the environmental ethos developed by the movement participants could not be expressed in terms acceptable to the ethos of the society it fundamentally critiques. Moreover, neither can it be codified in the universalistic and normative manner of formal rationality, since ecological sensitivity must be attentive to its environmental context. Smith concluded that the goal of radical environmentalism is a practical ecological *sense*, an environmental expertise developed from gaining a "feel for the game" (to use a favourite expression of Bourdieu's) of living ecologically. In other words, Smith (2001) concludes, "an ecological habitus" (p. 198).

These studies draw conclusions that resemble experiential learning theory. In contemporary learning theories, learners are understood as active agents. Learning does not occur because teaching happens but because of what goes on in the learner. Learning is, however, socially situated and embodied, and therefore an intersubjective process in conjunction with the activity of the learner. Fenwick (2000) describes five experiential learning theories that are primarily variations on this situatedness. However, because humans operate in social settings, learners may or may not be entirely aware of the knowledge constructions that they are developing. This challenges the emphasis on "reflection upon experience" in most experiential learning theory (Le Cornu, 2005).

In this vein, Le Cornu (2005) begins to build a model of experiential learning that emphasizes the process of internalisation. Doing so highlights the multifaceted complexity of learning, that it is not a sequential or linear process, and that we "learn" or are affected by all experiences, whether we think about them or not. Much of what we know is part of our bank of tacit knowledge. Since most of life's practices – toilet-training, social interaction, recycling, not-littering, getting to work via carbon-intensive means – were once learned, then routinized and in a sense "forgotten" by the mind (but not the body), we need a notion of learning that does not rely only on thought. So, whether conscious or unconscious to the learner (who is, by the way, fully immersed in a social context and not an independent, autonomous thinker of the Cartesian variety), learning "must be understood as the gradual transformation of knowledge into *knowing*,

and part of that transformation involves a deepening internalisation to the point that people and their 'knowing' are totally integrated one with the other" (Le Cornu, 2005, p. 175, emphasis added). This has considerable implications for the development of a routinely environmentally attuned lifestyle – what I will describe as an ecological habitus.

Crossley (2002) finds social movement theory inadequate because of its overemphasis on movement agents' intentionality. He asserts that social movement theories that give primacy to strategies based solely on consciously managed discourse "seem inadequate to express the depth and richness of that which must be connected to. It is not simply a matter of cognitive frames, but of deeply held and embodied dispositions; an ethos, and ultimately, a way of life" (pp. 142-3). Crossley insists that social movement theory deficiencies are best met by Bourdieu's theory of practice and calls habitus the "hinge between agency and structure" (p. 177). Bourdieu has also been heavily used by theorists to explain social reproduction. Therefore, to Bourdieu we turn to give direction for a sociologically robust approach to learning that can be applied by SMOs.

Bourdieu and the Logic of Practice

Bourdieu describes his sociological approach as explaining "the logic of practice." He conceptualizes society as space, both symbolically and substantively. He posits that actors interact within interlocking and multilayered social "fields." A field is a network of relations. It is not just the actors on a particular field, but the configuration of relations between actors and their relative positions – differential resources, power, marginality and command of capital are part of these configurations.

The field constituted by its interactions generate "habitus." Habitus, in Bourdieu's thought, is the internalized set of general dispositions in a social setting. As social and cultural norms, habitus generates practices and beliefs as it forms individual and social representations of the world (Bellamy, 1993).

> The theory of action that I propose (with the notion of habitus) amounts to saying that most human actions have as a basis something quite different from intention,

> that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be interpreted as oriented toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that that objective was a conscious design. (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 97-98)

Habitus is a set of embodied rather than consciously held dispositions, or tendencies; the concept occupies middle ground in the structure-agency tension that has characterized social theory.[11]

The dynamism of habitus and field co-generate a "logic of practice," the context-appropriate ways of thinking, acting and interacting. Since the English "logic of practice" tends to convey cognitive action, it is the French expression, the *sens pratique,* that I wish to emphasize – an embodied habitus that unreflexively generates the way to be, the way to think, and way to interact. Mick Smith (2001) picks this up to describe the practical ecological *sense*. An ecological habitus would generate more environmentally sound lifestyle practices, that is, lifestyles grounded in what makes sense in that socio-ecological location.

The result of the dialectical cogeneration of field and habitus is that we – our ways of thinking, ways of acting, and so on – are produced by our social conditions, which are constituted by and embedded in us through the diverse but consistent social relations of our biographies. This generates a "feel for the game" of THAT social milieu. The habitus is embodied at a deeply, pre-reflexive level, resulting in what Wacquant (2004) calls the "prelogical logic of practice."

In the conclusion to his introductory environmental sociology textbook, Michael Bell describes the goal as "living environmentally without trying" – as routinized habits. Such habits at the individual level serve to reduce one's ecological impact. To make such

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[11] LiPuma (1993) characterizes Bourdieu's theorization of the co-generation of fields and habitus as his way of accounting for culture while specifying how people carry internalizations that produce practical logic appropriate for perception and action in social settings. Interestingly, Polletta (2002) explicitly states, "Structures, as I conceptualize them, are patterns of durable relations" (p. 9), which is precisely Bourdieu's definition of field. Polletta wishes to recover a wider conception of "culture" as being involved in constituting structures, which seems to me better handled by the specifics of Bourdieu's sociological theory. Bourdieu and his exegetes argue his approach is designed to avoid such antimonies as structure-agency, subjective-objective (e.g., Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Lane, 2000), and, in Smith's (2001) view, even the division of culture/nature.

practices routine, they need to be outgrowths of a habitus which privileges ecological considerations. He points out the attitude/behaviour split – that proenvironmental attitudes are not matched by environmentally sound lifestyles. Bell attributes this to "social structure. We do not have complete choice in what we do. Our lives are socially organized" (Bell, 2004, p. 225). The notion of habitus implies that our very means of operating in a social milieu are organized, such that other ways of being do not make sense, even were they within our conscious awareness. Habitus generates practical actions – that is, actions are "practical," because they work in the field. Bell concludes: "We are more likely to regard the environment in environmentally appropriate ways when our community life is organized to encourage such regard" (p. 248), but that contemporary community life is not so organized. The result: transformation of the habitus held by an individual will be difficult apart from the social fields in which the person finds him or herself.

Some scholars have asserted that Bourdieu's theory cannot account for progressive social change (e.g., Lau, 2004; Mesny, 2002). It is true that for Bourdieu, the habitus is basically conservative. He states, "[habitus] tends to ensure its own constancy and its defense against change through the selection it makes within new information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its accumulated information" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). The coincidence between habitus and field then allows structure to meet the expectations of the habitus. Habitus is thus responsible for a systematic "misrecognition" of the nature of the "fields" and institutions within which agents operate, for example, resistence to information about the dramatic effect of contemporary humans on the earth. Thus, the intransigence of society to social change efforts is (partly) explained.[12]

Bourdieu's concept of habitus has also been criticized as deterministic (Bohman,

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[12] A thorough explanation of social change/reproduction needs to address the struggle over the various species of capital, especially that which Bourdieu calls "symbolic capital" – "the power to give a certain meaning to the social world" (Meisenhelder, p. 169). Environmentalism has extremely limited resources of symbolic capital compared to other actors in their struggles on the broader social field, which partly explains the inhibitions against environmentally-sensitive lifestyle practices.

1999; Butler, 1999; Jenkins, 1992). In response, he considers that most such critiques underplay the strength of forces in fields and apportion more ability to individuals to change their dispositions. "What happens to an object in the field does not depend only on the characteristics of the object, but also on the forces exerted by the field upon it" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).[13] Elsewhere Bourdieu explains, "No doubt agents do construct their vision of the world. But this construction is carried out under structural constraints" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 130). Yet habitus is generative of practice, so creative change can occur as the ever-shifting conditions of the field enable different interactions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Habits of mind and social practice are shaped by pervasive cultural forces and the existing social fields at odds with societal change or new environmental paradigms (Bowers, 1993). An habitus is neither compelled by the field (as in structuralism), nor freely chosen by actors (as in rational choice theories or phenomenology). Thus, habitus is the hinge between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of human action. Aboufalia (1999) responds to this criticism, "It may be that those who charge Bourdieu with determinism are in fact detecting recurring invocations of determinism's kissing cousin, the inertial" (p. 168). Bourdieu characterises actors as "falling into" habitus. To conclude, we are not creators of our lives, so much as reworkers of the raw materials yielded to us by history and biography.

An Ecological Logic of Practice

The question remains: how is social change to be accomplished? As co-generative operants, Bourdieu insists that a focus on either the field or the habitus would be inappropriate and ineffective. Much rests upon the recursiveness in the system of habitus

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[13] Shusterman (1999) summarizes one reaction of critics to the concept of habitus:

> Much of the resistence to the *habitus* (italics in original) derives from the assumption that it must function somehow as an underlying causal mechanism. Since we tend to assume that behavioral explanations must be either in terms of conscious rules or brute causality, and since *habitus* is clearly not the former, one implicitly (but falsely) assumes that it must somehow involve some hidden causal mechanism that Bourdieu's analysis fails to display (p. 4).

and field. Key to outcomes in this system, however, is understanding the "prelogical" nature of the habitus (Wacquant, 2004). Thus Bourdieu's theory of practice differs from the cognitively held praxis of Eyerman and Jamison.

Since we cannot think about everything, much of life's action needs to be routinized: the outcome of habituated dispositions. Duenkel's (1994) phenomenological study of eight consciously ecocentric wilderness guides showed how difficult it is to maintain that philosophy and concomitant lifestyle in a society with a very different orientation and structure. Duenkel characterized an ecocentric orientation as "not separate" and "not superior" to the earth or other creatures. In her study, the individuals described their slipping back toward the separated and superior attitudes of the dominant milieu. As a *cognitive* praxis, they bought the deep ecological worldview. The difficulty was maintaining this at the level of *sens pratique*. The social field mitigated against this ability, facilitating a less ecological lifestyle praxis. Nevertheless, the disjuncture between cognitive praxis and *sens pratique* helps generate reflexivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Meisenhelder, 1997).

Since society is a field centred around hegemonic versions of realities that are contrary to the social movement's goals, and therefore, these hegemonies must be contended against, insurgent social movements will have to be intentional about their reality-making. Naidoo (2004) considers this a limitation of Bourdieu. "The exclusive focus on the dominant principles structuring society excludes an analysis of social forces that are strong enough to challenge dominant forces but too weak to entirely displace such force" (p. 468). Karakayali (2004) argues a similar point in comparing Adorno's critical theory and Bourdieu. He believes that critical theory places perhaps too much faith in cognitive analysis and would be improved by aspects of Bourdieu's theory of practice. But he also argues that Bourdieu allows too little space for creative imagining of alternatives.

It is possible that reflexivity can be conditioned as part of the *sens pratique*, particularly among those whose habitus is marginal to the dominant poles of a field (Adams, 2006). However, this is not to lose the embodied character of the habitus,

particularly among those who are not so marginal and therefore for whom the dominant constructions of reality adequately describe the world in which they operate. An alternative logic of practice – that of ecologically sound lives – will need to be creative and explicit, since it appears illogical to the dominant social field's existing logics. In their efforts to rename the social reality, insurgent social movements must develop this reflexive analysis, as Conway's (2004) study showed. This does not overemphasize the *cognitive* praxis of a movement. Habitus's nonreflexiveness does not entail that it absolutely cannot surface to awareness (Lau, 2004).

To this point I have not specifically described an ecological habitus. To do so, we can take a cue from Bourdieu's relational sociology. Social relations are situated, embodied beings are located; the habitus is conditioned in its field. In transposing Bourdieu's tools to environmentally familiar language, the word "field" can be replaced with "place" It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full exposition of the meanings of "place." Suffice it to say that no place is narrowly bound, isolated, nor the same for all members (Cresswell, 2004). A place incorporates objective and subjective components, in ways that are quite similar to Bourdieu's characterization of society as multi-layered and interlocking fields, wherein a sense of place and strategies to be employed therein are relevant. Now, let us extend beyond the anthropocentrism of *sociological* theory to *mitake oyasin* – all my relations in place, including other ecological actors (Smith, 2001). Landforms, weather, distance to energy sources, ecosystems, watersheds, endangered species, animals, economic class composition, ethnic groups, religious worldviews and other relations are a portion of what comprise a place and have a role in shaping the habitus, and to which a *sens pratique* responds albeit not necessarily consciously.

So what is an ecological habitus? It would be described *backwards* from the practices of reducing ecological impact and living socially and ecologically well in place. Since habitus provides a *sens pratique* or "feel for the game" by being embodied in a particular place, we can understand an ecological habitus as an expertise developed from a "sense of place" – a practical logic of how to live well in *this place*, which necessarily includes this place's linkages externally (Massey, 1997). Universally applicable rules for

living well in every place do not exist. We are talking, instead, of a *modus vivendi*, a *sens pratique*. The normative aspects of social movements are suggestive, rather than prescriptive. The practices generated by an ecological habitus are attentive to its place as a socio-ecological milieu.

The inclusion into environmental social movements of a theory of practice culled from Bourdieu points out strategies to be employed by a better understanding of the intersecting ecological and sociological verities of human life. That is, that much of life is a function of a pre-logical habitus produced and reproduced in a particular social milieu. It is important to highlight this point, as it clearly points to several components that an ecological *sens pratique* will need in the negotiation of an un- or anti-ecological society. These include:

1) details for ecologically sound lifestyle practices that reduce impact and reinvigorate ecosystems;
2) a critique of the social structures that inhibit an ecologically sound lifestyle,
3) an understanding of how social relations resist an ecological worldview and lifestyle.

These three components of an ecological *sens pratique* wed the cognitive praxis and habitus of an environmental way of life. The first component recognizes that new technical knowledge about how to live is part of an environmental movement's purpose. The latter two components imply that a facet of habitus informed by insurgent social movements is reflexivity. A Bourdieusian theory of practice, however, also implies a fourth component:

4) an ecological habitus will thrive only in a social field that supports its maintenance.

It is not enough to inform, as if cognitive knowledge was enough to change internalized dispositions. A strategic move on the part of environmental social movement organizations might be to be these interim communities of practice, rather than epistemic communities as a focus on cognitive praxis would imply, or as mobilized members as political opportunity theory asserts. Ironically, intentionality as a social space wherein

alternate habitus is supported would help provide for environmentalism the symbolic capital and other resources to compete politically and to present its own socio-ecological messages in the societal marketplace of ideas.

Pedagogical Implications for Social Movements

This leaves the transformation of the habitus as a matter of question. For Bourdieu, the habitus is resistant, and generally conservative in that it seeks to conserve its characteristics. Yet, because habitus is generative of practice, but not determined, Bourdieu allows that habitus can be modified in the face of other fields, or due to "an awakening of consciousness and social analysis" although it is not easy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). It is a process of learning.

Transformation of the habitus is not a strictly cognitive process, nor is it individualistic (Reay, 2004). Learning is always situated. If habitus is contextual, then learning of new habitus is the transformation of deep-seated habituations of mind and life. The challenge is to help people learn to recognize how the existing order co-creates their experiences via habitus and to help them internalise new dispositions. Since habitus is contextual, such learning would be best accomplished within an alternate order in which the new habitus "makes sense." This provides an enhanced pedagogical role for social movements.

Conway's (2004) ethnography uncovered the "evolving habitus" of social movement participants (p. 163). Movement effectiveness is enhanced, she concluded, by intentionality to learn from collective engagement. "The practical implications of recognizing the nature and importance of tacit knowledge are enormous for understanding how social movements might more purposefully and effectively reproduce themselves and their politics, practices and knowledges..." (p. 164). Such transformative learning is best accomplished in a relational setting (Kilgore, 1999; Mezirow, 2000; Ryan, 2005), connecting personal biography with opportunities for new experiences in that biography through which dispositions can be modified or new ones incorporated. "Habitus is a practical sense emerging from experience" that needs a sense of the

possible (Lau, 2004, p. 370). The sense of the possible is certainly significant for the insurgent reality-making of a social movement.

The question remains whether the environmental social movement can do the job of re-education of the habitus. It is an important question, but it is not answerable in the abstract. As insurgent realities, environmental social movements must critique the dominant reality, articulate a vision of alternatives, and model these alternatives. These are essentially educative tasks. Eyerman and Jamison have made a good point about social movements as knowledge incubators. However, the notion of cognitive praxis is expanded by Bourdieu's theory of practice. For the environmental movement, it is an environmentally sensitive cognitive praxis that is to be taken up, put into practice, and routinized until it becomes internalised as an ecological habitus and the resultant effects on social fields. Bourdieu's theory of practice contributes to an understanding of social movements as change agents via political and cultural mechanisms involving the interplay of habitus, practice and the contentions on social fields over the naming of – in this case – socio-ecological reality.

Habitus is creative and generative of practice leaving socio-cultural change as diverse and dynamic. Instilling a new *sens pratique*, then, is not a rational task, because it does not depend on the logic of the doxic habitus. Or, more accurately, it is not a rational task only. In the words of Zygmaunt Bauman, it is "not safe in the hands of reason," (quoted in Jarvis, 1998, p. 71).

Conclusion

To conclude, there are several points that I wish to summarize. First, a theoretical potential exists for environmental organizations to provide opportunities for a transformation of habitus. Numerous studies have shown that learning – cosmological, organizational, technical and so forth – have occurred through experiential participation in environmental movement activities.

Second, effectiveness implies that the environmental movement include an intentionally experiential and transformative pedagogy as an intentional part of its movement praxis (Mayo, 1999; Mezirow, 2000). Such education must have both the

cosmologic and technical content as outlined by Eyerman and Jamison. It must have experiential components that can impact the non-cognitive portions of the eco-logic of practice. To change habitus and impact fields, the pedagogical intent must be to do more than chip at incremental lifestyle changes or only attend to structural or policy considerations. Environmental social movements must include the reflexive components listed above, even becoming "communities of practice" in support of emerging ecological habitus. For movement purposes, a transformation of both fields and habitus must co-occur, until an ecological logic of practice is routinized.

Third, too few of these studies have focused on the everyday practices of environmentally-active people, and too many have focused on those engaged in highly visible protest activities. In understanding the creation of an ecological habitus, we need research in the lived experience of "regular" environmentalism – that of environmentally involved people, not merely the most activist.

Fourth, environmental social movements would usefully see themselves engaged in a struggle for ecological praxis melding theory and lifestyle, habitus and community, structure and agency, reason and habituation. Bourdieu's theory of practice is helpful in that it directs attention in certain ways – toward everyday practices situated in a social milieu. Such a theory can help us in developing an ecological *sens pratique* appropriate for contemporary lives in today's world. This reconceptualization of the purpose of the environmental movement as a whole is its lifeblood, the genuine praxis needed in an un-ecological society.

Finally, Bourdieu's theory of practice advances social movement theory. What has been described for ESMOs could be applied to other social movements. Social movements are not only about mobilizing resources and finding opportunities on the political field. As knowledge-creating, and reality-making entities, they are engaged with the often unreflexive aspects of social fields that reinforce existing reality constructions. A Bourdieusian theory of social movements recognizes that much of what constitutes the *sens pratique* of regular life is tacit and routinized, rather than explicit, and available to cognitive or conscious attention.

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Interlude: Ethnography as Method

In the preceding paper, I argued that sociologically informed environmental social movement organizations would include building an ecological habitus as part of their mission. I explained an ecological habitus as that which would enable living well in place, while using the term "a compassionate sense of place" to describe a logic of practice for environmentally active persons. The questions now become: how are these found in practice, in the field? An empirical study conducted in one locality will be reported in the following two papers, with this "Interlude" providing a detailed description of the methods used in those two papers. Doing so will enable more detail to be presented here, as well as reducing repetition in each following paper.

The research questions were as follows:

1) What evidence is there of a place-conscious ethos of caring – a compassionate sense of place – among environmentalists?
2) Can a compassionate sense of place serve as an environmentally effective logic of practice?

These questions implied that the study should be approached ethnographically. Ethnographic techniques, including participant observation, discussions with key informants, collection of textual data and informal conversations, are particularly well-suited to understanding the specific social practices occurring in a particular site. At the close of the fieldwork period I used formal interviews to probe members' own conceptualizations. Finally, public expressions related to environmental activity or organizations – such as newspaper stories, and organizational communication – were also collected and provided information about the overall field of environmental interest in Thunder Bay, and its relations to other fields. These materials are not reported in this dissertation because of the focus of the research questions on habitus and a compassionate sense of place.

Ethnography in General

Ethnography is a means of gaining a deep, rich understanding of a specific social scene, usually focusing on the "culture" of the social group(s) involved. Immediately, some ethnographers will want to contest that simple definition. There is "a distinct lack of orthodoxy in ethnography" observes Creswell (1998, p. 59). As I will explain later, this study takes the form of an analytic ethnography (Lofland, 1996; Snow, Morrill, & Anderson, 2000), although it draws heavily on critical ethnography (Thomas, 1993). Furthermore, while grounded in the experience of environmentally active people in Thunder Bay, Ontario, it will not involve much description of the scene – what some researchers call "thick" ethnography (Geertz, 1973).Critical forms of inquiry are methodologies for using knowledge, not just a method for finding knowledge (Sorotnik, 1991). They have a normative component, pursuing questions of values, interests and the greatest good in all their ambiguities, even to the point of interrogating power and uncovering existing material and symbolic "relations of ruling" (D. Smith, 1999). Critical ethnography intends an examination of the broader social relations that shape local practice for subordinate groups (Thomas, 1993). Smith (2001) notes that most social scientists deal with description of existing social constructions, rarely even to the point of questioning *qui bono?* Yet, Smith claims, deteriorating environmental conditions demand that social scientists move beyond empirical case studies even of ethics-in-action to do the challenging work of presenting new models of practical action that give attention to ecological relations as well as social ones.

This study, then, is not a conventional ethnography of environmentalists-in-action although it is intended to be grounded in the practical action of people involved in environmental organizations in a community. That I have described a compassionate sense of place and this project as a form of imagining new interpretations of socio-ecological reality aligns it with what Schubert (1991) calls speculative inquiry. "Existing forms of knowledge simply do not speak to the needs of a great many issues. Needed is speculative or imaginative projection as a method [of inquiry]" (p. 67) that fruitfully occupies public space. A compassionate sense of place focuses consideration of forces

that act on the material and the experiential; like Bourdieu's reflexive sociology, it tries to undermine dichotomies of structures and agency, subjective and objective, personal and social, human and nature. Nevertheless, it is not a "thick" description as advocated by anthropologists like Clifford Geertz and presented as "conventional" ethnography (Campbell & Gregor, 2002; Davies, 1999). Neither, however, is it a pastiche presented as a souped-up, reflexive version of "researcher tales" (Davies, 1999; Van Maanen, 1988). While I am aware that the notion of "a compassionate sense of place" is a conceptual creation – maybe even a bricolage – from within this researcher, reflexivity and the "crisis of representation" in academia in recent years has not necessarily helped critical thought overcome oppressive forms of social reality. So while I take heed of the discussion over reflexivity and representation, I also take Paul Willis' advice:

> Write down what happens, take notes about what people do and say, how they use objects, artefacts, and symbolic forms *in situ*. Do not worry too much about the endless debates concerning ethnographic authority and the slippages of discursive meaning understood from an abstract post structuralism. Tell me something about the world. (Dolby & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 169)

I seek to "tell something" here, while simultaneously forwarding the possibility of another world (Carroll, 2004; Smyth & Hattam, 2000). So while the research is grounded in the "insurgent" work of social movements (Haluza-DeLay, 2004; Lofland, 1996), it is nevertheless, grounded.

Ethnographers of all sorts emphasize that the research process is one of balancing rigour and openness.

> There is merit in both "loose," inductively-oriented designs, and "tight," more deductively approached ones. The former work well when the terrain is unfamiliar, and/or excessively complex...and the intent is exploratory and descriptive. (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 431)

This study took the latter route – a tighter approach culminating in formal interviews. This approach, rather than the inductive format conventionally used by ethnographers, was chosen for a number of reasons. First and most importantly, I was guided by the specific facets incorporated into the notion of a compassionate sense of place as ecological habitus. This moved the methodology several steps ahead in ethnographic

procedures (such as Spradley's [1980] "Developmental Research Sequence") minimizing but not eliminating the initial stages of rudimentary description that then leads to more focused observation.

Second, I had been generally involved in the environmental community for more than two years in this location and was somewhat known. Familiarity with me was further enhanced because I had produced a well-publicized report on racism in Thunder Bay, called *A Community of Acceptance: Respect for Thunder Bay's Diversity* (Haluza-DeLay, 2002). In many cases, this facilitated my position as both a credible compatriot and a respectable researcher. Third, having experience conducting other ethnographic studies,[14] other scholars advise, leads one to see the world as an ethnographer (Davies, 1999), and enables one to move more quickly into ongoing analysis (Glancy, 1986; Handwerker, 2001).

In this study, I took a position as something of an insider, on the continuum towards active participation rather than merely observation. In part, I sought to help build the movement in both practical and theoretically-engaged ways (Charmaz, 2005). I helped the only environmental group in the region with that all-important charitable status recover that status from suspension by doing its government-required reporting for the past three years. As well, the Ontario Environmental Network (OEN) was attempting to build its representation through a regional network and I helped recruit participants for meetings, especially trying to link the OEN to anti-racism, Aboriginal, and church groups with an environmental interest. I had also been previously active with the local Green Party, and represented it with prepared statements at several provincial hearings, such as an education task force. Over-identification with environmental organizations was not a threat (Grills, 1998). The study was focused on everyday practices and the operating logic behind these. For an activist to do research on what might be a more publicly

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[14] These include a wilderness trip (DeLay, 1996; Haluza-DeLay, 1999, 2001a); analysis of the advocacy and response to the *A Community of Acceptance* research (Haluza-DeLay, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), and an authoethnography of doing environmental education in church-based settings (Haluza-DeLay, 2001b, 2005a, under review).

effective way of doing things, means attending carefully to one's observations and assumptions in the effort to find what would be even more effective.

In the process of the research, it became clear that many members of other community organizations were environmentally interested, but were not part of "environmental" groups. Some of these people were included in interviews. Furthermore, many people indicated that what I was looking for was fascinating and something they rarely thought about. Many relished the opportunity to think through some of their views, and their practices.

> Mary[15]: Such hard questions!
> Randy: I make no apology for that!...
> Mary: These things are always helpful to us too, because it makes us step back, and the next thing we have to write – it gives us a little different perspective.
> Randy: I remember what you said – 'We never take the time to study ourselves.'
> Mary: ... You start talking about it and you realize you are doing things in a certain way for a certain reason. (Interview, Mary and Brian)

Among the potential benefits of ethnography is uncovering aspects of the social scene that help to explain it but which are not normally available to the explicit knowledge of members. Spradley (1980) asserted that a large portion of our cultural knowledge is tacit and outside of cognitive apprehension. This corresponds to the workings of the habitus (Lane, 2000). Reed-Danahay (2005) and Wacquant (2004) reminded scholars that Bourdieu began as an ethnographer, during the Algerian revolutionary period of the 1950s. The concept of habitus was introduced to solve an empirical puzzle, that of the disjuncture between traditional Kabyle society and the new conditions being generated by Algerian modernization (Wacquant, 2004; see also Lane, 2000, and Reed-Danahay, 2005). This means that Bourdieu was not foremost a theorist, but a researcher who developed theoretical tools to facilitate sociological explanation

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[15] Pseudonyms have been used throughout, and in some cases, personal details and organizational affiliations have been obscured in order to protect anonymity.

(Camic & Gross, 1998).[16]

Other ethnographers go further than merely seeking to illuminate tacit knowledge present in the field site. In various ways "critical ethnography" (Foley & Valenzuela, 2005; Thomas, 1993), "institutional ethnography" (Smith, 1999; Campbell & Gregor, 2002), and "reflexive ethnography" (Davies, 1999) assert that the social scene is not sufficient of itself, that what goes on is at least partly structured by what Dorothy Smith (1999) calls "extra-local relations of ruling." The researcher who values member perspective must also attend to ways that their perspective may be socially shaped. Snow, Morrill and Anderson (2000) "bemoan" the "tendency" for ethnographers to neglect the theoretical side of research. They attribute a good deal of this neglect to the predominance of "grounded theory" in ethnography, that is, to describe the social world completely from within that world (Creswell, 1998), but which leads to neglect of substantive and sustained theorizing relevant across cases.

Ironically, although I attend to "place" and "caring," both of which demand deliberate attention to particularities, I concur with such critiques. Analytic ethnography is a theory-driven approach to studying a social scene. Lofland (1996) characterizes it as "attempt[ing] to provide generic propositional answers to questions about social life and organization" culminating in an analysis that is "conceptually elaborated, descriptively detailed, and concept-data interpenetrated" (p. 367). I sought to do that by interpellating the interview participants with the idea of a compassionate sense of place. Snow et al. (2000) argue for three types of theory orientation for analytic ethnography. The first type is *theory discovery*, but at middle range levels rather than grounded theory. Snow, et al. describe this as "substantive theory," developed for "particular *empirical* domains, such as juvenile delinquency, medical education, hospital organizations, or dying" (emphasis in original, p. 185), but not at the site-specific levels of *this* juvenile detention centre, or *that* street scene. The second type is *theory extension*, which "extends pre-existing

[16] Bourdieu has been drawn on heavily by both sociologists and anthropologists. Reed-Danahay is the latter, which made reading her book refreshingly informative for someone who was considerably more familiar with the sociological use of Bourdieu (Haluza-DeLay, 2005b).

theoretical or conceptual formulations to other groups or aggregations, to other bounded contexts or places, or to other socio-cultural domains" (p. 187). By way of example, Goffman's theory of "frames" was extended by Snow himself into social movements (Snow & Benford, 2000), which then became a recognized tool of analysis for numerous other researchers. The third type is *theory refinement*, whereby the data and existing theory inform each other, in order to improve theory. These three "types" are not mutually exclusive, nor the only way for theory to be part of ethnographic work.

My study was clearly theory-driven, while following the exhortation to allow theory and data to mutually inform each other. The techniques of analytic ethnography may not be much different than in more conventional ethnography, according to Lofland (1996), but the orientation is. In this study, analytic attention was directed to observations that reflect a compassionate sense of place, such as caring, attentiveness, place-meanings, specific environmentally sensitive practices and so on. The theory of habitus was extended into that of an ecological habitus, while the study also intends to refine the concept of a compassionate sense of place by attention to the "caring in place" of environmentally active people in this region of Northwest Ontario.

Specific Methods

The Thunder Bay Field Site

The Thunder Bay region presents an interesting field site for a project in environmental awareness. The region has a long resource extraction history, but also a large urban centre with a population over 100,000. Tourism is significant and primarily nature-based, and the local university has a large outdoor recreation degree program, as well as other faculties that claim "Environment" in their titles (including the Faculty of Forestry and the Forest Environment, which is widely claimed as the most traditionalist of loggers of any forestry university department in the country). Nestled on a protected bay of sparkling Lake Superior, it is hundreds of kilometres from other urban centres, surrounded "on three sides by trees [and rock], one side by water" as one interviewee described it. Part of Ontario, it is nevertheless far removed from "the halls of power" in

southern Ontario. This gives it a sense of its own marginality, a feature exacerbated by over two decades of economic and population decline. In fact, in a book-length ethnography of Thunder Bay working-class culture conducted in 1984-1986, Dunk (1991) demonstrated how this north-south marginality reproduces itself and affects social relations. He argued that Thunder Bay racism, particularly against Aboriginal peoples is a function of the perception that they are favoured wards of distant governments. Thus, the antipathy toward "those of the south" was transferred to local Aboriginal peoples.

Thunder Bay's history spans centuries of inhabitation, as a hub of east-west travel at the "head of the lake," where rivers and railroads come from the west to Lake Superior. It was one of the important sites of the fur trade with European settlement, which means that Aboriginal-White relations have been socially, economically, and politically entwined for three centuries. There is a considerable history of political disenfranchisement, paternalism, and racism (Dunk, 1991; Haluza-DeLay, 2002, 2003c), as well as cultural revitalization and political resurgence. Aboriginal peoples are conspicuously absent from environmental groups, although not from government and industrial discussions on land and resource management. Aboriginal people have been marginalized but are a growing demographic, economic and political force. There has been some limited partnership work between environmental groups and Aboriginal groups in the region, primarily on land and resource issues. Further west, the Asubpeeschoseewagong Netum Anishnabek (Grassy Narrows First Nation) have been actively supported by church, peace and environmental groups through one fight after another over 20 years. Finns, Italians and other ethnic groups have become other significant portions of the otherwise highly British-descended population. The city depends on primary resource extraction for its economic livelihood; the "three sides trees" has considerable impact on its culture (Dunk, 1994, 2002).

The antipathy toward southern Ontario is demonstrated in environmental affairs. Letters to the editor of local newspapers sometimes expressed an attitude that distant environmentalists were trying to tell them what to do. This became particularly pronounced during the debates over the cancellation of the spring bear hunt in 1999

(Dunk, 2002). Furthermore, corporations such as Bowater – an international timber operation – played up the "environmentalists from the south" angle; a discursive strategy that gave them putative "local" status despite the actual direction of the flows of authority, decisions and revenues. However, the "southern" link is not so simple; a number of the environmentally active people I interviewed were lifelong Thunder Bay natives and most of the rest had been there a decade or more. Environment North is one of the most prominent local environmental organizations. On its website, it describes itself,

> ENVIRONMENT **north** has a "pro-north" perspective, and attempts to represent interests and particular issues of the region.... We think objectives of diversifying the economy while maintaining the natural resource base need to be central in regional practices. In other words, a "sustainable" North, where economic and social decisions contribute to the long-term. (http://www.environmentnorth.ca/about_us.htm. Accessed October 15, 2006, Punctuation as in original)

These are discursive representations, wherein locality and place are mobilized as symbolic capital in the struggles over position in the community.

I spent the years 1999-2002 in Thunder Bay. Deliberate fieldwork occurred between May and December 2002, but even before that time I attended public gatherings and events of the few environmental groups, as well as more private meetings and personal encounters. I also participated in meetings with other community groups, particularly related to following up the racism study. While there are about 20 non-profit, non-governmental groups that could be loosely labelled "environmental" organizations, most are small with few meaningful meetings or events. They do not exist "in name only" but are mustered when some issue presents itself. People also come together in ad hoc association over particular matters. These included organizing a wind co-operative to promote renewable energy, running the annual "Sustainability Fair" in a church hall, and ensuring that environmental topics were represented in the films shown at local festivals. People mattered more than organizations, although affiliation could make a difference, as the president of one organization mentioned,

[Organizational Name] gives an umbrella where I can do things. Hard to do as an

> individual. But I can do it more as organization. When I go to talk to councillors, I always remind them that [this organization] has 750 members. (Interview, Stan)

Nonetheless, it was the initiatives of individuals that developed individual reputation and drove environmental topics forward. As this became more clear in the ethnographic component of the study, it solidified my decision to conduct formal interviews.

Forest issues, and water and land management were the most prevalent issues labelled as “environmental” issues. The working group on wind energy also formed during this time and is loosely associated with one of the more prominent community organizations. Some mobilization began around a proposal for a new power station utilizing “pet-coke” (a byproduct of far-off Alberta tar sands oil production, and disallowed as a fuel by Alberta law). There were some groups dealing with “lifestyle” issues of energy conservation, recycling and consumerism. These tended to be very local in character. On land management issues, especially forestry, several provincial or national organizations were involved, but with very little local involvement other than specific well-recognized individuals.

Most people overlapped their organizational involvements, considering themselves as environmentally interested, rather than group or organization specific. This was fine by me, as I was interested in the dynamics of being environmentally active rather than the specifics of organizational membership. Researchers attempting to delineate the extent of environmentalism in an area are faced with classificatory concerns (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Kempton, et al., 2001; Markowitz, 2001). For example, is a hunting and fishing group that does some game management an environmental group? Said one speaker at a moose hunting seminar, “We share with other parts of the ecosystem [wolves killing moose] and I think all hunters appreciate that” (Fieldnotes, September 18). There are other contentious classifications – health groups now sometimes called environmental health or eco-justice groups, so-called “wise-use” groups, which are often construed as anti-environmental because their version of how to live in relation to the environment is contrary to preservation principles (Kempton, et al., 2001).

Conceivably, since “the environment” includes such definitions as “the totality of surrounding conditions” (Onelook Dictionary search, http://www.onelook.com/) a tremendous variety and unmanageable number of organizations could be construed as part of the environmental “field” in Thunder Bay. Furthermore, it also became clear that there was considerable interplay between the environmental community organizations or non-profit sector, and governmental ministries, and for-profit sectors. For example, one interviewee worked as a municipal employee with responsibilities in environmental services, and was involved with several organizations considered environmental. His involvement was sometimes as a City representative and sometimes as a private citizen. In conversation, his diverse “hats” were not usually separated; I often had to ask to whom he was referring when he used “we” during the interview. Sometimes it meant the city, sometimes his family, sometimes one or another environmental organization, or the whole citizenry becoming more environmentally aware.

I took a “common sense” approach to what was an environmental group, following how individuals and groups tended to self-identify. For example, I attended some meetings of hunting-related groups, as they often talk about conservation. Ultimately, however, I made the decision that an environmental group was one that sought to protect the environment, and was “recognized” as an environmental group by other groups in the region (Andrews & Edwards, 2004).

Data Collection

Much of the ethnographic data collection has been sketched above. I went to every publicly advertised environmental event or meeting that I could attend during the period from May to December 2002. When I heard from contacts or “through the grapevine” of other meetings, I attended them when feasible. I introduced myself when possible, and explained that I was doing graduate research on environmentalism in Thunder Bay. I also clipped every article or advertisement that dealt with the topic of “the environment” from the local newspapers. Over time, I began to realize that while there was not a lot of publicly apparent activity, there were indeed many meetings, and

that many of the same people usually participated. Since I was also involved in the follow-up to *A Community of Acceptance* I participated in a considerable number of other meetings of groups like Diversity Thunder Bay, the Thunder Bay Health Coalition, Lakehead Social Planning Council, and the Mayor's Committee on Race Relations. This led to a rich understanding of the nonprofit and community organizational world of Thunder Bay, that would not otherwise have been visible from my participation with environmental groups alone.

Field notes were written by hand, during or as soon after events as possible. They were later typed and additional recollections added at later readings. Kouritzin (2002) noted "fieldnotes impose order on the everyday phenomena" observed by the researcher (p. 127). Mine followed the heuristics of caring, place and habitus as elaborated by my application of analytic ethnography. Observations faced constant analysis, through the guidance of "how does this present caring?" and "how does this present practices of an environmental habitus" (Creswell, 1998; Lofland, 1996; Snow et al. 2000; Spradley, 1980). Such constant analysis directed further data collection, and eventually the interviews.

In the last few weeks of my field time, I began conducting formal interviews. Twenty-three interviews with 27 people were conducted in November and December 2002. The guiding principle was that these be "environmentally active people," who were involved with local organizations and seemed likely to yield theoretically informative results. Arcury and Quandt (1999) described a "site-based procedure" for recruiting participants for qualitative studies. While their focus is on obtaining a relatively representative sample, my focus was on representing viewpoints, specifically attempting to obtain views from the range of people involved across a diverse range of environmental organizations. Therefore, modifying Arcury and Quandt's procedure, I generated a list of organizations that had become visible in the participatory phase of the study. Charting of the organizations showed at least two clusters depending on general focus of the organization's projects – a "protected lands" cluster, and a "lifestyle-

community" cluster.[17] Depending on the apparent diversity of viewpoints in the organizations, I identified specific individuals to interview. Three of the interview participants would more fairly be described as "social" activists (anti-poverty, food security, housing), but had been involved in an environmental event. For example, one person who was staff at a poverty-related agency had attended an OEN weekend retreat more than a day's drive away. Since the concept of a compassionate sense of place necessarily includes social sustainability as well as environmental attention, it was completely appropriate to include these people. Similarly, several of the interviewees who were environmentally focused also had social justice involvements.

Nearly everyone I asked to interview agreed to participate. The 27 people are reasonably representative of the members of the organizations involved, or, one could say, the environmental "field" in Thunder Bay. This group included some members of organizations that might seem peripheral to that field, such as Ducks Unlimited – once identified as a hunter self-interest group – or Trees Thunder Bay – primarily a community beautification organization. Appendix B shows my working list of environmental organizations in Thunder Bay, along with the relative involvements of the 27 interview participants. Some people were involved in several organizations, some of which only became apparent during the interview (hence the seeming over-representation of participants and part-time employees of EcoSuperior). Although I selected the interviewees through their organizational involvements, the individuals were not consistently affiliated over the months of fieldwork. Involvement shifted as new issues hit the media, seasons changed (e.g., the rhythms of gardening, or legislative sittings, or kayaking season) or personal circumstances varied. Furthermore, their associations flowed among organizations, occasionally meeting each other on projects, at meetings, or on hiking trails. This cross-participation certainly contributed to "recognition" of each

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[17] There were several nodal organizations (and one individual) who connected the clusters, and the local groups with provincial organizations. The data collection was not able to articulate the level at which habituses vary according to positions in the environmental field. However, this is a recommendation for fruitful further study: accompanying ethnographic work with social network surveying designed to articulate distinctions among the affiliated individuals.

other as environmentally active. A couple of people were not specifically involved in any organization, but took an active role in events; for example, this is the case for one of the primary organizers of the Sustainability Fair.

The interviews took between 45 minutes and two hours. The Interview Brief is included in Appendix A. However, the interviews took the form of conversations, loosely structured by the question plan. Fontana and Frey (1994) described an interview as a "co-constructed encounter." Because of the effort to explore deep-seated, often unreflexive, and perhaps unconscious elements of the *sens pratique*, I deliberately structured the interviews in this fashion. Participants felt free to question me, as represented by the following encounter (this section of the interview was not fully transcribed; what follows is a close paraphrase, except where verbatim words are placed in quotations):

Jack: Are you going to address whether humans are part of the natural world?
Randy: Oh [joking] I think we are completely separate. I mean, we don't eat or have to sleep or drink or poop or anything.
Jack: [Laughs, then starts to explain.] Because that's not fair to a lot of people either – like, who should eat meat – we are part of the ecosystem.
Randy: [I say we don't act as if we are. I mention Minimum Impact Camping.] "Why did you ask the question?"
Jack: "Just interested in your perspective. Because that will factor in in how you approach it."
Randy: [I talk about the caring thing a while.]
Jack asks if I have any personal opinions.
Randy: "Oh, yes."
Jack: "Well – what are they?" [sounds a little irritated, as if he shared and now I should]
Randy: [I talk about idea of a compassionate sense of place] – unless people think differently, they are not likely to actually change structures. (Interview, Jack)

I often described my own perceptions and beliefs during the interviews. In addition, in the letter confirming the interview beforehand, I had informed participants of the nature of the project – entitled "Developing a compassionate sense of place" – and pointed them at two items that I had placed on the internet describing initial conceptualisations. One item was a proposal for a Social Science and Humanities Doctoral Fellowship (successful) – thus written in highly academic language. The other

item was the power-point presentation I had used to explain my emerging idea of a compassionate sense of place – thus written in an outline format, with evocative quotations and comments yet somewhat cryptic. These items became another avenue for conversation for those who perused them, and "primed the pump" for their thoughts.

It is important to note that these were environmentally active people, not *activists* per se. Few called themselves activists, and I did not necessarily want those who would. Some of the interview participants would only accept "soft" labelling as "environmentalists" and attempted to clarify with me their reasons for being uncomfortable with that label. The youngest interview participants were in their late 20s; participants otherwise ranged across the ages into their 70s. Professions included doctors, foresters, biologists, a retired teacher. Eight were actually staff – often part-time or contract – of environmental organizations. Most were volunteers. Eleven of the 27 were female. Several ran business trying to put their environmental values into practice and employment; none of these businesses were particularly successful. Thunder Bay is small enough that most of the people knew each other, although sometimes only by name. All were white, which is significant because Aboriginal people make up between 7-15% of the population of Thunder Bay, and a considerably higher percent in the rest of Northwestern Ontario.[18] In fact, there seemed to be few linkages with Aboriginal organizations, as Ballamingie (2006) also found in her research on the St. Lawrence region coalitions around land management associated with the Living Legacy campaigns. Because there were few Aboriginal peoples involved in environmental organizations I did not include any representatives in the study. While this may be considered a deficiency in the study, unpacking the concepts and practices in the First Nations cultures of the region would have added a great deal of complexity to the study. More saliently,

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[18] Based on 2001 Canadian Census numbers estimated upwards to address sampling errors such as under-participation, literacy and resistance that tend to underrepresent First Nations populations. In the Thunder Bay *Census Metropolitan Area*, Aboriginal peoples comprised 8200 (6.8%) of the 120,370 population. This rises in the Thunder Bay District to 13,150 (8.7%) of the 149,180. In the Thunder Bay *Health Unit*, Aboriginal peoples comprise 17,820 (11.5%) of the 155,755. See the 2001 Community Profiles (http://www12.statcan.ca/english/profil01/CP01/Index.cfm?Lang=E). Nevertheless, some undercounting is still expected and the census is resisted, despite Statistic Canada's best efforts.

Ruby Farrell, Director of the Indigenous Studies department at Lakehead University, advised that the concepts of place and caring likely mean very different things in Aboriginal culture, in ways that would take years to understand, if even possible by someone schooled in a different epistemology (Ruby Farrell, personal communication, 2002)[19]. Therefore, this study was limited to those participants directly involved with environmental organizations in Thunder Bay.

Interviews were tape recorded and converted to digital recordings. Transcription software was used to facilitate the transcribing process (Transana, 2004). This software allowed the typed transcript to be linked to the actual digital recording. Thus, not only were the words available for analysis, but so were the inflections, tone, and other vocal modalities that convey meaning. Full transcriptions were produced of the first dozen interviews; partial transcripts were produced after emerging categories become apparent and saturation of categories began (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). The linking of transcripts to recording within Transana also meant that word-by-word transcripts were less necessary, as the actual recording could be easily accessed, thus saving transcription time.

Analysis

Transcripts and field notes were imported into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package (ATLASti, 2004). These documents were coded top-down by a coding manual developed prior to analysis and added to during the hermeneutic cycle that followed. I listened to the original tape of the interview while coding. Kahn (2001) describes the conventions of using a coding manual. This allowed a better appreciation of the communicated meanings as vocal inflections could also be heard. A method of constant comparison involving saturation of categories was followed (Creswell, 1998; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). However, as noted, the analysis was directed by the

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[19] Dr. Farrell and I had many conversations along these lines, and on the Diversity Thunder Bay research (Haluza-DeLay, 2002). Cree epistemology was the subject of her own doctoral dissertation.

heuristics of place, caring and habitus in an attempt to refine and develop theory that is more applicable for the development of better socio-ecological orientations.

Researchers are usually warned to be alert to the ways research can produce findings in concert with the methods used to develop the data. Bourdieu, in particular, warns of the "scholastic fallacy," that is, understanding social worlds through abstracted "thinking the world", or, reading "the logic of theory into the logic of practice" as Karakayali (2004, p. 363) summarizes. One drawback with ethnographic observation is that one can only observe behaviour and not the reasons or dispositions that underlie behaviour. But in what is generally accepted as the corrective for this deficiency – that of asking (interviewing) about behaviour or reasons for behaviour – the researcher automatically requires the participant to frame their responses through articulated deliberation and instrumental rationality, epistemological principles that may be at odds with how people actually operate in their social worlds.

Therefore, that there seemed to be reflexive elements in what I have described as an environmental habitus may be an artifact of interviewing. However, participatory involvement among environmental groups, the intentionally conversational nature of the interviews, providing material ahead of time for comment, and discussions of deeply philosophical but generally undefined notions such as "caring" and "respect" were all means of matching method to the presumed "pre-logical" character of the habitus. Such methodological control provides more confidence that reflexive, cognitive, praxis was indeed part of the habitus carried by these environmentally active people (and this will be discussed further in *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists*).

Writing

Richardson (1994) described writing the research as a "method of inquiry" (p. 923). Similarly, Kouritzin (2002) refers to trying to "write my way into understanding" (p. 127). I came to understand a compassionate sense of place much more as I talked with participants, transcribed, re-read, categorized, teased apart and put back together, and then wrote about these ideas and the ways that environmentally active persons practiced

their many-varied ways of being environmentally active. Although it has trappings of conventional ethnographic accounts, this work is not intended to be a realist picture of the world of the environmentally active. It is a pastiche, a creation that seeks to be creating (of a compassionate sense of place) even as it is informed by the created worlds of Thunder Bay environmentalism. My hope is that this research will help do what Thomas (1993) described, "critical ethnography proceeds from an explicit framework that, by modifying consciousness or invoking a call to action, attempts to use knowledge for social change" (p. 4). Whereas qualitative research was once said to be legitimated by evoking "recognition" by members, we can now say it is something quite different (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). If social movements are contestations with hegemonic realities, then research in the service of social movements must be imaginative transformations of those realities (Haluza-DeLay, 2004, 2006). Bourdieu (1998) emphasized the role of social scientists as to create new tools for the shaping of societies, based on their analysis of the current conditions of society.

Both the following papers – *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* and *Caring for place? Possibilities for a compassionate sense of place among environmentalists* – are ethnographic accounts that present evidence of a compassionate sense of place in the process of scrutinizing environmentalist habitus. Whereas in *The practice of environmentalism* I argued that an ecological habitus would help one live well in place, for *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists*, I decided that in an unecological society an ecological habitus is an ideal. *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* re-examines the habitus concept, and examines how environmentally active people conduct themselves. Interrogating the actuated habitus of environmentalists, the paper uses the term "environmental habitus." Specifically, it acknowledges the many ways of being environmentally active, and characterizes four distinct forms of dispositions that seem to constitute important parts of an environmental habitus in a community where such a habitus does not fit smoothly. *Caring for place?* extends that general analysis by narrowing the scope to the domain of "caring for [a] place." This requires analysis of the meanings of place, and the ways that

caring was conceived or practiced. *Caring for place?* concludes with discussion of a compassionate sense of place.

At this point, reiterating that this dissertation is constructed as a series of integrated articles is important. The two papers that follow are not a comprehensive ethnographic portrait of Thunder Bay environmentalism. They are slices, for specific purposes of theory extension and refinement. In addition, they are intended to be independently published and are therefore stylized for journal publication. The articles do not, therefore, exactly fit conventions of most dissertations. Although in the process of writing for the dissertation I have included some aspects that I would expect to eliminate for subsequent journal publication in order to present a more complete picture, these two following papers are not "chapters" in the conventional sense.

Senses of place and envisioning of social and ecological alternatives require different epistemological and ontological frames than those prioritized within modernist social scientific frames. Commenting on the "crisis of representation" in ethnography (and qualitative research generally) and calling for diversity in narrative forms, Tierney (2002) simply states that we should not be apologetic or defensive any longer in our writing of the research. That is challenging when one's future rests on publishing in the face of criticism or otherwise defending one's work! The even greater challenge, of course, would be how to represent the other residents of a place, those who do not have human voice (Russell, 2005). I have not chosen to do that here, but look forward to new ways of presenting "socionatures" (Brady, 2005; White, 2006).

One example is Basso's (1996) continuing anthropological research with the Cibecue Apache. An aspect clearly conveyed in that work is the sort of knowing generated by the places – "wisdom sits in places" is how the Apache informants described them. It is an intersubjectivity between personal and placedness that disputes much of Western epistemological traditions. The book, an anthropological account funded by the National Science Foundation, won a creative nonfiction book award. From his position as an academic with 40 years experience with the Cibecue people Basso (1996) writes,

> The experience of place... is, in anthropology and the social sciences generally, lightly charted territory. There are few intellectual maps for ethnographers to follow, and therefore they are obliged to fashion them for themselves. But where does one turn for direction and helpful ideas? The answer, of course, is wherever one chooses to turn or... wherever things look bright (p. xvi).

Basso found some brightness in a wide assortment of philosophers, historians, poets, naturalists, physicists, and of course, Aboriginal peoples and writers on Native America.

This is the task in this project: to look for helpful ideas with which to weave this tapestry of a concept; to balance rigour and imagination; to find out what is this thing called a compassionate sense of place; and to explore existing logics of practice of environmentalists with an eye toward new perspectives on socio-ecological relations.

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Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists

Research on social movements has looked primarily at activists involved in campaigns. Since the environmental movement has maintained that the everyday lifestyle of the citizen is part of the environmental problem and part of the solution, we would do well to examine also these lifestyle practices and what generates them. Using tools from Bourdieu's sociological method, this ethnographic study considers how environmental "logic of practice" is informed by habitus. A logic of practice is the "feel" for living (sens pratique) generated by internalized and "pre-logical" dispositions (habitus) and the social field. Another approach to explaining the operations of social movements, particularly for members, is that of "cognitive praxis." In this formulation by Eyerman and Jamison, social movements create new knowledge systems.

This research assesses the environmental habitus of environmentally-active persons in a region, finding several common dispositions amidst the great variety of ways of being environmentally active. These individuals tried to live in environmentally responsible ways, but were keenly aware of their inconsistencies. Being different than the dominant ways of being in contemporary society, they engaged in a variety of practices to "self-dispose" or non-cognitively support their environmental dispositions. However, their place in contemporary society where a routinized environmental sensitivity is contrary to the dominant or mainstream logic of practice, led to increased self-awareness. Thus, an environmental habitus could be said to include reflexivity, which appears to contradict the "pre-logical" description of the habitus. Reflexivity is a core part of being environmentally active, and participates in developing movement identity. The paper concludes by explaining the link between sens pratique and cognitive praxis, thereby advancing social movement theory.

Mick Smith (2001) argues, following an extensive survey of sociological and social theory, that for genuine and long-lasting environmental improvements to occur, a social theory grounded in place and everyday practice is needed. He calls for a social theory that is relational in its approach, culminating in an ecological habitus. The result would be an ecologically sound "logic of practice" or "feel for living"– rather than environmental rationality as has been the focus of environmental ethics. Social theory's purpose is to help explain social phenomena. In this case, perhaps the diagnosis can help with prognosis for a more ecologically sound future.

For the most part, research on social movement participants has looked primarily at activists involved in campaigns. Given the goal of the environmental movement to change societal and personal practices in more ecologically adequate ways, the everyday lives of environmentally-active people are at least as significant as the "heat of battle" environmental campaigning (Almanzar, Sullivan-Caitlin & Deane, 1998). This study analyzes the logic of practice of environmentally-active persons involved with environmental organizations. The research is guided by Bourdieu's sociological tools; as others have noted, Bourdieu's concepts are "good to think with" (Camic & Gross, 1998; Reed-Danahay, 2005). It also draws on Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) conceptualization of social movements as "cognitive praxis." Specifically, this research interrogates the broad parameters of the habitus that shapes the lived practice and articulations of practices of environmentally-active people in Thunder Bay, Ontario. Secondarily, it pursues the interrelationship of habitus and cognitive praxis among these individuals in order to advance social movement theory.

Conceptual Background

The complexity of modern society is such that rules for living are near impossible. On a practical basis humans do not live by rules, but by a *modus vivendi*, a way of living rather than a rationally derived ethic. Drawing on French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Smith (2001) argued for reconceptualizing human-environment relationality in terms of an ecological habitus. Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field provide a means of understanding social reproduction without determinism, and integrating agency and structure in a parsimonious manner. Bourdieu's is a relational social theory (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Society is a multilayered edifice of interlocking social fields, each with its internal logic. A field is the intersection of positions held by actants in relation to other actants.[20] The field is constructed by the configuration of their

[20] I have intentionally used this word, drawn from Latour's (1999) work. Since "actors" usually conveys connotations limited to human agency yet for an ecologically-sound social theory the influence (if not action) of non-human components of the ecological community needs to be acknowledged, the term

shifting positions, changing as they interact. Habitus, in Bourdieu's thought, is the internalized and embodied set of general dispositions of a class of actors in a given social setting. Habitus generates practices and beliefs as it forms individual and collective representations of the world. Habitus is thus formed in the biography of social agents, and in everyday practices generated within social fields. Together, the field and its habitus generate practices that work in their context.

Bourdieu's own favourite expression of habitus was as a "feel for the game" of the specific field. This embodied sense of effective play on the field generates what Bourdieu calls the "logic of practice," which acts back upon both the habitus and field which co-generated it. Because this logic is not necessarily cognitive or reasoned, the French equivalent *sens pratique* conveys more of the tacit and unreflexive operations which are at the root of routinized everyday life. For Bourdieu, a key element of habitus was its "pre-logical" character (Wacquant, 2004b). Bourdieu (1998) explains,

> The theory of action that I propose (with the notion of habitus) amounts to saying that most human actions have as a basis something quite different from intention, that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be interpreted as oriented toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that that objective was a conscious design. (pp. 97-98)

Put simply, we do not think about all our actions in everyday life, particularly those practices that have become routine. The common-sense knowledge of what "works" is the *doxa* of the field. Most people would be described as orthodox. In Smith's (2001) analysis, environmentally-sensitive practice is heterodox because in modern society, everyday living of most citizens pays little attention to the environment . Effective and lasting environmental improvement requires that such an "eco-logic of practice" needs to become routinized (see also Bell, 2004).

Habitus is creative, providing a basis for generalized practice able to adjust the variances of circumstances. Therefore, the habitus has also been described as "forms of embodied competence... [the] basis for improvised, innovative action" (Crossley, 2002,

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"actants" opens discursive space that matches socio-ecological realities.

p. 176). It could be extended into the notion of an ecological habitus which generates practices appropriate for the socio-ecological characteristics of a specific place. Smith uses Bourdieu's terminology to discuss the practical sense of living in a way that is consonant with environmental sustainability. An ecologically sensitive habitus can generate the practices effective for the ecology of a particular place, distinguishing what is environmentally sustainable or "right." "The point is that an ethics of place requires that one cultivate a *practical sense* of what is significant and fitting and when and where it is so" (Smith, 2001, p. 219, emphasis added). Ecologically sensitive living is contextual – what works for one place is not necessarily appropriate in another.

Bourdieu's approach prioritizes neither agency nor structure, yet links them in ways very useful for social movement analysis. "Agents act, think, reflect, desire, perceive, make sense, etc. but they always do so by way of habits inherited from the social locations in which they have socialized, which are in turn shaped by wider dynamics of the social world" (Crossley, 2002, p. 175). Crossley notes that few social movement scholars have incorporated Bourdieusian insights into their analyses. Their emphasis has typically been on the deliberate actions of the social movement actors. In contrast, social change from a Bourdieusian framework views the practical logic(s) of society as primarily remaining below the keen of rationality. Yet since the coexistence of habitus and field cogenerate a logic of practice, such a logic that does not fit the dominant field will dwindle without support. An environmental lifestyle needs a social field where an ecological logic of practice 'makes sense.' From the sociological point of view, a significant part of the work of environmental organizations would be oriented toward effecting an ecological logic of practice.

A different approach is that taken by Eyerman and Jamison (1991), who describe social movements as creators of a "cognitive praxis." As they describe,

> The forms of consciousness that are articulated in social movements provide something crucial in the constitution of modern societies: public spaces for thinking new thoughts, activating new actors, generating new ideas, in short, constructing new intellectual 'projects.' (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 161)

The mark of a social movement is the extent to which its cognitive praxis is taken up by

the society in which it operates. If it is incorporated into the society at large, the social movement is a success and will be absorbed; if it is not incorporated, the social movement will become marginal and irrelevant; if partially incorporated, the movement will have to change with the times, and frame its knowledge and practice innovations differently. Analyses such as Yearley (1994), Wall (1998), and the recent "Death of Environmentalism" assertions of Schellenburger and Nordhaus (2004) argued that the cognitive praxis of the environmental movement has been diluted such that it has become less about an overarching vision for social transformation and more about professionalized operation and technical battles over policy cases.

Smith (2001) argues that environmentalism needs both the "practical sense"and a "theoretical (or reflexive) language that can do justice to the idea of... creating new relations to environmental others" (p. 204). Environmental organizations and their members, insofar as they seek transformation, challenge the doxa of society and must certainly include a reflexive and cognitive element. However, Smith emphasized that the logic of practice derived from habitus must be considered as the foremost sociological descriptor of the dynamics of everyday life. From this perspective, Eyerman and Jamison overemphasized the cognitive aspect and both environmentalism's strategies and social movement theory could benefit by including a Bourdieusian theory of practice (Crossley, 2002; Smith, 2001). Scholars of social movement learning show there is a highly tacit dimension to what members apprehend from movement involvement (Conway, 2004; Foley, 1999; Le Cornu, 2005). Such research concludes that praxeological motives and behaviours are not completely available to the cognitive attention of a movement's members.

Similarly, research in environmental education demonstrates that knowledge and behaviour are not well linked. In a survey of the frameworks used to explain the gap between environmental knowledge and environmental behaviour, Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) concluded that cognition is only a small part of environmentally-responsive behaviour. They argue that there are three major barriers to pro-environmental behaviour: lack of internal incentive, lack of environmental consciousness, and lack of external

options. In their final discussion, the two authors note that:

> There are several factors that influence our decisions towards pro-environmental behaviour that we have not elaborated on.... We have not discussed the influence of habits. If we want to establish a new behaviour, we have to practice it. We might be perfectly willing to change our behaviour but still not do so, because we do not persist enough in practicing the new behaviour until it has become a habit. (p. 246)

Such "old behaviour patterns" block all three of the major barriers, they observe. Kollmus and Agyeman's focus on the individual (consistent with the bulk of environmental education practice) ignores social dimensions. In Bourdieu's model "old behaviour patterns" are generated by a durable logic of practice grounded in the habitus created in the particular social space. Pro-environmental behaviour in an unecological society will be difficult to practice as routinized habits of everyday life yet the cognitive aspects of environmental sustainability has continued to be emphasized in most literature and research.

Methodology

The present study sought to clarify any relationship between an ecological habitus and cognitive praxis within the environmental movement. In this study, I have differentiated between an ecological habitus and an environmental habitus. An ecological habitus would be an ecologically sensitive and internalised orientation that drives *appropriate* practices for the ecological characteristics of a specific locale. It is an idealization, given the limits to our ability to know the "best" ecological relationship with the rest of the earth (see Milton, 1997). Furthermore, at the individual lifestyle level access to home and work environments would be needed to investigate ecological habitus-in-action. Access to the participants of the study was through their involvements with environmental organizations. This study focuses on the dispositions and *sens pratique* involved in being environmentally active, what I have called an environmental habitus, rather than those facets of the habitus that would drive ecologically sound lifestyle practices.

The city of Thunder Bay sits in a remote region of Ontario, far in the northwest

corner of the province. Thunder Bay is a large urban centre with a population over 100,000. Nestled on a protected bay of sparkling Lake Superior, it is hundreds of kilometres from other urban centres. The generally working class economy (Dunk, 1991, 1994) revolves around resource extraction and has now experienced more than two decades of economic decline. Outdoor recreation, especially hunting, fishing and snowmobiling are common pursuits.

Deliberate fieldwork occurred between May and December 2002, but I had lived in the city of Thunder Bay for nearly three years previously. While there are about 20 non-profit, non-governmental groups that could be labelled environmental organizations, most are small with few meaningful meetings or events. People also come together in *ad hoc* association over particular matters. During the fieldwork I increased my level of participation with environmental groups by attending public gatherings, as well as more private meetings and personal encounters. During this time I was also involved with other community groups, particularly related to follow-up of a well-publicized study of racism (Haluza-DeLay, 2002, 2003).

Forest issues, and water and land management were the most prevalent issues labelled as “environmental” issues during the research time. Some mobilization began around a proposal for a new power station utilizing “pet-coke” (a byproduct of Alberta tar sands oil production, and disallowed as a fuel by Alberta law). There were some groups dealing with “lifestyle” issues of energy conservation, recycling and consumerism. These latter foci tended to be very local in character. On land management issues, especially forestry and protected lands designations, several provincial or national organizations were involved, but with relatively little local involvement other than specific well-recognized individuals.

I went to every publically advertised environmental event or meeting that I could attend during the period of fieldwork and as many other gatherings as feasible. Field notes were kept with the observations facing constant analysis in order to direct further data collection (Creswell, 1998; Lofland, 1996; Spradley, 1980). I initially focused on environmental organizations, attempting to discern the terrain. Researchers attempting to

delineate the extent of environmentalism in an area are faced with classificatory concerns (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Kempton, et al., 2001). For example, is a hunting and fishing group that does some game management an environmental group? There were other difficult classifications, such as health groups, food security and social sustainability organizations. Ultimately, however, I made the decision that an environmental group was one that sought to protect the environment, and was "recognized" as an environmental group by other groups in the region (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Over time, I learned that many of the same people were involved with two or more groups.

At the close of the field research, 23 interviews with 27 people were conducted. Arcury and Quandt (1999) described a "site-based procedure" for recruiting participants for qualitative studies. Modifying their procedure I generated a list of organizations that had become visible in the participatory phase of the study. Depending on the apparent diversity of viewpoints in the organization, I identified specific individuals to interview. The 27 people are reasonably representative of the field of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) in Thunder Bay. Although I selected the interviewees through their organizational involvements, the individuals were not consistently affiliated over the months of fieldwork. Involvement shifted for a wide variety of reasons.

It is important to note that these were environmentally-active people, not *activists* per se. Three of the interview participants would more fairly be described as "social" activists (anti-poverty, food security, housing), but had been involved in an environmental event. The youngest interview participants were in their late 20s; participants otherwise ranged across the ages into their 70s. Professions included doctors, foresters, biologists, a retired teacher, among others. Eight were actually employed – often part-time or contract – by environmental organizations. Most were volunteers. Eleven of the 27 were female. All were white, which is significant because Aboriginal people make up between 7-15 percent of the population of Thunder Bay. In fact, there were few linkages with Aboriginal organizations. Because there were few Aboriginal

peoples involved in environmental organizations I did not include any representatives. The cross-cultural dimension of coming to understand the concepts and practices in the First Nations cultures of the region would have added a great deal of complexity to the study. Furthermore, social science research has often been historically misused as a tool of colonialism (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). Therefore, this study was limited to participants in environmental organizations.

Fontana and Frey (1994) described an interview as a "co-constructed encounter." Because of the effort to explore deep-seated, often unreflexive, and perhaps unconscious elements of the *sens pratique*, participants and I deliberately conducted the interviews as conversations loosely structured by the question plan (See Appendix A). The interviews took between 45 minutes and two hours. Interviews were tape recorded and converted to digital recordings. Transcription software was used to facilitate the transcribing process (Transana, 2004). This software allowed the typed transcript to be linked to the actual digital recording. Thus, not only were the words available for analysis, but so were the inflections, tone, and other vocal modalities that convey meaning. Full transcriptions were produced of the first dozen interviews; partial transcripts were produced after emerging categories became apparent and saturation of categories began (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). Transcripts and field notes were imported into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package (ATLASti, 2004). Pseudonyms have been used throughout, and in some cases personal details have been obscured to protect anonymity. These documents were coded top-down by a rudimentary coding manual developed prior to analysis and added to during the hermeneutic cycle that followed. A method of constant comparison involving saturation of categories was followed (Creswell, 1998; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). The analysis was guided by the question, "What is the 'feel for the game' of being environmentally concerned and active in Thunder Bay?"

Findings

The difficulty in interrogating environmental habitus is that the very nature of habitus is that it would be unavailable to ready articulation by its holders. As creatures

embedded in a social fabric, we have only a tentative understanding of the social milieu we have internalized. It is evident that the habitus of environmentalists was conditioned by mainstream society as well as by their involvement in the environmental organizations. Furthermore, the embodied sense of being environmentally oriented took many different expressions but contained a number of common components. This constituted the backdrop for the feel for the game of being environmentally-active.

The 27 people interviewed in this research included, among others: employees of environmental organizations, for whom the work was a job that they cared about, but a job nonetheless; employees and volunteers for whom it was a ruling passion for their efforts; a financial analyst known as one of the most effective environmentalists in Thunder Bay who moved comfortably in the nexus of joint corporation-government-ENGO commissions; a vegetarian deep ecologist whose lengthy and greying beard and ponytail conveyed every image of the hippie environmentalist that he was; a city employee who pushed ecological modernization in his workplace and in the business sector, sat on several ENGO boards and drove many miles twice a day to his acreage. Even though all participants were involved in ENGOs and identified themselves as being environmentally-active, it became clear that there were many ways of being environmentally-active. It is conceivable that there will be multiple *sens pratique*. Nevertheless, as different as they were, the environmentally-active persons in this study "recognized" each other as part of "the team." So while there were variations in the way it was expressed, their embodied habitus contained some common dispositions. Four components of an environmental habitus will be discussed, followed by consideration of the roles of environmental organizations.

Characteristics of an Environmental Habitus

First, a general orientation of *trying to live environmentally* appeared. Second, this orientation was in concert with an *awareness of inconsistency*. The consciousness that they were not living as they wanted demonstrates how an environmental habitus brushes up against dominant habitus and practices. Third, given the relatively weak

social support for ecologically sensitive practices, environmentally-active people sought ways to buttress their internalized *sens pratique*. Specifically, they *engaged in self-disposing* through non-cognitive means such as attraction to natural settings, moralizing about "the way things 'should' be," and maintaining a sense that they were "against the mainstream." Such internalized strategies for maintenance of environmental dispositions were generally not explicitly mentioned by participants but were evident in observation and analysis. Finally, and in addition, there was a significant element of *reflexivity* evident in the dispositions of environmentally-active people involved in this study. The socially marginal character of their concerns for the environment surfaced to awareness as the structure of the social field forced inconsistency between the environmental practices they desired and those they could perform. Reflexivity thus became a crucial component to their practices. This fourth facet of environmental habitus draws attention to a role for cognitive praxis in the *sens pratique*. These four facets helped to link the individual to the environmental movement. Despite my use of the "game" metaphor, environmental concern was a serious game to which these people were committed.

Trying to Live Environmentally.

Most salient was an internalised orientation among participants of *trying to live environmentally*. One would probably expect this orientation, as it would be the obvious manifestation of environmental commitment. As noted already, the forms this disposition took differed considerably among the participants in the study. Participants explained and justified and apologized for their lifestyle choices from the commitment of *trying* to live in an environmentally conscious manner. From living out of town and closer to natural settings, to living in town so one could walk or bike; from recycling, reducing waste, and composting to counter-cultural simplicity; from building an energy efficient home to renovating an existing one using reclaimed materials; from getting involved in visible environmental campaigns, to trying to do local things with neighbours to running a business that promoted environmental sustainability; from extensive, wilderness-based recreation to staying close to home – the practices of the participants of this study were

underlain with a deliberate intention to pay attention to environmental considerations. This theme was the underlying "rule" for the game of being environmental, independently defined, but generally consistent. The ability to play by its guidance is closely connected to the next theme, so they will be further elaborated together.

Awareness of Inconsistency.

Participants made considerable judgements about the appropriateness of their specific lifestyle choices and frequently allowed that they were not doing enough or were not consistent in their practices.

> I don't live in an urban setting, or a co-op. I live in the country. My house is surrounded by trees. I don't harvest them. I harvest only what has fallen to the ground. I don't cut trees off my property although wood-burning [to heat the] house. Only those trees that have reached the end of the life-cycle. My children are the same way. We do promote recycling. Composting. Vegetable garden. Not enough to keep us going for a year, but we try to practice what we preach. I have some things that I have not been able to get a handle on. My family is a large consumer of fossil fuels. We commute back and forth – two vehicles, and a third trip back at some point. Can I do anything about that right now? Not if I want to live in the country. (Interview, Edward)

> There's only so much I can do. I've got a few more jackets than I need. How many of those do I give away? And how many of all my stuff do I give? (Interview, Richard)

Others asserted that they could do more, and that their organizations could do more, even while recognizing that many members contributed a lot of effort, and might even be tapped out. Nearly every participant expressed at some point that they did not "always do everything right."

In many ways, acceptable practices were a matter of living in this society. To be environmentally-active already meant being different than others. Many of the interviewees pointed out that the general public does not want to hear that they should be doing more. Christoff represented this when he observed that "A lot of [other] people just lose out because traditions are too big, and I think it's because they don't bite enough of the piece off. They don't say: well, maybe I can change just by buying a fluorescent

fixture." Socially acceptable ways of doing things – traditions, in Christoff's words – were the context in which these environmentally-active people conducted their lives. As they observed, their own attempts to live in a more environmentally-conscious manner set them apart from others in the community.

> I suppose things are better than they used to be, but I don't think that [they've changed much] – look at recycling, our blue-bag program, depots. Go down the street in this neighbourhood on a day when it's blue-bag pick-up day and you'll hardly see any blue-bags. (Interview, Richard)

> But still the pesticide issue. Like, 'I cannot have a dandelion on my lawn – what will my neighbours think?' There are still a lot of people out there who cannot bear to cancel the weed man because the neighbors might hate them if they have a dandelion. You know that's still very strong. (Interview, Mary).

The participants in this study were often alert to the "unusualness" of their dispositions in the broader social field. And while they sought to live consistent with their environmental beliefs, they found it difficult at times. Their own practices would be affected as they worried about being perceived by their neighbours. This was partly related to being negatively labelled as an environmentalist (and will be addressed later).The study participants further expressed some sense that their lives and the choices about their practices were not completely their own. For example,

> Because if you can do it then [live an environmentally-appropriate lifestyle in some settings], why can't you do it now? The only difference is the fact that we – don't know when – became a consumer society.... [It's] related to time – go to a drive-through because I have to be somewhere. So drive-through, with the packaging, and my car idles. What's wrong with the planning, that you can't sit down? We recognize that as part of our culture, but what can we do to break that vicious loop, and say 'This is what you can do to help your quality of life issues, and future generations?' (Interview, Edward)

Most of the interview participants talked about their own lifestyles as Edward did. While the details were different, an apologetic tone demonstrated an awareness of self-established inconsistencies with what they thought were the "better" practices of their normative environmental logic. Similarly, reasons for the inconsistencies varied, but this *awareness of inconsistency* is an important part of recognizing that an environmental habitus does not match what even an environmentally-active person would assert is a

properly ecological praxis. Awareness of inconsistency in their own lives also illuminated how an environmental habitus brushed up against dominant habitus and practices. This sense of being "against" the mainstream was part of the following themes as well.

Engaged in Self-Disposing.

The above awareness implies a reflexive or self-scrutinizing element in what I have described as an environmental habitus. But there are indications that these people used various non-cognitive or unconscious means to maintain the practical logic for living environmentally in the face of inconsistencies due to societal limitations and personal contradictions. Due to the fact that these efforts were generally not discussed explicitly by participants and appeared more as internalisations, I describe these methods here as "*engaging in self-disposing*." The intent is to highlight the strategic, albeit unconscious, character of these strategies resulting in practical action that supported or reinforced their existing dispositions. Such efforts included seeking natural settings, identifying themselves as nature's protector, claiming to act on the basis of "caring" (instead of self-interest),[21] and feeling part of a movement that was opposed by forces allied against their deeply-held environmental convictions. To illustrate, this section will focus on two strategies that demonstrate this component of the environmental habitus – the use of "nature" and the sense of being "against" mainstream social institutions and practices.

One of the clearest examples of the use of nature as a self-disposing practice occurred during a meeting of people from around the Lake Superior Basin on environmental threats to the basin. This meeting occurred as the final stop in an around-

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[21] In Bourdieu's (1990) theory, "disinterest" is an illusion that actually masks deep social norms of reciprocity that are part of the play upon the field. Appearances of disinterest serve as symbolic capital, to be exchanged for other benefits in due time (Lane, 2000). For example, "protecting nature" is a more symbolically powerful position than "protecting my recreation opportunities." Similarly, when corporations advocate development as increasing jobs in a community, they are expressing a level of disinterest more socially legitimate than their real motives of increasing financial profit-taking.

the-lake tour, and was the second tour meeting I had attended. There was a sense of defeat in the small crowd, a defeatism that I had noted in other encounters with a variety of movement members. As one person commented, "Our action is so small compared to the assault on the watershed" (Fieldnotes, November 14). However, the meeting began with one of the main organizers giving an overview. He started by talking about his drive up from Duluth. "We sat by the water, watched trees hanging onto the rock..." he said. It was fascinating to hear this story, as it corresponded to a common pattern of environmental narrative, that of the rejuvenatory power of natural settings and the consequent importance of protecting "nature" (Kitchell, Hannan & Kempton, 2000). Others in the small audience nodded. The narrative set the stage for the meeting as one about this group taking the responsibility to protect nature, arrayed against others who would be destroying it via contamination or development of Lake Superior.

Similarly, at another meeting, held in a provincial park, we trooped out at lunch on an interpretive nature walk led by one of the participants. Comments immediately before the walk indicated that people accepted that time in nature would provide the refreshment for continuance of the meeting. Not only does this incident point out the salience of the nature trope, but also the contradictions of those who are environmentally intent. Ironically, as we all walked past the parking lot, we realized that everyone had driven their own car out to the park, an hour from Thunder Bay. In an interview months later, Richard (who had not been present at that meeting) commented on similar occurrences,

> How many people go to a meeting who live within a few blocks of each other and drive themselves separately? How many green people – [Green] Party people – are going to be the only person in their car there, without having thought, 'why didn't we organize a car pool?' It's because we're so used to going out and jumping in our cars. (Interview, Richard)

The reason given for the meeting to be held at that location had been that in order to develop an environmental network for the region the group should meet in one of its most beautiful places. Such reasoning further demonstrates the internalised code of nature used to support environmental dispositions.

In numerous other ways, the study participants referenced nature – backyard nature, green space, recreational experiences, caring for creeks or birds or bird habitat – as a means by which they maintained their orientation to environmental involvements. Even the interviewees who were more focused on social justice referred to nature as important to their personal orientations. For example, an affordable housing advocate told me that she "doesn't get out as much as I'd like." While well aware that few of her clients had such opportunities, she felt that this was a human necessity and important to maintain. Environmental issues are not all about nature, as numerous analysts have pointed out. But the stereotype persists, due in part to the nature-disposition that forms part of the habitus of environmentalism (Greenbaum, 2005). Greenbaum's analysis demonstrated how appreciation for nature is culturally trained, and is deployed within environmentalism as a means of status distinction. Such a nature-orientation, however, is a barrier to cross-movement fusion with other forms of social and environmental activism.[22]

A second example of self-disposing strategies was the positioning of environmental concern as opposing and being opposed by powerful (and often unspecified) social forces. This oppositionality, or sense of "against," was clearly visible in many observation settings and underlay many of the interviewees' expressions of being environmentally-involved. The internalisation of oppositionality is evidenced in the following exchange from fieldnotes taken at a meeting of a group trying to form a wind energy co-operative. In the exchange, they discussed another meeting of stakeholders trying to develop a different wind energy project associated with the regional electrical generation company.

> Someone mentioned that Monday was the meeting of the Community Sustainable Energy Association. If I remember correctly, this is a fairly well-to-do association, not working with people, but seeking ways to make good money off of renewable energy. Someone commented "I'm cynical" because the cost to attend reduces civil society participation.

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[22] Such as environmental justice, which has been heavily urban-oriented, and concerned for issues such as safe housing, health, toxics and ground-level pollution far removed from standard perceptions of "nature."

Ernie: Yes, and [electrical] grid costs cut out smaller scale operations.
Peter: Rural development plans force people into urban centres.
Richard: By charging attendance costs, and application fees limits who shows up.
Helen: Even convention costs do the same.
Laurie: If that's the political environment [here in Thunder Bay], are we going to be blocked at every step?
Ernie: If so-and-so's name [name deleted] shows up, you wonder what's behind the scenes. ([Name deleted] is a Thunder Bay city councillor. He's a businessman in town and is generally considered to be one of the pro business slate. He's also the council representative to and for this 'association'). (Fieldnotes, October 31)

A rapidly developing issue near the end of my field time was a proposal for an energy production facility that would be run on "pet-coke." A group of about nine gathered in the shared home of two activists to discuss options. Many of the participants were very concerned that this was happening in their community. I wrote in my fieldnotes:

> I got the sense that in this meeting that there was a NIMBY thing happening. People were concerned about the kinds of effects this pet-coke plant might have. They were against it. They didn't really have alternatives. At one time people talked about how bad the coal-fired plants in Atikokan are, but nobody had any alternatives. They were against, without seeming to show a sense that energy production still needs to happen. Of course it seems that this pet-coke plant is an environmental bad, and probably to be fought against. However, most everything at this meeting gave me a sense of *Against*, just *Against Things*. (Fieldnotes, June 25)

At times there was surprise and a sense of "How could people think this way?" For example, at one meeting of the Lake Superior Basin group, one of the organizers said that the U.S. Corp of Army engineers "tried to replumb the Great Lakes." People reacted, sitting up more alertly, looking around, with expressions of surprise and "aghast". There was a common sense of having a different sort of orientation from the mainstream.

The sense of being "against" sometimes became visible as motivation for being environmentally active, as exemplified in this comment by Chrissy:

> I think the people involved with Earth Home partly perceive a threat to this city... and we want to see some changes. I mean we see the coal-fired generating plant. We see the smoke coming out of the mill all the time, and we're looking at that and thinking, there has to be a better way. And we're very much involved in the

> wind energy study that's going on and alternative energies for the city... So at the same time as we have that positive sense of, we want to do some good stuff... we also have that sense of impending doom that this community, and any community based on primary natural resources, is doomed unless we start taking care of those resources.

But more than just as motivation, this sense of opposing and being opposed was internalised as supporting dispositions for remaining environmentally-active.

None of these methods of buttressing their dispositions for living environmentally – nature experiences or oppositionality, nor the others mentioned above – were consciously deliberate for these environmentally active people. These strategies were ways to maintain an environmental habitus in a field where that habitus did not fit. Because of their non-cognitive and internalised character, calling them dispositions of the environmental habitus is appropriate. Furthermore, as these strategies were normalized in the subfield of people involved with environmental organization, they served to support some degree of identification with the environmental movement, even if, as we shall see, these people did not claim the labels of "environmentalist."

Aware of their Reflexivity.

Finally, there was a significant element of *reflexivity* in the habitus of the environmentally-active people included in this study. By reflexivity, I mean practices open to sustained self-scrutiny (Adams, 2006). The ways that their environmental convictions were experienced as socially mis-fit led to understandings of marginality, oppositionality and inconsistency, thus making awareness and analysis crucial components of their practice. This fourth facet of environmental habitus even more clearly helped to link the individual to the environmental movement. It also drew attention to roles that cognitive praxis may have in the *sens pratique* of a social movement.

As described above, trying to live environmentally yet being aware of their inconsistencies was an important part of the internalised dispositions of the study participants. Part of the reflexive dimension was analysis about the nature of this

inconsistency and the felt opposition which could then lead back to self-scrutiny.

> I was getting tired of that banging my head against the wall and making lots of noise but basically not getting heard, except by people – you know – the converted already. And I started to look at what was going on around me and people were talking about bad air, water – tracing that back through the political process and what could be done about that. This was about the mid-80's when I started to focus my learning on how ecosystems actually function, and the human impact on that function. (Interview, Richard)
>
> I was working on that Nuclear thing [deep-depositing wastes in the boreal shield] and you might get engaged in a particular issue and see how corrupt or unfair the system is. And that just fuels you to continue to do your work.... I know that happens to me emotionally – I see injustices that occur against common sense and knowledge and science... So when I see that – I get more engaged when I see those injustices occurring. (Interview, Jack)
>
> For me, it's been incredibly hard to break through that barrier of letting anybody see me act out. On the one hand, I'm a performer [She is a professional musician] but that's still a very particular role. You know, you step into the role and do it.... But to become an activist, to go out and organize a rally, then I'm saying 'I have an opinion about what's going on in this world and about our government and what it means to live in this country and I'm going to stand up and say that.' You know and I know that that is somewhat scandalous to do. (Interview, Laurie)

Such self-awareness was a form of self-education. Reflexivity was a developing practice.

Ultimately, for the environmentally-active, reflexivity became a regular part of their way of life. Repeatedly, participants referred to their environmental engagement as making them think differently, which they then sought to help others do also. "You have to put the burrs under the saddle and make people think [about doing things differently]," is how Roger saw his efforts. In contrast, many of the interviewees believed that most people would only become conscientized by a personal experience or threat – a "pinch" in the words of two different interviewees. Short of a pinch, or directly experienced threat to family, neighbourhood or other personally relevant matters, it was difficult to get others interested in environmental concerns. The disposition for reflexive analysis may itself be a problem.

> I find that with a lot of activists, they're too far down the road. Maybe they partially live in the changed world but it hasn't changed yet. So they develop plans and programs and stuff that don't work because the people that are in there

> [municipal government or other positions of influence] aren't ready for them. (Interview, Richard)

Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that high degree of reflexivity was standard practice for an environmental habitus. That habitus itself is conditioned by the logic of practice of the environmental field, is shown by the consistency with the environmental master narrative of nature of the practice of self-disposing with nature. There were also "blind spots" among the varieties of environmental involvements. One such blind spot was the lack of association with other types of community development organizations, or the large Aboriginal community in the region, which has considerable political power, land management responsibilities, economic development desires and comprises about an eighth of the population. Finally, there were also considerable differences in their analyses of the causes of environmental problems, and little commonality in whether incremental change would be adequate or transformational social change would be necessary to resolve persistent environmental problems, particularly on global scale.

The four components expressed here – trying to live environmentally, awareness of inconsistency, efforts at self-disposing, and a reflexive awareness – are components of an environmental habitus. They represent important aspects of feel for the game of being environmentally-active in this community. These characteristics also demonstrate why there are many ways of being environmentally active. The dispositions will and did generate a variety of practical logics. Together, such components provided a practical sense of living environmentally, and united the diverse people who engaged with environmental organizations in Thunder Bay.

Environmental Organizations and Being Environmentally Active

As already noted, there were many ways of being environmentally-active yet the participants of the study had a number of internalised dispositions in common. These dispositions guided their involvements, constituting their serious play at being environmentally-active. Environmental organizations played a role in supporting the

practical action of being environmentally-active, and, to a lesser degree, were sites for learning of environmental praxis. That is, they were sites for development and maintenance of an environmental habitus. While becoming committed to the environment had developed over a long time for some of the interviewees, it was relatively more recent for others. Even some longtime environmentalists, like Samantha, Chuck, Virgil, and Sam, described ways in which the organizational involvement had facilitated greater learning, and commitment for them.

There was little deliberate education in the organizations. Because of this detail, most learning involved with environmental organizations was incidental. Participants described it as significant, however.

> Your behaviour does change. I think your level of awareness, understanding – it's education in a way. I mean that's obvious you work at a job for a couple of years and you're gonna learn something and I think you do. I can't speak for Mary [She is agreeing] but I do think your behaviour does change as a result of some of the things that do go on. I think those are positive changes. (Interview, Brian)

> Randy: Has your involvement with environmental work changed your understanding of yourself?
>
> Edward: [Quickly] Oh yeah. Oh yeah. There's no doubt. I think it's a combination of things – you've probably experienced this. [It's a] combination of learning, age, wisdom, children, partnerships. It doesn't end just because you've walked out the door. You have a desire to learn. (Interview, Edward)

> What I notice – I notice it when I go home to Kingston. I am more conscious of being less materialistic than people around me. I don't think I have really changed much, it's just [being] more conscious than other people are. I was wandering behind three women, each who had 2 shopping carts... (Interview, Mary)

Mary, like Brian, was an employee of an environmental organization. She had clearly stated that the job was meaningful, but it was a job and not a passion. Nevertheless, she said because of the job, "I've changed a lot of the way I do things, like the way I do things at home." Many of the interview participants expressed how the environmental involvements with which they were engaged as employees or volunteers had produced subtle shifts in themselves, as represented above.

In some cases, environmental organizations had a more deliberate educative

effect. Stan gave credit to a presentation at some meeting for raising his awareness enough to get involved, eventually even to the point of starting his own organization. Similarly, Olivia and Garry were at a presentation that helped them realize the significance of a particular issue that had affected them as homeowners, giving them the knowledge basis for addressing the issue in what turned out to be a lengthy, expensive, but provincially-significant and precedent-setting battle. Organizations made a deliberate effort to provide some learning opportunities, primarily through presentations and speakers. However, most interviewees allowed that information alone was not enough to generate social change in environmental awareness. More importantly than deliberate educative forums, organizations gave people a place to "plug-in." Organizational involvement provided a site for seeing action happening, for pooling efforts to make a productive change, or for interacting with similar-minded people said participants.

Some of the members of the organizations, and even organizations themselves, did not consider themselves environmentalists. The term "environmentalist" had reduced value in Thunder Bay, which even the staunchest environmentalist recognized. At one meeting, an activist stated "Young students feel they don't want to be called environmentalists but would go to an anti-globalization rally" (Fieldnotes, May). Chrissy referred to "... negativity towards so-called tree huggers. People think 'I just don't want to hear one more thing is wrong with how I'm living.'" Numerous interviewees mentioned that environmentalists were viewed as always saying "nothing is ever good enough." Others noted the difficulty of the word "environmentalist" in a community with a high degree of mining and timber production. As a result, some of the groups did not label themselves as environmental organizations. Nevertheless, such organizations played a role in shaping the many ways of being environmental, including the development of an environmental *sens pratique*.

The Thunder Bay Field Naturalists (TBFN) provided an example of these processes. Virgil, one of the organization's officers, observed that "local nature clubs are a gathering point... we have information, but we *see* [emphasized] the problems on the land." Three interviewees mentioned that being on one of the committees of TBFN

tasked with fact-finding and crafting positions for the membership had heightened their attention to environmental problems. The organization had recently come to understand itself differently which also affected its members. For example, at one of the monthly meetings, Virgil presented some of the land protection and wildlife enhancement activities of the group. “We expanded until we're a real conservation organization with many interests, not just ornithology,” he announced. The organization had been quite involved in a province-wide campaign to preserve large natural areas and create new protected spaces (the Lands for Life project), and, as I summarized, “It seemed to have given them the idea that naturalists should be involved with conservation.” (Fieldnotes, September 23). Similarly, at a different point in that meeting, another member commented, “Being this is the naturalists’ club, our philosophy is one of recycling. We have recycled [name deleted] through all the [organization’s] jobs!” (Fieldnotes, September 23). Virgil later confirmed that the Lands for Life campaign had caused some in the group to rethink their natural history interests and convert them to conservation or environmental concerns. As time passed, the organization and its members identified more with environmental practices, and were beginning to see this as an accurate identification.

On the other hand, a person heavily involved with Ducks Unlimited (DU) definitively declared TBFN to be “an environmental group.” Doug had been surprised to have found common ground between TBFN and DU in joint land protection efforts. Although repeatedly declaring DU was not the hunter’s group it has often been perceived, he was also uncomfortable with DU being increasingly identified as an environmental group, which was a relatively new organizational strategic plan. “So we are an environmental group, up to a point,” he qualified. Ironically, that new trajectory committed him less to the organization, and allowed more personal time, which he used for involvement in a lake management committee and for lifestyle-oriented practices.

One of the organizers of another group which primarily worked to protect the urban forest of Thunder Bay and engaged in tree-planting (which were not strictly intended as beautification projects), had an interesting response when I asked if the

organization was an environmental organization.

> Stan: We're never... we don't promote it and members may not make that connection.
> Randy: Are you [an environmentalist]?
> Stan: Oh definitely.
> Randy: Is [organization name deleted] an environmental organization? [Asked for second time.]
> Stan: Yes, when it comes down to it and when you look at other areas, like urban growth... The label as an environmental group carries a lot of baggage. Rightly or wrongly it carries that baggage. (Interview, Stan)

Stan later talked about his interest in promoting greenspace generally, and how he once got involved in a presentation to city council on a development project. He noted that one councillor "Thought we should be sticking to trees. Thought it was muddying the image [of the organization]. He's taking a very narrow view of what we're about." Per Bourdieu's sociological approach, we can see that as this organization operated on the social field, those operations contributed to the shaping of the field and the shaping of local habituses. Progressing from trees, to greenspace, to development in general, the organization extended its purview. This position-taking contributed to shaping notions of what could be construed as legitimate concerns and practices, eventually extending to what is "environmentally" appropriate. And in the process, the effects shaped Stan, and (he thinks) other members' internalisations and identifications.

The examples above represent how the environmentally-active participants in this study incorporated organizational involvements, along with other sources of environmental knowledge, into their own practice in ways that formed dispositions for practice. That there were many 'ways of being environmentally active' suggests that researchers must avoid a singular approach conveyed by the idea of a "movement" (Lofland, 1996), and attend to the fragmented and complex character of the environmental field. There was recognition of other persons as environmentally involved, despite the range of environmental practice, suggesting that there are commonalities among them. Furthermore, organizational involvement had some effect on personal dispositions.

This finding provokes consideration about ways that an environmental habitus

can become more mainstream. Some pro-environmental change had occurred, observed numerous of the study's participants. Brian's explanation represented most of the interviewees:

> I was thinking – there is almost a level of background noise out there about environmentalism. It used to be a big thing when someone screamed or shouted or this organization or that organization [said or did something]. Now it's a background roar almost ... It's out there and everyone accepts it as part of business now. Even the ZWAT people [a business group addressing waste reduction], they accept it as a part of business. (Interview, Brian)

Many others acknowledged the business community and the general public as having more awareness of the environment than in the past. However, most also struggled to explain why more change, despite the evidence of environmental degradation, was not occurring. An ill-defined "social" dimension was accused.

> I think what holds people back on certain things is the perception that, you know 'You're [sarcastic] riding the bus?'... I think there's a social aspect to all this that I just can't define. In some ways it's advancing because it is socially acceptable to recycle or naturalize your lawn... [but] I think the social aspect has a hold that's larger than we give it [credit]. (Interview, Brian)

> [People are] doing things because it's politically incorrect not to. Not because they truly believe that it has any connection to place or to save the environment it's because all the neighbours are putting the blue bags out so I will too. (Interview, Mary)

> I don't know what that [social change in environmental attitudes] is. It's not like people don't have the information. The information is there.... Anything we're doing or not doing is not because of a lack of information. So what is it? What's the key here? (Interview, Chrissy)

As noted, information was not perceived as being sufficient to change practices and attitudes in more pro-environmental directions. Yet they were unsure what could produce the changes that they felt necessary. I propose a more sociologically robust explanation based on habitus and *sens pratique* would lead to more effective environmental strategy.

Analysis

Interpretation of the data presented above helps us to understand certain aspects

of the environmental movement and its effects on those involved. Clearly, there was no singular way of being an environmentally-active person. It has also demonstrated that such persons understood to a certain extent that the effort to be environmentally consistent often falls short. This led to efforts to shore up their environmental dispositions as well as a greater degree of self-reflexivity about the personal and societal difficulty in doing so. And organizations had a role in the developing understanding and practice of environmental concerns. It is possible that organizations can have a greater role in facilitating the development of an ecological habitus.

Bostrom's (2004) study of the members of six Swedish environmental organizations asserted that members incorporated the organizational "cognitive practice," thereby assuming organizational identity as their own.[23] Environmentalists maintained different positions in the environmental field in accord with their organizational operational focus (e.g., "eco-labelling," "green democracy," "nature's protectors"). However, Bostrom's research focused on the cognitive aspect of environmentalist work and was ultimately unconvincing for this reason. Emphasizing the cognitive as Bostrom does fails to address important aspects of what happened in Thunder Bay in two important regards. First, Bostrom focused on how organizations "frame" their campaigns. While there are relatively clear demarcations in Thunder Bay between organizations as environmental actors and between them and other social actors (and perhaps professionalized organizations prevalent in Bostrom's research are more careful about their framing and other cognitive practices), the Thunder Bay organizations seem more to have stumbled along as they found "things to do." So rather than codified rules and knowledges as Bostrom emphasized for cognitive practices, those involved with Thunder Bay's environmental organizations had a sense of what to do, and only in retrospect were able to look back to see distinct patterns that more or less matched a general orientation

[23] Bostrom nodded to Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) theory of social movements as cognitive praxis, then focused almost exclusively on "framing," that is, the diagnostic and prescriptive messages which organizations employ to explain the problem and mobilize for solutions. This is not the same as saying that movements develop new forms of thinking and social organization, as Eyerman and Jamison did in their conceptualization of cognitive praxis.

in their organizational identity. Even more precisely, Thunder Bay's environmental organizations were the people. If Samantha said something was a significant parcel of nature and should be protected or Jack put out a media statement on some concern, or Roger got a toxic waste project going, or Edward or Mary or Brian or Dawn thought it important to address a lifestyle practice such as water conservation, pesticide-free lawns or automobile idling, the various organizations became the visible proponent. The concerns and actions (and means of approaching them) of individuals were then perceived as TBFN's conservation project, or Environment North's position, or the Remediation Action Project's work, or EcoSuperior's, Earth Home's or ZWAT's project. In actual operation, the organizations were the people, rather than the people being "of the organization."

This highlights the second contradiction with the work of Bostrom and others who have emphasized the cognitive aspect of social movement activity. For the individuals involved in Thunder Bay, acquisition of differentiated organizational framing could not be discerned. Participants in this study blurred concepts and incorporated into themselves as environmentally-interested persons a diversity of beliefs, practices and analyses drawn from a variety of sources. Moreover, it was clear that this process was less intentionally thought out than that these things became embodied dispositions that then structured their diverse ways of being environmentally-active. Thus, the participants internalised a form of movement identity, without necessarily specifying their association with the environmental movement. The point is that to focus on the cognitive aspects of practice may miss a great deal of the other facets of environmental practice. Researchers may then misconstrue the practical ways that people actually develop ecological awareness and behaviour and recommend ineffective environmental education and communication efforts. In other words, that we read the logic of theory into the logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1998).

Horton (2003) presented somewhat of an alternative in his analysis of environmental "distinctions." Horton examined the environmentalist field in a northern British city. The purpose of his study was to articulate the "codes" of being

environmentalist, that is, how one earns "'green distinction,' the markings of a green identity" (p. 64). Earning such distinction occurred, not through the articulation of an environmental philosophy, but by "the embodied performance.... following the logic of their habitus, playing according to green cultural codes" (p. 64). According to Horton, "green capital" was gained through such practices as type of clothing (fleece or scruffy-looking), frequenting of certain stores or cafes, purchasing certain items (and displaying them), or being carless. However, although Horton did highlight some differentiation among environmentalists, he implied that certain ways of being an environmentalist were recognized by other environmentalists as the most legitimate way.

Horton dismissed what he termed "environmental culture," citing the need for broad relevance in order to create sustainable societies. Perhaps it was the narrow distinctiveness of certain types of green lifestyles that Horton seems to have observed that led him to the conclusion that environmental culture is not broadly relevant. Thunder Bay's environmentally-active people incorporated a wide variety of ways of being environmentally active into their practices and their self-identification. Even the "old-hippie" participants at the pet-coke meeting warmly welcomed a late arrival, a lawyer arriving in his suit. Such heterogeneity is potentially beneficial because sustainability will rely on practical environmental logics routinized in everyday practice in many such positions within a complex society. Also present were other influences, including the effects of an un-ecological society as the field pushing against the ecologically-oriented habitus of the environmentally active. However, such *sens pratique* will remain unlikely or weak without cultural settings in which the practices make sense. Hence the role for social fields, such as environmental organizations, in which this alterity as environmentally-oriented is normalized and supported. This research shows that environmental organizational involvements had effects on members' understandings of themselves and the internalisation of environmental praxis, diverse as it was.

The findings of this study, while pointing to limitations in social movement theory's understanding of cognitive praxis, support a synthesis of this concept with habitus in social movements, at least in the case of environmental involvement. There

was a *sens pratique* for how to live well environmentally that had a cognitive element because of the experience of being marginal to the "normal logic" of the social field. Reflexivity was therefore important as a dimension of the habitus of environmentally-active people, supporting the notion that movements must create cognitive awareness of movement alternatives for social structure or personal praxis. Reflexivity had a role in disrupting the doxa of society.

"Habitus is naturalized" (Meisenhelder, 1997, p. 166), but the ecological habitus cannot be, because it is not "natural" to the field of an unecological society. The social field and its habitus exerted pressure on the study participants' efforts for ecologically sound practices, thus forcing attention on their attempts to live in more ecologically appropriate ways. An environmentally-oriented *sens pratique* does not "fit" the mainstream social world. Once alert to their alterity, these people began to think about the lack of fit between an unecological society and their attempts to be ecologically appropriate. Thus, an environmental habitus cultivated ecological practices plus a measure of reflexivity, constituting the environmental *sens pratique* (Figure 3).

In Figure 3 this reflexive *sens pratique* leads to analysis in line with the movement, along with movement involvement and identification with the movement. It converts into the personally-appropriated cognitive praxis of the movement, which latterly acts on the individual habitus and on the social field.

Acknowledging reflexivity as part of the disposition of an alternative habitus helps to account for how habitus could potentially provide an analysis or critique of the society in which it is derived. If habitus as an unconscious manifestation of the social field drives the strategies of the actor on the field it would be largely invisible to the actor. Yet without being visible, the actor would have little ability to perceive his or her own strategies, much less develop any understanding of the 'doxa' native to the field or act in a fashion that presents alternatives to the dominant logics of the field (Karakayali,



Figure 3. Representation of the relationship of habitus, reflexivity and cognitive praxis in environmental social movements.

2004; LiPuma, 1993, Maton, 2003).[24]

That habitus may include reflexivity seems counter to its pre-logical and doxic character as described by Bourdieu. However, Bourdieu allowed that under some

[24] Bourdieu himself accords his ability to perceive the habitus (especially the academic one, Bourdieu, 1988) as a function of his insider/outsider status, according to Reed-Danahay (2005) in an account of the development of Bourdieu's theories that draws on his writing as something of an autoethnographic database. My reading of Reed-Danahay's analysis is that Bourdieu, reaching the top echelon of French academia, positioned himself in this insider/outsider position as a strategy that enabled and justified his critiques of French academia. By this reading, the insider/outsider station is inadequate to explain the development of genuine reflexivity to counter the epistemic capital of the doxa (Maton, 2003).

Where could reflexivity vis a vis the environmental (mis)logic of Canadian society come from for these environmentally-active informants? Building on the insider/outsider position, one could suggest that "nature" helps provide that outsider element. Nature is often considered outside of social reckoning, and considerable research has shown that nature experiences are often important in the life history of environmentalists (e.g., Kahn, 1999). However, if our perceptions of nature are socially constructed, then narratives about nature can hardly justify such a distinction; Kempton et al. (2001) studied the social shaping of narratives within environmental discourse. Furthermore, criticisms of this distinction exist with urban or environmental justice activists, or activists from the Global south who will have different cultural constructions of "nature" (Guha, 1989; Milton, 1997). In addition, we are never *outside* society, nor not *inside* nature, although we may be more or less oblivious to one or the other. Thus, "nature" is not a true "source" of reflexivity. It could be a source of epistemic capital – that is, a resource of information that can help reorganize knowledge (which is always socially constructed) – to help produce reflexivity.

conditions the habitus could be altered, particularly when it was mis-fit with the field (although he considered that the field conditions usually changed before the habitus). An habitus that includes a reflexive component is particularly relevant in light of recent theorizing about "reflexive modernization," namely, that the features of this period of late modernity have meant that society and individuals are subject to increased demand to constantly reconstruct themselves and their practices (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994)."The question 'How shall I live?' has to be answered in day-to-day decisions" with far less sure foundations upon which to rely than ever before (Giddens, 1991, p. 14).

Such theorizing is contrasted by theorists who seek to explain continuity, gradual change and resistance, as did Bourdieu in the concept of habitus. Adams (2006) summarized several attempts to "hybridize" reflexivity and habitus, observing that "the persistence of forms of habitus heavily qualify, but do not fully deny, the transformative potential of reflexivity" (p. 516). In particular, Adams argued that the limit of reflexivity is in the wielder's potential to exercise meaningful choice, that is, "convert 'reflexions' into meaningful realities" (p. 524). Without such positional power, reflexivity is rather meaningless. Organizations, as places to "plug-in," concentrate individual effort.

This highlights the relevance of social movement organizations, and moves us further along the trajectory represented in Figure 3. The mis-fit with the field generated a sort of analysis – "Why is it so hard to be environmental?" and "What could be done?" – and for these people at least the answers involved continuing involvement with environmental organizations. Thus, habitus and reflexivity were combined with movement participation to become a sort of "movement identity." The organization(s) then became an anchor point – of collective identity, or socio-ecological analysis, or how to be environmentally-involved – from which support for identity and practice was found (Bostrom, 2004; Melucci, 1996). The environmental organization could potentially become a new field that encouraged environmental habitus, or even supported its maintenance in the face of a dominating social field while individualized *sens pratique* became affiliated with the cognitive praxis of the social movement organization. The combination of reflexivity, practice, and movement involvement participated in shaping

analysis and identity among the environmentally-involved. This became the genuine cognitive praxis of the movement, which then operated back on both individual habitus and the social field. The pressure exerted by the dominant field became a little easier to handle within the system of meaning provided by the intersubjective relations of the social movement organization.

As depicted in Figure 3, *sens pratique* and cognitive praxis are placed in relation to each other. In contemporary society we have seen some acceptance of mildly environmental practices, such as a generalized concern for the environment, recycling, and moderate environmental regulation (although these are being rolled back, see Paehlke, 2000). This shows that there has been some shift toward inclusion of certain ecological practices in the mainstream logic of practice (Almanzar, et al., 1998; Dunlap, 2005). Recycling, for example, has become a somewhat regular practice for more people.

Nevertheless, while an habitus that generates an ecologically appropriate *sens pratique* may be the eventual goal, it is clear that we are not there: consumption of energy and materials is escalating, as is environmental degradation. Therefore, the environmental movement's cognitive praxis is still important until an environmental praxis sufficient for the resolution of environmental problems becomes normalized. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no single cognitive praxis of the environmental movement (Brulle, 2000). There are presently many ways by which the diverse cognitive praxes of the movement affect either field or habitus. We would expect this to remain so, even were the broad parameters of environmental awareness more fully absorbed by the broader society.

Conclusion

This research demonstrates several conclusions related to the development of an ecological habitus. First, an ecological *sens pratique*– a feel for the game of living in an ecologically sound manner – is more realistic than a rule-directed ethic in the construction of environmental lifestyles. Second, reflexivity is important, particularly when a position is recognizably marginal, as are social movements. Third, "the feel for

the game of living ecologically" needs to be extended via deliberate articulation. An ecological ethos with explication would be the effective praxis of the environmental movement. Fourth, this articulation will compete with other logics of practice to shape the habitus of the local community.

That this contestation occurs at all is a hopeful sign. Habitus is not so determined nor sedimented as some critics will make it. That there is a reflexive component, and that the doxic *sens pratique* can link with the alternative construction of a social movement's cognitive praxis means that there is a learning component, which social movements and environmental educators can exploit. Although the primary habitus will remain deeply influential, a secondary habitus can be shaped by social movements such as the environmental movement (Reed-Danahay, 2005). As Wacquant (2004a) notes, critical thought is "solvent of the doxa." Moreover, it is possible for environmental organizations to be the social field upon which an ecological habitus can be shaped, supported, and maintained in opposition to the unecological logic of practice of our contemporary society. This would seem particularly important in that the environmental movement presents a way of life that differs from the dominant logic of the modern world and which will seem peculiar to that logic.

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Caring for place? Possibilities for a *compassionate sense of place* among environmentalists

A place-conscious ethos of care - what I have called "a compassionate sense of place" - was co-explored with people involved in environmental organizations in a specific geographic locale. Data was collected through ethnographic methods and interviews using "living in place" and "caring" as heuristics. Both place and caring are practice-based logics that challenge universalizing tendencies in modern discourse. Environmentalist discourse and practice attempted to extend the discourse of "social" relations beyond social space, that is, to the socio-ecological entirety of "place" (understood here to be socially constructed but distinctly material, the site of the performance of practice and experiences, with porous boundaries and multiply scaled). Caring was conceived as deeply authentic and disposed to action, yet was considered discursively and politically ineffectual. Nevertheless, if caring can be politicized, as recent theorists have argued, a compassionate sense of place could serve as a logic to orient contemporary practice in an ecologically embedded society.

Northwestern Ontario is a sweeping land of rocks, trees, lakes, scattered mines or timber cuts and equally scattered collections of people. Hundreds of kilometres from other urban centres, nestled on a protected bay of sparkling Lake Superior – the largest freshwater lake in the world – sits Thunder Bay's gritty buildings, roads and 110,000 people engaged in resource extraction, transportation between rail and ship, government business, and other activity befitting the central hub of the region. "The city of Thunder Bay is three sides trees (and rock), one side water" said one resident.

Many works of writing in environmental studies begin or are based upon personal recollections and anecdotes about meaningful places, linked with concepts of caring. The basic argument of this literature is that knowing one's place includes understanding what is required for its ecological integrity, and for taking action to maintain that integrity. David Orr, the environmental scholar and educational theorist, also argues the centrality of place attachment, for regionally based economies, and decentralized politics. Orr (1994) says, "I do not know whether it is possible to love the planet or not, but I do know that it is possible to love the places we can see, touch, smell and experience" (p. 146). The environmental answer for Orr "is to rediscover and reinhabit our places and regions,

finding in them sources of food, livelihood, energy, healing, recreation and celebration" (p. 147).

The two concepts – "place" and "caring" – are tightly woven in this approach to environmental awareness. This paper seeks to investigate their meanings and practice among environmentalists in one locality, that of Thunder Bay, Ontario. Elsewhere, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), I have stressed the doxic character of the habitus and how inculcation of ecologically-sound tacit and routinized practices must be part of the move to environmentally appropriate societal structures and lifestyles (Bell, 2004). That theoretical underpinning will be assumed in this paper. Here I explore a place-attentive ethos of care – what has been called a compassionate sense of place (Curthoys & Cuthbertson, 2002; Cuthbertson, 1999; Haluza-DeLay and Cuthbertson, 2000) – inquiring as to whether it can orient contemporary environmental praxis and be a means of facilitating further transformation in existing logics of practice.

Placing the Researcher: Methods in the Field

Thunder Bay's history spans centuries of inhabitation, as a hub of east-west travel at the "head of the lake," where rivers and railroads come from the west to Lake Superior. It was one of the important sites of the fur trade with European settlement, which means that Aboriginal-White relations have been socially, economically, and politically entwined for three centuries. Aboriginal peoples are conspicuously absent from environmental groups – despite being between 7-15% of the local population – although not from government and industrial discussions on land and resource management. Finns, Italians and other ethnic groups have become other significant portions of the otherwise highly British-descended population. The city depends on primary resource extraction for its economic livelihood; the "three sides trees" has considerable impact on its culture (Dunk, 1991, 1994).

The Thunder Bay region presents an interesting field site for a project in environmental awareness. The region has a long resource extraction history, but it is also a

large urban centre. A variety of community-based environmental groups operate in the area, such as EcoSuperior and the Thunder Bay Field Naturalists (TBFN). Organizations such as EcoSuperior focus on what might be considered "lifestyle" issues, while TBFN and others address land management. Other organizations involved in the area include the provincial-scale Federation of Ontario Naturalists (FON, of which TBFN is an affiliate although FON also has independent projects in the area), The Wildlands League (the provincial division of the national Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society), and the international World Wildlife Fund and Lake Superior Bi-national Forum. Recent campaigns, such as the Living Legacy, have created new provincial parks and protected areas. Outdoor recreation is a significant industry with numerous hunting and fishing lodges scattered in the region. Snowmobiling is also common, as are cross-country skiing and camping.

Northwestern Ontario is connected through tourism, transportation, government services and resource extraction to global capital flows, but still feels isolated and peripheral to the core in southern Ontario. At the time of this research, the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH), and the Northern Ontario Tourism Outfitters (NOTO) had been embroiled in public controversy over the cancellation of the spring bear hunt that was spurred by environmentalists based in southern Ontario, reinforcing the sense of marginality of the North (Dunk, 2002). The issue contributed to the labelling as environmentalists as "from the South." Dunk's previous ethnographic work showed how working class alienation was partly a reaction to perceptions of being peripheral and marginalized by the dominant classes in business and government in southern Ontario (Dunk, 1991).

Since the intent of this research was to examine the *potential* (rather than current actuality) for a compassionate sense of place as a logic of practice for environmental sustainability, this research followed a process of analytic ethnography rather than a process of ethnographic "thick description" (Lofland, 1995). "Analytic ethnography seeks to produce systematic and generic propositions about social processes and organization" (Snow, Morrill, & Anderson, 2003, p. 182).

Fieldwork occurred between May and December 2002, but I had lived in the city of Thunder Bay for nearly three years previously. While there were about 20 non-profit, non-governmental groups that could be labelled environmental organizations, most are small with few meaningful meetings or events. People also came together in ad hoc association over particular matters. During the fieldwork I increased my level of participation with environmental groups by attending public gatherings, as well as private meetings and personal encounters. During this time I was also involved with other community groups, particularly related to follow-up of a well-publicized study of racism (Haluza-DeLay, 2002, 2003).

Forest issues and water and land management were the most prevalent issues labelled as "environmental" issues during the research time. Some mobilization began around a proposal for a new power station utilizing "pet-coke" (a byproduct of Alberta tar sands oil production, and disallowed as a fuel by Alberta law). There were some groups dealing with "lifestyle" issues of energy conservation, recycling and consumerism. These latter foci tended to be very local in character. On land management issues, especially forestry and protected lands designations, several provincial or national organizations were involved, but with relatively little local involvement other than specific well-recognized individuals.

I went to every publically advertised environmental event or meeting that I could attend during the period from May to December 2002. Field notes were written by hand, during or as soon after events as possible. They were later typed and additional recollections added at later readings. Observations faced constant analysis (Creswell, 1998; Lofland, 1996; Spradley, 1980). Such constant analysis directed further data collection. I initially focused on environmental organizations, attempting to discern the terrain. Environmentalism is a complex mix of community, provincial, national and transnational actors, primarily organizations (Brulle, 2000). It is exceedingly difficult to get a handle on numbers of either organizations, or persons involved with them (Andrews & Edwards, 2005; Kempton, et al., 2001). Furthermore, philosophical orientation and goals of organizations that may be considered environmental differ widely (Brulle, 2000:

Kempton, et al., 2001). During the fieldwork, I simply defined an environmental group as one that sought to protect the environment, choosing to attend to a representation of environmental approaches in the region.

Twenty-three interviews with 27 people were conducted in November and December 2002. Arcury and Quandt (1999) described a "site-based procedure" for recruiting participants for qualitative studies. Modifying their procedure I generated a list of organizations that had become visible in the participatory phase of the study. Depending on the apparent diversity of viewpoints in the organization, I identified specific individuals to interview. The 27 people are reasonably representative of the field of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) in Thunder Bay. Although I selected the interviewees through their organizational involvements, the individuals were not consistently affiliated over the months of fieldwork. Involvement shifted for a wide variety of reasons.

It is important to note that these were environmentally-active people, not *activists* per se, if activist is meant as someone who seeks to visibly mobilize public opposition. Three of the interview participants would more fairly be described as "social" activists (anti-poverty, food security, housing), but had been involved in an environmental event. The youngest interview participants were in their late 20s; participants otherwise ranged across the ages into their 70s. Professions included doctors, foresters, biologists, a retired teacher, among others. Eight were actually employed – mostly part-time or contract – by environmental organizations. Most were volunteers. Eleven of the 27 were female. All were white. In fact, there were few linkages with Aboriginal organizations. Because there were few Aboriginal persons involved in environmental organizations none are included in this study. Unpacking the concepts and practices in the First Nations cultures of the region would have added a great deal of complexity to the study. Furthermore, the problematic use of research as a tool of colonialism was something with which I did not want to be associated (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999).

The interviews took between 45 minutes and two hours. Fontana and Frey (1994) described an interview as a "co-constructed encounter." Because of the effort to explore

deep-seated, often unreflexive and perhaps unconscious, elements of the *sens pratique*, participants and I deliberately structured the interviews as conversations loosely guided by the question plan (see Appendix A). Interviews were tape recorded and converted to digital recordings. Transcription software was used to facilitate the transcribing process (Transana, 2004). This software allowed the typed transcript to be linked to the actual digital recording. Thus, not only were the words available for analysis, but so were the inflections, tone, and other vocal modalities that convey meaning. Full transcriptions were produced of the first dozen interviews; partial transcripts were produced after emerging categories became apparent and saturation of categories began (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). Transcripts and field notes were imported into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package (ATLASti, 2004). These documents were coded top-down by a rudimentary coding manual developed prior to analysis and added to during the hermeneutic cycle that followed. A method of constant comparison involving saturation of categories was followed (Creswell, 1998). “Caring” and “place” and the notion of “a compassionate sense of place” served as heuristics. That is, the analysis pursued how people talked about or how their actions expressed what the literature means by caring or place, and this is used to describe a compassionate sense of place at the end of the article.

This research followed conventions of ethnographic work (Davies, 1999; Spradley, 1980, Thomas, 1993), but varied from them. Since the interest was theoretical (Lofland, 1996; Snow, Morrill & Anderson, 2000), the research was intended to guide understanding of the practical challenges of representing place and caring in everyday environmental involvements and in the quest for more effective logics of practice for a sustainable society. Many of the environmentally-active people involved in the project said that the things I was looking at were things they rarely thought about, but were fascinating. Envisioning of social and ecological alternatives requires different epistemological and ontological frames than those prioritized within conventional social scientific frames (Brady, 2005; Charmaz, 2005; Thomas, 1993). If social movements are contestations with hegemonic realities, then research in the service of social movements must be analytic re-imaginations or transformations of those realities (Gaonkar, 2002;

Smyth & Hattam, 2000).

Placing the Research: Conceptual Background

Place

The literature on "place" is diverse and extensive. It ranges from phenomenological studies of "sense of place" (Casey, 1996; Preston, 2003; Tuan, 1977) to cultural analyses of place-meaning (e.g., Basso, 1996; Escobar, 2001), to detailed analyses of the political economy and political ecology of places and their roles in the networks of economic, multicultural, and ideational flows in national, regional and global systems (Burawoy, 2000: Escobar, 2001; Massey, 1997; 2004). Since the literature on "place" has been ably summarized (Ardoin, 2006; Cresswell, 2004; Hutchison, 2004; Massey & Jess, 1995), I simply assert an understanding of the concept, as does Escobar (2001). Place is

> the experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries (however, permeable), and connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed. (Escobar, 2001, p.140)

Environmental scholars have taken up each of these styles of place-conscious analysis. While place is often conceived in terms of its social relations occurring in a material environment (Hay, 1998; Massey, 1997), environmentalist discourse and practice extends these relations beyond social space to include ecological processes and objects, and relations between human and other-than human (Bell & Russell, 2000). This includes breaking down the standard dichotomies of modernity, such as culture/nature. The human realm does not simply exist apart from the biophysical, but is integrally located within that realm while simultaneously organizing the material and symbolic ways by which cultural members understand and interact with that environment (Milton, 1997). This results in fluidity, interactivity and boundarylessness between environment and culture, realization of which has led scholars to begin to talk about hybrid formulations, such as "socionatures" which are more accurate depictions of the material conditions in which human societies are embedded (Braun & Castree, 2001; White, 2006). The processes of "place-making" combine political-economic, ecological, phenomenological, and cultural

"forces, connections, and imaginations" such that even globalization is grounded in the local (Gille & O'Riain, 2000, p. 271). Escobar (2001) demonstrates that "culture sits in places." That is, people live in particular places that are affected by, but also recursively shape global connections, forces and ideas into particularized forms. Place is a "relational space understood as the matrix and product of social (and environmental) practices" (Smith, 2001, p. 210).

With such insights, Norton and Hannon (1997) proposed a place-based approach to environmental decision-making as the accumulation of many locally-based sustainable ethics. However, one of the difficulties of place-based approaches is to define the relevant place, even if "fuzzy" approximations are used (Meredith, 2005). Berthold-Bond (2000) finds this "elusiveness" of the definition of a place beneficial because it forces attention to the subjective and experiential aspects of place.

A criticism of place-based approaches is place-boundedness. This can be expressed as parochialism, that one place is better then another, or that certain senses of a place – usually historically privileged – are more legitimate than other constructions (Mackey, 2002). Places can be highly limiting, as evidenced by those who seek the anonymity of larger population centres where social censure arising from tight relations is diluted (Young, 1990). Another problem with place-based approaches is that of the "Not in my Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome, whereby place figures prominently in the opposition to undesirable uses, such as a hazardous industry. NIMBY opposition may lead to diverting the rejected project into another community with less resources to combat such siting. As a corollary to the parochial NIMBY ethic, Norton and Hannon (1997) added the more comprehensively place-conscious NIABY (not in anyone's backyard) ethic.

Place-making is complex. Singular notions of what is the place may be presented, but should be seen as contestations over the making of place. Place-making projects are not free from domination, oppressions, or inequities. Place-making also seeks to position the specific place in relation to larger scales (such as provinces, regions, and nations) and in relation to other places. Constructions of place remain projects, that is, ever incomplete,

advancing in bursts and stalls, and with contestation, especially as variegated actors employ their resources to make the place in their imagining. In Thunder Bay, to name just a few of the actions in the time period of this study, actors operated to protect the nature they valued, oppose or propose forest management schemes, build or oppose the park/Wal-Mart/energy-producing facility they wanted, or to wish for said development for employment or said forests managed for employment plus hunting for food and pleasure. Place-making, then, is personal and collective, discursive and material, social and ecological.

Since place meanings can be varied and actions toward places multifaceted, it would not seem that a consciousness of place alone would be an adequate basis upon which to presume an environmental or social ethos. Although a comprehensive concept of place would conceive it as profoundly relational with a mix of social and ecological processes operating across a variety of scales, a logic of practice appropriate for "living well in place" would seem to need direction within a relational context.

Caring

Caring as a potential direction for place-awareness is based on an ontological proposition that manifests sociologically and ecologically: that the autonomous self is a fallacy, and that we are fundamentally relational (Noddings, 2002; Plumwood, 2002; Whatmore, 1997). For environmental scholars, these relations include social and ecological relations. This has profound implications for ethics, social policy and environmental understanding (Hankivsky, 2004; Noddings, 2002). If the nature of human reality is relational, then caring could be fundamental to environmental awareness and action (Bratton, 1992; Curry, 2002).

Feminist theorists have been at the recent forefront of conceptualizing an "ethic of care." However, Hankivsky (2004) positions "second generation care ethics" as moving beyond gendered formulations to establish care as central to human life, and working to link care and justice. However, it should be acknowledged that numerous traditional moral and religious systems position "love" (even of neighbour and enemy) and "compassion" at

their cores.[25] These are not ethics so much as ethos, which constitute a practical sense of behaving appropriately and morally, rather than rule-oriented moral behaviour (Smith, 2001). Caring is not an ethical system but a dispositional orientation founded in the relational character of being human, that generates caring practices.

Feminist theorists assert that humans are fundamentally relational, decrying the inappropriate starting point of the autonomous individual. We are always dependent on others. "Our interdependence is part of the original condition and in no way part of some social contract" (Noddings, 2002, p. 234). Environmentally-minded scholars have pointed out that we are dependent upon natural systems also. Furthermore, the fundamental insight of sociological approaches is that we are inevitably moulded by our context. In Bourdieu's (1990) theory of practice, society is comprised of interlocking social fields, each of which shapes the habitus appropriate for non-consciously operating in each social setting. Habitus, which becomes carried as bodily dispositions in a person, creates practical tendencies resulting in a logic of practice (or a "practical sense" – *sens pratique* in French) that functions effectively in the particular context. Bourdieu's is an explicitly relational approach; social fields do not exist apart from position-holders that interact and thus intersubjectively create the field. This corresponds well with the relational conception of place discussed above, suggesting that if place and field correspond, then "sense of place" and habitus have some correspondence as well (Hillier & Rooksby, 2002). Recognizing the verity of socionatures and adapting this construction to Bourdieu's social fields apparatus, ecological conditions would be considered as part of the core relations on the field. Smith (2001) notes that ecology has been seen as radical precisely because it challenges modernist principles to "recogniz[e] nature as an active participant in the production of self, society and our ethical values. Nature may be masked and find itself constantly subject to transformation and abuse but it has not ceased from being part of the

[25] Evidence clearly shows that caring-for can sometimes be dogmatic, misapplied, lead to new forms of oppression, or maintain status quos in which power differentials and privilege are not scrutinized. Love or caring can be a disservice (McKnight, 1989, 1995).

dialectic" (Smith, 2001, p. 212).[26] An ethos of caring presents a different response to the complex relationships of a place, as caring emphasizes attentiveness and situated responsiveness to relations instead of normative and abstracted principles.

Most care-based thinkers postulate several facets of caring although they are loath to definitively describe it. Caring consists of those practices that are contextually appropriate in meeting needs of all parties. Needs can be expressed, but may also be inferred, which leads to the question of how to infer the needs of anOther [sic] when the communication is limited (Noddings, 2002; Russell, 2005). Thus, caring is *attentive* to the other(s), and to the quality of the relationship itself. Secondly, caring is *responsive,* consisting of action that responds to needs. Tronto (1993) adds that caring may also be *responsible*, in that it regularly considers what could or should be done for others, and *competent* so that the intentions to care are matched to the quality of the caring. Caring is not merely a form of sentimentality. Most care theory distinguishes between "caring for" face-to-face relationships and more distant relations that involve "caring about." This latter form of caring begins to be much like a form of action for social justice. Attentiveness even in distant relations requires listening to the expressed needs of others, rather than the application of pre-existent principles (Noddings, 2002).

From these descriptions, it is clear that "caring" is not an emotion. However, we should understand that "caring" is socially shaped so that caring practices, even in intimate relations, are part of the socially conditioned habitus. They are not essentialist components of persons, especially women with whom caring has most been associated. Held (2006) insisted that caring *is not* "dispositions of individuals," à la character or virtue ethics. Tronto (1993) also refused a dispositional approach to caring, insisting that "to call care a practice implies that it involves both thought and action, that thought and action are interrelated, and that they are directed toward some end" (p. 108). On the contrary, I assert that caring *is* dispositional – albeit not individual virtuous characteristics

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[26] "Nature" is meant here in a wider sense than the simple and limited cultural construct of nature as birds, plants, parks and so on. In this context, Nature refers to all material reality. Nevertheless, there is considerable discussion of the topic of the social construction of nature (Braun & Castree, 2001).

– in that dispositions are socially produced (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 107). The way that a Bourdieusian framework links the dispositions of the habitus with practice and the social milieu makes care an *ethos* – a practical sense of action that organizes reason, instincts and emotions (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 107) – rather than an *ethic* – which still conveys a rationalized process.[27]

Noddings (2002, 2005) has consistently pointed out the value of educating the caring response, and that a society of people who actively care (that is, draw on an habituated ideal of caring and respond) will move toward social policies of caring. Caring has often been relegated to the private sphere, leading McGregor (2006) to criticize its usefulness in orienting modern socio-ecological praxis. Recently, there has been an increasing effort to position care theory to guide public policy (Hankivsky, 2004; Held, 2006; Noddings, 2002) Caring results in action because, attentive to need, caring is responsive. This is as true on the societal level as on the individual scale. Furthermore, if we assume the field/place to include other-than-humans, as did Smith (2001) and Plumwood (2002), caring extends to ecological response also.

Several studies have pointed to compassion, love or caring as being linked to environmental involvements. "'Love' is a powerful fuel," report Kovan and Dirkx (2003) about their research with long-time environmental activists in Michigan. In their conceptualization, love is an emotion that helps to prevent burnout, and that can motivate and rejuvenate activists who are often engaged in draining campaigns. Investigating the ecological self-identity of people who attended a retreat on connections to nature, Zavestoski (2003) reported that even more important to these deep ecologists was their self-identification as "altruistic/compassionate." That a very high level of the men and women reported being in "helping professions" led Zavestoski to conclude that there must

[27] That the habitus is socially conditioned is part of the reason that care has been constructed as a logic of practice associated with women. The denigration of both women and caring is a form of symbolic violence, that is a form of coercion imposed without physical force, and accepted as "normal" or "natural" (Bourdieu, 2001). In this book, Bourdieu even speculated on love, as a way of rapproachment, following previous work in which he called uncovering symbolic violence and oppression the sociologist's (expression of) "love" for members of society.

be some relationship between compassion and ecological identity. While both studies suggest that there may be some relationship, both studies also present caring/compassion/love as emotion, although resulting in reasoned action.

A different vein of research uses care theory to imagine alternatives to socio-technical systems. Whatmore (1997) showed how a relational analysis allows one to chart the milk-production system and conceptually apply caring in the diverse relations between farmers, cows, corporate industrial complex, regulatory institutions, and consumers. Curry (2002) applied care theory to pork production; while Millar and Hong-Key (2000) considered "love" in resource management. These applications to the public and policy spheres sought ways that systems could be redesigned, so that "bad caring" is not rewarded by the political-economic system of maximal efficiency, price competitiveness and instrumental value. In other words, caring was potentially but not currently in substantive use in these systems.

An emphasis on "caring" has been critiqued in several ways. Caring is usually considered to be about face-to-face interactions, and in the private sphere rather than the public sphere. Often, this assumption is based on the gendered division of caring work – for children, for family, for the aged, in schools and as counsellors, social workers, nurses and so on. Women remain predominant in such "carework." England's (2005) focus was on caring for human others; despite the article's promising title – *Emerging theories of carework* – there is no attention to ecological care or notice of the extensive discussions of care theory within ecofeminism. McGregor (2006) extensively evaluated the assignment of caring to the female sphere, simultaneously criticizing scholarship on ecological citizenship for its "gender-blindness" and the "ecomaternalism" of much environmental feminist thought. She suggested the need to "draw a distinction between caring as a set of material practices (i.e., to take care of something or someone as a form of labour) and caring as a disposition (entailing particular values or ethics)" (McGregor, 2006, p. 58). This concern is important. On one hand, caring could be an ethos for both men and women. On the other hand, sustainability practices are disproportionally performed by women, owing to their disproportionate position in domestic maintenance, interpersonal

care-giving and community-organizational involvements within both overdeveloped and developing countries (Jackson, 1993; Oates & McDonald, 2006). This allows caring to remain marginalized and associated with women. McGregor's interviews with female urban activists – who made few distinctions between environmental and quality of life activism – showed that none spoke of "caring for nature" and all conceptualized their work as "caring for people," all the while typically asserting that women care more than men.[28]

McGregor concludes that "care" needs to be politicised, as have other scholars (Curtin, 1999; Russell & Bell, 1995; Held, 2006). If "caring" is to be a meaningful form of environmental praxis, it cannot be gendered, domesticated, and privatized. Russell and Bell (1995) believed that a politicised ethic of care would be able to analyze the structures that create conditions of deprivation and oppression, such as homelessness or environmental toxicity. However, it remains to be seen how caring or compassion can serve in an environmental logic of practice effective for addressing the social field and not merely individualized relations.

Caring for Place? Presenting Data from the Field

With the above in mind, I was looking for ways that caring and place-attentiveness were associated by the environmentally-active persons in this study with their praxis. Nevertheless, it is impossible to observe bodily dispositions, except through specific actions (which could be interpreted in different ways by observers) and through people's

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[28] Gynocentric assumptions are occasionally but rarely problematised, although often in backhanded ways, such as in the following footnote in McGregor (2006):

> I suspect women tend to dismiss men's forms of caring work as less valuable than women's, and in so doing tend to guard this caring work as something women do best.... [Doing so may preserve the] kind of power that women derive from being typically more competent at caring than men. If this is true... [it means] women will need to change.. So that men and women can share it more equally... (p. 264).

These are consistently gendered generalizations about caring. For example, new fathers' worries about the family finances with a new baby may be an expression of caring not captured by the focus on breastfeeding and bonding in mother-care. I have rarely seen such discussion in the academic literature, but men talk about it and such discussion of father-care is prevalent in parenting magazines.

reflexions. The discussion about "caring" came late in the interviews after considerable conversation about their environmental work, motivations, beliefs about paradigmatic or incremental change, and environmental strategies in personal and organizational efforts. In addition, I asked participants to compare "caring" to "respect" and "justice" in the context of their personal environmental concerns and involvements with environmental organizations, and shared my own perspective, as many asked me to do. Their understandings of place and caring are interpreted in the context of this co-constructed, conversationally-inclined interview.

Elsewhere, I have presented the habitus of these environmentally-active people (*Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists*). Some of its dispositions included trying to live in ways that matched their environmental awareness, but being faced with personal and collective contradictions due to the mismatch of an ecological habitus with the unecological fields that comprise modern North American society. This marginality of environmental activity led to reflexive self-awareness and social critique. Furthermore, in the face of this mismatch environmentally-active people worked to maintain their dispositions for environmental concern through a variety of techniques I called "self-disposing" to reflect their non-reflexive, tacit character. These included seeking natural settings, buttressing a movement identity, and projecting themselves to act on the basis of "caring" for the place or environment rather than from motives such as self-interest. Ultimately, caring had a variety of meanings, and was enacted in diverse ways, as shall be shown shortly.

Understandings of Place

In practice, Thunder Bay as a place was a container for enactment of a practical logic of environmental activity. Four facets about the role of "place" can be discerned. First, place was practical and performative, that is, a place in which participants could perform practices called for by the intersection of their environmental disposition and the conditions of their lives. Second, place was experiential – as corporeal beings, participants observed that specific places had been important in the past or mattered to them now.

Third, places are linked with other places and "scale up." Fourth, environmental orientations produced movement from "place matters" to "place matters (environmentally)." To demonstrate these facets of the place-awareness in their complexity and contextual character, the following section will focus on one representative informant, and use interview quotations from other environmentally-active persons in Thunder Bay to show that these facets were more broadly present.

The multifaceted, and dynamic relationship between place and environmental practice were expressed by Christoff. Beside involvements in several local environmental and progressive groups, Christoff had been heavily engaged in local and national Green Party politics. He first began by commenting that "place" did not matter.

> I don't think where I live has driven my opinions. And I don't think that if I lived in Malawi, London or Toronto, I would have a fundamentally different approach towards my politics. Maybe what I'm arguing is I don't know how much place matters to why people come to politics, or come to activism.

However, he soon observed that place mattered in some ways.

> So my sense of place drives specifics but my overall interest in politics, my overall interest in being involved in the political and the decision making process of society, I think, is a bit more fundamental to ME [with emphasis], as opposed to being to the location or the locale that I'm in.

As he talked, place – as in "the local" – became more important as a site of practice,

> At some level or another things are global and you have to address that, recognize that. But you also have to have some level of recognition that people locally have to deal with their issues.... And that's where the local driving the priorities is reality. I'm not saying it's perfect because there are certainly things where locally we may be well served by something that on a global basis is a bad idea. Or at least we may perceive we would be well served by it. But you have to at some degree focus on what you know and what you feel you can directly get your hands around.

He continued, observing that while places were linked, they were necessary as the site in which people could act.

> In all honesty, it's easier to communicate what you're trying to do to a local community, to people that you deal with and live with. So obviously, place is important because I can't influence the Sudanese government very easily, but I may be able to influence half a dozen neighbours.

More significantly, for other, less environmentally involved people, Christoff believed place mattered, in that they needed the impact of personal experience,

> I think they need to see a threat. Most people need to see a threat to what they're used to, to make the difference. I think people need to be able to say: this place matters environmentally because if we don't take care of it we can't live here; our children don't have a future here. Or, because we can't even drink the water.

Thus place had importance because it is the ground of experience where the circumstances of everyday life occur, and unless there was a change in the experiences, environmental awareness was unlikely to occur.

Repeatedly, when environmentally-active people like Christoff talked about what they do, they referenced it in the local and the specific, even if it regarded an occurrence that was in some other locale or at a larger scale (e.g., national, global). Thus, place was important as the site in which an environmental logic of practice was performed. The various logics of environmental practice were part of and had to function in Thunder Bay although they may include cultural, ecological, political and economic processes on larger scales. Other interview participants also described place in terms of these aspects of place. The narratives are lengthy, and complex, resisting simplification. Place was the site of environmental praxis, experiential, and linked. But place-attentiveness did not lead automatically to environmental attentiveness. These themes will also be visible in data presented later.

There was not a person in the interviews who did not draw connections between the local and the larger scales. Nor was there a single person who was acting at larger scales that was not also locally involved. Perhaps this was an artifact of the methods used, that is, by accessing individuals through organizational involvements, localized action was privileged. One further incident, near the end of the field time, was interesting. As recorded in my fieldnotes:

> Met this fellow at the Lake Superior Alliance meeting. He is a lawyer. Started 4½ years ago but as a career change. He came from Sudbury, had been writing Environmental Assessments. His interest is in government policy things–"place" doesn't matter much to him he said when I told him my dissertation topic.

I wish that I had followed up further. However, even this fellow was known to be involved

in other local environmental activities, an informant said. And while others said that their environmental awareness was independent of the local place – that they would be environmentally-active anywhere – these people were also highly involved in locally-relevant issues.

In conclusion, that places are multifaceted, and that sense of place differs among persons appeared to allow and even necessitate a diversity of ways of operating environmentally in places. Nevertheless, people needed somewhere to act in, hence place was practical and performative. Place operated back on people in terms of being the site of experience. Any place was seen as linked to other places and to larger scales, thus places were porously boundaried. In Bourdieusian terms, Place can be considered as the experiential component of the field shaping the habitus, the locale in which the *sens pratique* must function. Finally, that environmental dispositions seemed to be formed independently of the place in which they currently lived indicates that other aspects of personal orientation are also important.

Understanding of Caring

Like the understanding of place, caring was understood by the environmentally involved people of this study in ways that were practical, performative and experiential. Three primary attributes of caring were held by the interview participants. First, caring was perceived primarily as a deeply authentic but personal motivation. Second, caring led to the performance of action to care for things. Third, it was also associated with or viewed as an emotion. For these interview participants, the objects of care could include environmental actors or considerations. However, although deeply authentic and action-oriented, caring was not considered particularly valuable for the work of environmental organizations or the messages that they wished to convey. Both men and women talked about caring in ways that did not appear to show gendered differences.

Three Themes about Caring.

The three primary attributions of caring – deep authenticity, disposed to action, and perceived as emotional – were held consistently by the interview participants. These three attributes serve as a backdrop to consideration about whether caring can serve to orient the *sens pratique* of a more sustainable society. As in the understanding of place, I will use one interview as representative, in order to show the complex and contextual understandings of caring, and other interview quotations to show that these themes were more broadly present.

The various attributes associated with caring were shown in the following dialogue from an interview with two employees of one of the city's most respected environmental nonprofit agencies illustrates these points. Asked which of caring, respect or justice was more important to their environmental work, they replied,

> Randy Which would you say sort of represents the sort of things you do – you don't just have to think of it just in terms of this specific organization – Respect for the environment or Caring for the environment?
>
> Brian: I'd go with respect, I think caring is probably part of respect....
>
> Mary: I'd agree with Brian. There's no hard and fast line between them, but you can respect something without necessarily– [pause, searching for words] loving it or feeling attached to it. But you still recognize that you need to respect it, whether or not it really directly impacts you. You can develop respect, or even be aware that respect should govern what you do. I think that we recognize in a lot of our programs that a lot of people really don't care about the environment. But they do respect the fact that there are impacts that need to be recognized. I think respect is probably more accurate.

Caring was seen as a deeper disposition than respect, but one which they felt many people would not possess regarding environmental concerns. After a bit more discussion, Mary concluded,

> Mary: [You] can't force people to care.
>
> Brian: You are seeing it as an end goal, so the person is beyond respect, and now they are *really* [emphasized] into it.
>
> Randy: You both are making it sound like respect is good, caring might be better.
>
> Brian: Ok [the] idea of the [TBFN – a naturalist group] bringing people up to see places– They seem to be going beyond the respect thing. 'We've got some beautiful places, let's bring them [people] up and connect them.'

That's going to go beyond this or that lake or forest, go beyond the respect thing.

Mary: Yeah, an emotional attachment. And I guess that would provide more commitment. And if you can do that on a broader scale – I don't know. I would think it would tend to provide more commitment to the environment. That's getting into the emotional side.

Randy: So caring as emotional –

Brian: Yes.

Several of the attributes associated with caring are present in this exchange. Caring superseded respect and might provide more long-term commitment. This form of commitment, involving caring and a sense of attachment, could be based in direct experiences although it could also transcend such experiences or specific place attachments. The two observed that caring might be more of a process than simply an end goal. Finally, caring was an emotion.

As the conversation continued, I suggested other ways of looking at caring. Brian and Mary continued to express a view of caring as an emotion, as did participants in other interviews. Earlier, Brian had talked about his own youthful experiences with Lake Superior. He described that sense of the lake and experience of the lake as providing a basis for being able to "connect with [others who] felt passionate about it." He also reaffirmed that caring had a role in connecting this passion with place:

Brian: The Lake Superior aspect is a bit different – I think there is a fair amount of emotion there, even if you don't realize it. Some of the people you deal with – it would never come up , but I could name any number of people who are connected. Like the National Marine Conservation Area thing [a proposal for an extensive protected area along Lake Superior] – there was some real emotion. and that did get emotional. Some individuals started to scream. And that's because they are pretty closely connected to that body of water. And in normal situations you'd never be aware of that. But when you are around them a bit, you realize these guys are pretty closely connected with the lake. (Mary is agreeing.) There is an emotion and a caring aspect to it.

Mary observed that caring was part of the private domain, therefore, important but not explicitly part of their organizational efforts.

> I think we appeal to people's sense of caring without openly stating that. It's sort of an assumption – that we've given you the facts, and if you care enough [you'll do

something].

As represented by Mary and Brian, caring had attributes of being more deeply authentic than other potential motivations, being action-oriented, and being an emotion and individually private. Other interview participants also noted these attributes. Caring as a more authentic, deeper and better disposition was a commonly held view among these environmentally-active people. In a speech on environmental sustainability before a large crowd of teachers, students and community members, Kane described how compassion made him less strident, but no less committed. I summarized his message in my fieldnotes:

> Not only does [compassion] keep us from being strident or judgmental – even though being judgment or at least speaking to what we think is true is important – compassion can be a fundamental principle that can reorient our relationships with all the world. (Fieldnotes, October 29)

And Sam said in an interview that compassion "for those identified as the opposition" helped him work with them and oriented him as the kind of person he wanted to be. Interview participants consistently and repeatedly represented caring as leading to action.

> Jack: Well caring for something is self explanatory. Respecting – caring and respecting nature. Not creating such a large impact that it can't recover or function the way it was designed to function.
> Randy: Is it [caring] an emotion?
> Jack: No it's an action. I guess caring could be an emotion as well. Seems to be an action though.

> Stan: [What is more important to my work?] Caring. Because caring implies doing something about it. Respect is OK, but it's not doing anything. So what?

> Randy: Do you have any examples [of caring]?
> Roger: (rattled off several). I care for Lake Superior very strongly.... And I cared enough to bring the two parties [together]. The government was getting nowhere and I did some secret negotiations with [name deleted] and [worked out a deal that helped protect the lake.]
> Randy: And you said that's because you care about Lake Superior?
> Roger: Right, if I didn't care – who cares? If I didn't care that it was a beautiful body of water and we have to get this crap out of the lake? And we did that.

Christoff: Care is having some willingness to consider giving one thing in return for something else. And being able to actually move yourself out of comfort.... That's how I distinguish care. If I care about something, I'm willing to say: I'd rather sit here and do this, but I'm going to get up and do that.

The interview participants appeared to perceive the general public as more motivated by self-interest or threats to their well-being. But the result was that caring was viewed as a concept that could not be effectively used in advancing environmental matters, since it would likely be understood in its form as an emotion and devalued.

Richard: [Some other approach] seems to make more sense than trying to say 'we must love the earth,' 'we must respect the earth,' 'we must care for the earth.'
Randy: Love your mother [Earth]. Nice—
Richard: That's exactly what it is. Nice and groovy. It's not a political motivator.

On the other hand, caring had effects on their own practice, in ways that other orientations would not. That caring was deeply authentic and led to action, but was seen as emotion-like, led to a conundrum in that caring was generally seen as ineffectual for the work of environmental organizations. This will be elaborated below, after assessing the objects of care.

Caring for Whom? Caring for What?

Caring was practical and performative, that is, attentive to specific concrete objects to which to respond with care. Many of the participants linked caring to past experiences of significant places or to family relationships. Respondents mentioned caring for an array of objects – kids, family, neighbours, backyards, creeks and specific places, trees, caribou, underprivileged persons, ecosystems, bacteria, Lake Superior, and communities. When asked what they do to show caring, people gave a variety of examples, describing specific actions done. For Maude, it meant developing a free bike program "for people who can't afford them." For Roger it meant getting people concerned about Lake Superior to work with governments. Stan planted trees. Stacey secured grants to buy and protect small natural areas. But, as Arlette commented, caring meant different things at different times:

> The way I care for my family is very different from the way I care for my clientele. I'm much more sentimental in my personal life. However [in] my professional life, my caring is in a detached way.... It has to be, because if I get too sentimental or too attached to clientele, I will be dragged into their situation and maybe not be able to get out of it.... I think you can care about issues, about people, about problems in a detached sort of way and still be meeting a need and having it be meaningful to the need to the problem to the person you're working with. So what does caring conjure up for me? Yeah, different things for different situations. (Arlette, Interview)

Special places were important, with most of the interview participants telling stories about specific locales: Chrissy's rural property, Roger's place by the lake, Doug's mother's cabin on Lake Shebandowan and his fishing experiences on the Kam River all led to caring about these specific places, which were only somewhat transferrable to other specific places. Only a few of the interview participants mentioned experiences of special places related to early life experiences. However, many related it to families. Arlette expressed a common sentiment among the interviewees.

> Truly, it's my own backyard first. I will look after my own family I will look after my own community first. I will look after my own country next. I think that most people are typically like that. Do we need to change, yeah, we all need to be a little more sensitive to what our neighbours are going through but I choose to work within my level.

Similarly, Roger stated, "I live here all the time and you feel for the land and you say I want it to get better not worse."

Caring was specific, and caring environmentally involved specific places. However, this came with recognition that places were linked to other places. Recognition of this connection did not diminish the sense of caring as a disposition that could orient environmental praxis, as shown in the following exchange.

> Randy: Which is more important for your environmental work: respect for, or caring for, the environment?
>
> Roger: [Lots of thinking] Probably caring for. By caring for it you really do respect it otherwise you wouldn't really be caring for it. You only respect something that doesn't need fixing. Something that needs fixing needs care. If you have respect for people you go to a hospital and you care for them. That counts as caring.
>
> Randy: [Which is more important for your environmental work] Caring for the

earth, or Justice?

Roger: [Carefully said] Caring for the issues that affect the planet, the biosphere.

Randy: So caring more about particular issues or caring for—

Roger: [Talking over previous, speeding up] – You can't really look at the whole world, you have to pick something that contributes to the whole world. Anyone says they're going to look after the whole world – the question is how? There are millions of issues out there that but if anyone took on a few issues to care and to advance, then the whole planet is positively affected. You can't really say 'Well, I'm gonna save the whole planet.'[29]

Other people observed the ways connections – such as economics, or long-distance transport of pollutants, or even environmental ideas produced somewhere else – affect this place.

> I mean, in the longer term there are global issues, obviously, related to [forest management in the region]. But, the reality is that we will live immediately with the results of that here. Toronto won't live with the results of it anymore than, quite frankly, Toronto environmentalists have to live with the results of living in a rural community in northern Ontario. Just how much recycling can you do when it costs you $20,000 a truck to haul stuff back and forth and you don't have the volumes to recycle?... Forcing a recycling strategy on the north, and assuming that the blue box program works everywhere is – I don't want to say dumb, but it's naive. (Edward, Interview)

Caring could still be associated with locales linked to broader geographic entities, but the actions taken by these participants returned to the local place to be acted out in ways specific to the place.

The constructions of "place"among these environmentally-active people bears further consideration. Participants in the study showed some recognition of the multiply and indeterminately defined and experienced character of places among the diverse range of people that comprise Thunder Bay. This was uneven, however. For instance, there were a variety of social and organizational networks in Thunder Bay. For the most part, participants in the environmental groups did not overlap with other social justice networks, or the wider nonprofit sector, community development, or business networks. This positioning in the social field may have affected which components of the place they

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[29] To make the context even more interesting, Roger was a financial planner, tied into global economic flows to the extent that he was checking stock quotes even as we talked in his office.

gave attention.

Arlette was one of the interviewees more oriented to social justice issues than environmental involvements. She frequently referred to her professional training as a social worker to explain why caring was an appropriate way to describe her efforts. With the permission of her employer, a housing advocacy agency, Arlette had attended a meeting of the Ontario Environmental Network in Sarnia, a two day drive from Thunder Bay.

> I had talked to [my boss] about going to the OEN conference and talk about [housing issues] there and... he was quite fine with that.... He too agreed with me about the environment not being limited to trees, air and water. It's much more. (Arlette, Interview)

Arlette also participated in a small networking meeting of Thunder Bay environmental advocates. Yet she stated,

> If I was to consider the environmental groups locally, I honestly haven't had a lot of contact with a lot of them... I haven't had a lot of success working with a lot of environmental groups here. [pause] Whether it be because they don't see my concerns as being environmental issues or—. So, yeah, I haven't had a lot of connection with any of the groups. [Trailed off, seeming unwilling to speculate]. (Arlette, Interview)

Even the relevant members of the community was shaped by particular forms of awareness. At one meeting to develop a coalition for Lake Superior protection, the facilitator, an environmental activist from outside Thunder Bay, asked "Who's not here that should be?" The group generated a list that included over a dozen other individuals and organizations that related to land or water management. But no one mentioned other community development groups nor First Nations groups being absent.

This is not to say that environmental groups or persons involved with them did not see social issues as unimportant. Groups like Trees Thunder Bay and EcoSuperior, and people like Edward and Roger were active with a wide range of involvements. The Food Action Network included some environmental concerns as well as health, nutrition, and food security. However, most of the environmentally-active people participating in this study attended to different portions of the range of relations that make up the place. As

they described how caring operated in their environmental activities, place-awareness of many of the study participants appeared to prioritize ecological dimensions of the place as objects of caring.

> I don't know if I can tell you [how I use caring] without giving you an example. Like, for example, I'm concerned, you know, I'm concerned about the extirpation of caribou out of the Nipigon Basin. So I mean, I don't get any economic gains from that personally, but I care about the respect for other life forms in the world that we should be looking after, and ensuring that the way we are managing it is sustainable. So that's a degree of caring. (Jack, Interview)

> And it goes beyond that. Not only caring about the environment, about people, about ecosystems, about those that live and breathe, or don't breathe, the ecosystems, for example. It goes to the point where there's a harmony whether you see it or not. Like bacteria exert some role. We may not know it, but they exist. (Edward, Interview)

In conclusion, constructions of place had limitations as individuals attended to different portions of the place, which would affect practices of caring for place. As Sam said, "[It is] essential to know the social and environmental context in which you live... Knowing the importance of the forest industry to incomes in Northwestern Ontario moderates my perspective." Few of the participants discussed this at length. This observation demonstrates a potentially important role of organizations, as well as other institutions of society, in the construction of understandings of a place. Attention to environmental concerns would do well to avoid forms of social exclusion, and vice versa; these are the "full range" of social and ecological relations of a place, to which attention should be given and response is needed.

Caring as Politically Ineffectual

Despite the practical propensity to action generated by caring dispositions, caring was seen as politically ineffectual. To a large degree, this was because of the association of caring as emotion. Mary said they wished to use reason, facts, "logic and technical soundness" in their presentation of environmental issues, behaviour and solutions. They did so because this approach avoided emotionalism. "All in all, I don't think we try to

appeal much to the emotional side of these issues. We try to keep it very basic," said Mary. Several interviewees believed emotion had been overly associated with environmental concerns.

> Mary: As an organization... we've avoided that term [environmentalist]. In a lot of ways, environmentalists are seen as emotionalists, and that is why we've taken a distinctly different tack, to try to keep things logical and so forth. Because the minute you get emotional, then it's personal. People are then either yay or nay.
>
> Brian: And it interferes with accomplishing a project.

"Facts" trump what is perceived as emotion. Emotions were seen as private and not a useful strategy for collective action. Caring as emotion, is not politicised.

On the other hand, many of the interviewees expressed that appeals to potential threat would be more fruitful than appeals to caring.

> Roger: A lot of people do many things and don't consider the larger picture, but... then they get pinched, and then you get action.
>
> Randy: So the difference between "place matters" and "place matters environmentally"—
>
> Roger: Is a pinch, that pinch.

> It's not gonna happen until they are feeling the effects that it matters. I don't think it can happen until there is that direct link. (Interview, Jack)

> Randy: What does it take for people to move from "this place matters", you know, concerned about the local specifics here, to "this place matters environmentally, or sustainably"?
>
> Cristoff: I think they need to see a threat. Most people need to see a threat to what they're used to, to make the difference. I think people need to be able to say: this place matters environmentally because if we don't take care of it we can't live here; our children don't have a future here. Or, because we can't even drink the water.

One point is that experiences matter, and experiences happen in specific places. Another point is that this view may be linked to beliefs that members of the public needed to perceive a threat to what or whom (such as family) they cared directly about. As a form of "caring-for," such caring is still private, but could be politicised. Conceptions of caring, and its practicalness (in terms of specific actions and objects of caring) is complicated.

The specificity of caring was often conceptualized as leading to direct involvement

with objects in need of care. In this it fits the "caring-about" form. Finally, caring could be perceived as *too* specific, or focused on the "cared-for in front of me."

> Love/compassion has to take on structures or they are just emotions. (Sam, Interview)
>
> All the caring in the world is great and we need to... But all the caring in the world is not what's going to be what changes it on a meaningful level. It's our caring that creates these band aid solutions. I know OCAP (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty) ... believes that things like food banks are the band aid solutions. So they typically won't take part in that... They would really rather work on 'Let's change it so people don't need to go to food banks.' And while I certainly am like 'Yeah, it would be nice to not have to use the food bank again,' I can't sit there and look across the table and say that 'I'm sorry you're so hungry but I'm gonna go out and protest for you today.' That's not meeting your immediate needs. It's my caring that says 'Here's some food'.... I think you do need to strike a balance between the caring work [and the justice work]... [But] does our caring drive the justice we need to seek or does the justice come first? (Arlette, Interview)

Most participants felt that justice or respect would better communicate with the general public, regardless of the perception that caring was more deeply authentic. In the words of another participant,

> "No, I don't think [describing environmental work as caring] will work because I don't think most people are there. You're talking over their heads or you're talking a foreign language" (Interview, Richard).

The conclusion of this analysis on the efficacy of "caring" is that participants believed it would not be effective as a framing strategy for environmental action. Reasons varied – caring was variously seen as too deep or too shallow. This leaves as an open question, whether caring can help orient the *sens pratique* of an environmental habitus. While caring was practical, performative, and experiential, led to action, and could be "ecologised" or extended to environmental considerations, it was also seen as privatized, emotional, and while effective privately, ineffectual on the collective level.

Discussing a Compassionate Sense of Place

It appears that "sense of place" alone would not be adequate to develop a concern for the place that incorporates the full range of social and ecological relations. Instead,

dispositions of caring, and personal biography of environmental interest led to attentiveness to the environment. As one participant pondered, after describing how her own sense of place was intimately linked to caring for the earth,

> I've never really spent much time consciously thinking about this stuff. It's difficult... I can think of people who have a strong sense of Thunder Bay as being their home, their place, who are not at all environmentally active. So, I guess I would have to say, no, I guess the two [sense of place and environmental awareness] don't necessarily go hand in hand. Would the paper mill worker, who makes his living from Bowater, be an environmental activist when he perceives that it's something that threatens his job? Even though he strongly identifies with Thunder Bay as his place that he grew up in. His family is there and his kids have grown up there. You know. I don't know if the two are [trails off].... I guess all I was saying is that just because you have a sense of place doesn't mean you will be environmentally active. Possibly in order to be active you need to have that sense. (Chrissy, Interview)

Stan considered the same question, as I recorded in fieldnotes,

> Why does he [Stan] do this stuff? Is it because he is in Thunder Bay? He said, maybe he would do it if elsewhere. Also it's the stage in life [he's at]. His kids are grown. Maybe [he would do it] if elsewhere–. Then he said, "Sure, if I was in another community, if I felt a connection to the community and wasn't just a transient... hmmm, I can see the benefits of your labour." (Fieldnotes, December 19)

The "benefit of this labour" was to consider if a place-conscious ethos of care could serve as a practical logic for personal and collective environmental praxis. The data showed that "place matters." The characteristics of place derived from the interviews with these environmentally-active persons were similar to descriptions in the literature. Place is the experiential site wherein one acts, feels, thinks and otherwise conducts life, amongst the relations of the many actors and processes involved. Places are constructed by these many relations, including the individual's actions. One performs one's life in places, guided by a logic of practice, a *sens pratique*, that is, a sense of one's place, one's positions and one's practices in that place. The "place" was a container for enactment of the practical logic of environmental lives, thus addressing some of the diversities of being environmentally-active.

Places are also linked to other places, according to the study participants.

Therefore, the place in which the *sens pratique* must make sense included extra-local components. Reed-Danahay (2005, p. 144) observed that Bourdieu's apparatus of the field, consisting of actors who interact, does not require being physically in the same place. These extra-local relations are among the social interactions that shape the habitus. The range of social relations and the presence of ecological ones – both affected by the extra-local reach of political, economic, cultural, phenomenological and ideational influences – make for a complex modern world in which to try to live in an environmentally sensitive way, particularly since we can only live in the place we inhabit. Attention to their environmental practice required reflexive awareness of these extra-local relations, which Massey (1997) has called a "global sense of place."

The characteristics of caring derived from the interviews with these environmentally-active persons commended caring as a possible guide to the logic of environmental practice, although not without reservations. An orientation to "caring " was seen as habituating a person in a way that is fulfilled by taking action. Caring was often grounded in experiences of personal relations and environmental caring included specific places and ecological knowledge in its orientation. But caring was often considered an emotion in a rationalized world, personal and not political, domestic and privatized when we need something public and collective to alter forms of social and mental organization that have created and maintain increasing environmental degradation (Bell, 2004). Therefore, caring was viewed as politically ineffectual, despite being perceived as a deeply authentic disposition. Still, many of the environmentally-active participants of this study expressed care – personally and as members of an environmental organization – for and about the wide range of socio-ecological relations that make up a place. Dispositions of caring led to attentiveness to the environment, desire to maintain the ecological relations as well as appropriate social ones, and response to (action to care for) the socio-ecological place. Caring *could* be part of the solution, particularly coupled with a comprehensive place-conscious orientation.

This study sought to assess the potential for such a place-conscious ethos of care. I conclude that there is potential for such a "compassionate sense of place," but that these

reservations need to be worked out. The route to a politicised ethic of care, as in all care theory, is attentiveness to specific care practices and relations/objects of care. These are the same things needed for an environmental praxis. What inhibits the flourishing of the cared-for or even the ability to act in a caring manner, must be confronted in a world wherein we are relationally embedded. The practice of caring action is dependent on specifics of who and what is perceived to be in a place. A compassionate sense of place attends to and responds to all the socio-ecological relations of the place, local and extra-local, human, nonhuman and nonliving, relations of power, flows of capital, and so on. Because some of these relations are not immediately obvious, a cognitive element – thinking about practice is necessary. This acknowledgement is supported by the research in *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* about the habitus of these environmentally-active people; because their attention to environmental concerns was mismatched with the social milieu, a component of reflexivity was part of their logic of practice. Therefore, a compassionate sense of place is a field of care involving the intersection of self-awareness and practical attentiveness to the flourishing of socio-ecological relations. A compassionate sense of place consciously links self as inseparable from the entirety of one's relations in the broader world. It is a reflexive yet practical logic of acting in place, requiring one pay attention to and respond to the nonlocal and nonhuman components of one's place in specific ways that facilitate the flourishing of the complex of socionatures. Several of the interview participants found a degree of resonance in the term "a compassionate sense of place." The problem remains, however, whether care/compassion can be used in politically and symbolically efficacious ways.

While many contemporary environmental problems are global in scope, the local variability in their manifestation can be significant: global temperature rise, for example, is greater in northern latitudes where ecosystems are also less resilient. Thus, resolution of environmental concerns must always take specific places into account. Specific places are affected by extra-local relations, but they also recursively shape these extra-local connections, flows, forces and imaginations into particularized forms. A compassionate sense of place involves attention to local particularities, and responds competently within

them. Ultimately, such competence requires a politicised and ecological ethos.

Now that this research has added to the research showing the potential for a place-conscious ethos of care, more scholarship is recommended to make the case for caring as legitimate symbolic capital for environmental praxis. Better language to talk about caring is needed, and an expanded notion of caring beyond emotion (Noddings, 2002). And practice in caring is recommended to build such habituations (Noddings, 2002; Ortega & Minquez, 2001). Place and caring are practice-based logics. In their attention to particularity, they conceptually challenge universalizing tendencies in much of academia and the modern consciousness, and will seem out-of-place in modern rationalization. Because of the variegated places and interactions which occur across the expanding range of social and ecological relations, there can be no objectively normative way of living well environmentally – each place will have its specific needs. Combining the literatures, we need a sense of place and a *sens pratique* that seeks the flourishing of the full range of socio-nature wherein we live. What sort of ecological habitus would generate an effective logic of practice in the field? Obviously it must take account of the field, ergo, be place-attentive. Additionally, it must provide a direction for action. Plumwood (2002) has shown the failure of reason alone for personal and societal environmental benefit. Therefore, as an alternative, compassion may serve as a constellation of dispositions to orient environmental praxis.

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Conclusion
Caught not taught: Growing a compassionate sense of place...

Even if the people of our respective communities or of our country are acting in ways that we believe are unworthy of human beings, we must still care enough for them so that their lives and ours, their questions and ours, become inseparable.
Grace Lee Boggs

The current state of environmental degradation on a tremendous scale suggests that as a society fundamental changes are needed in order to reverse this trend of socio-ecological deterioration. Upon what dimensions of society should we focus for this change? Institutional structures? Underlying mental models or social paradigms? Personalized lifestyle practices?

The Bourdieusian argument is: *all of these*.

While that may be frustratingly comprehensive, it is because Bourdieu's answer is the sociological corollary to John Muir's famous dictum, "When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything in the universe." Personal practices are conditioned by institutional structures. But personal practices, accompanied by the thought behind them (unconscious though the thought might be), are also formative of the institutions and their legitimacy. Personal practices accumulate into collective practices – *my* recycling is irrelevant, *our* recycling has an effect. Household recycling affects the systems of waste collection. It generates attention to waste production, such as excessive packaging. It normalizes some mild attention to environmental concerns. Bourdieu uses concepts such as *fields*, *habitus*, and *doxa* to construct an overall sociological approach that can provide tools for specific analysis (Bourdieu, 1990, 1998a; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), and which I have used here in considering social movements as sites of learning for an ecological *sens pratique*, a logic of practice underpinned by environmental habitus.

Bothered by what I perceive as the environmental movement's failure to capture the broader public imagination in the transformative ways I believe necessary, this study was intentionally oriented to suggest sociologically robust strategies for environmental

social movements to better accomplish societal transformation. I believe that we need a better understanding why environmentalism and environmental education have been failing, and that Bourdieu's sociological tools can supply the means for such an understanding, as well as suggestions for re-visioning (and revisioning) environmentalism.

This study has interrogated the theoretical concept of an ecological habitus, that is, embodied dispositions to live practically in ecologically appropriate ways. The study's genesis and culmination, however, are in the imagining of *a compassionate sense of place.* By this evocative term, I meant a form of a place-conscious ethos of caring: a compassionate sense of place is a field of care involving the intersection of self-awareness and practical attentiveness to the flourishing of socio-ecological relations.

Can a compassionate sense of place lead to a more environmentally effective logic of practice? Could it capture the public imagination? The latter question is unanswerable; only passing time will tell, although the participants in this study suggested that it was evocative for them at least. This study investigated the former question. To move toward an answer, it examined the concept of an ecological habitus, and queried what evidence there was for a compassionate sense of place among environmentalists.

This conclusion begins with a summary of the research and the conclusions in the three papers. It then moves into two matters that remain outstanding. First, to what extent can caring or compassion be politicized? Second, how can educating for a compassionate sense of place be accomplished within social movements so that seeking environmental and social conscientization can occur?

Revisiting the Research

Education, social movements and environmental learning outlined a rationale for looking at learning outside of the conventional domains of formal education. Specifically, following educational critiques by Orr and Bowers, I concluded that environmental social movements might offer an alternative site of learning. Place-conscious, experiential and social movement learning were reviewed for understandings that could advance a sociologically robust approach to the incidental learning that must precede the

routinization of environmental practices.

The practice of environmentalism: Creating ecological habitus drew on Bourdieu's sociological approach to expand social movement theory. Given the relatively ineffectual position of environmentalism in North America, I argued that the environmental movement would be better served by conceptualizing itself as working to create an ecological habitus. Generated within a social field, habitus conveys cultural encoding yet in a non-deterministic manner that also acts back upon the conditions of its making. The habitus of a less-than-environmentally-aware society – our society – is problematic. Bourdieu's theory of practice was compared with Eyerman and Jamison's notion of social movements as cognitive praxis. The latter tends to overemphasize explicit knowledge constructions while sociologists like Bourdieu along with the literature on experiential and social movement learning, show that much is incidental and tacit. I argued that in order to develop the routinized pro-environmental practices that are necessary for long-term ecological sustainability, an ecologically more appropriate *sens pratique* would need to arise from an habitus attuned to ecological fields as well as social ones – the totality of living well in place. Environmental social movement organizations could serve as the social space in which this new logic of practice can be "caught" through the informal or incidental learning that occurs as a result of participation with social movement organizations.

Research on social movements has looked primarily at activists involved in campaigns. Since the environmental movement has maintained that the everyday lifestyle of the citizen is part of the environmental problem and part of the solution, we would do well to examine also these lifestyle practices and what generates them. To do that, *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* used an ethnographic approach coupled with extensive formal interviews. The habituses of environmentally-active people in the Thunder Bay region were examined to see how they could form an environmental *sens pratique*. The habitus of these various people contained a number of common dispositions. These individuals endeavoured to live environmentally-responsibly, although there was considerable variation in the practice of being environmentally concerned. They

were, however, keenly aware of their inconsistencies, sometimes seeing these as limitations imposed by the conditions of the broader society. In a variety of ways, these people sought to support their environmental dispositions, which I called "engaging in self-disposing" to represent the tacitness of their strategies to do so. Finally, there was a reflexive component, as their position in the social field of Thunder Bay, being environmentally concerned where most were not, led to self-awareness. Thus, an environmental habitus included reflexivity. While at first glance this would appear to contradict the conceptualization of the habitus as pre-logical and embodied, in this case, the mis-fit of habitus with the field provided a force for self-awareness.

In their formulation of social movements as cognitive praxis, Eyerman and Jamison (1991) emphasized that social movements create new knowledge systems and are innovators of practices and institutions. In *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists*, I found that reflexivity was a core part of being environmentally active in society in which a routinized environmental sensitivity is contrary to the dominant logics of the milieu. This finding suggested a way of linking the *sens pratique* and cognitive praxis.

The analysis of the *sens pratique* was extended in *Caring for place? Possibilities for a compassionate sense of place among environmentalists.* "Living in place" and "caring" were used as heuristics in order to explore possible aspects of a place-attentive ethos of care. Whereas in most social discourse and practice, ecological dimensions are relegated to the fringes and social relations take precedence, environmentalists attempted to extend the zone of attention beyond social space to the entirety of "place." When considering the relations of the place, these environmentally-active persons included a wide mix of socio-ecological aspects. The local place – Thunder Bay – was acknowledged as connected to and affected by other places, but its specificity was as the locale in which to conduct their lives and their environmental praxis. The place, in its porous boundaries and complex of social and ecological processes and actants, served as the overarching field, that is, the socio-ecological space in which practices can be performed and habitus formed (or misformed and misfit in the local field).

Therefore, for these environmentally-active persons, place was experiential and practical. The "place" was a container for enactment of the practical logic of environmental lives, thus addressing some of the diversities of being environmentally oriented. However, environmentally-oriented dispositions preceded concern for the environmental facets of the place, rather than a focus on the place first which would then lead to environmental responsiveness. This finding contrasts with the emphasis on rootedness in the place-conscious environmental literature. Fortunately for our mobile society, it indicates that people can carry their environmental awareness into new places, or, that an ecological habitus can generate relevant logics of practice that are also place-relevant. This finding does not erase the importance of place nor valorize universalized, abstracted or decontextualized knowledge. An ecologically sound logic of practice will still involve living well in place. And an ecological habitus must develop somehow.

Within their environmentally oriented practice, many of the study participants included aspects of caring. However, while caring was seen as leading to action and therefore considered beneficial in personal practice, it was also perceived as emotion and given less credibility than other strategies or frames of environmental organization. Overall, the complexity of the social and ecological relations of place coupled with a locale's links to other places and larger scales again generated an aspect of reflexive attention that could be guided into practical action. Despite the study participants' beliefs that caring or compassion was not the sort of symbolic capital that could be part of environmental movement strategies presented to others, the study did support the possibility that a compassionate sense of place may serve as an internalised logic to orient contemporary environmental practice and describe the logic of practice of an ecologically attentive and responsive society.

Pursuing a Compassionate Sense of Place

I have chosen to mingle the words "caring," "love," and "compassion" in this work. Caring still maintains its gendered, privatized and emotional connotations, in both academic discourse and public parlance, and the strength of this association may not be

worth the fight to change.[30] The word and meanings associated with love have an extensive historical lineage, representing some of the most important moral narratives of numerous societies. As Millar and Hong-Key (2000) argue, love is not a set of rules, it is a set of practices, or dispositions. Similarly, Plumwood (2002b) explains,

> It is a mistake to think of love simply in terms of private relationships or episodes of internal emotion, like feeling strongly when you see a beautiful sunset. Love involves dispositions, including practices of caring for the loved one, and attempting to ensure that others' actions also exhibit that care.... Love of the land can be expressed at the public as well as the private level; at the public level also (indeed especially) love requires that we take care of the land, and see that others do as well (p. 356).

Finally, Bratton (1992) also used "love" (in its Christian form as *agape*) in developing a strong model of environmental praxis. Nevertheless, the word is highly overused, and to avoid syrupy connotations, I choose instead to use "compassion," which seemed to resonate with some study participants. Said one,

> I prefer [compassion] to saying "love"... I think love has to be written on little candy hearts. And while I agree with John Lennon and stuff like that, we've gone past that point. It's too hard to reclaim the word. But 'compassion' hasn't been misused as a word that much. (Richard, Interview)

Nevertheless, in the public parlance and in the ideas of people the words are likely different in connotation, rather than in denotation, which is why I have mingled their use here.

A significant caveat, however, is that while caring (or compassion) was perceived as a deep, positive disposition that often led to action, it was not seen as the sort of symbolic capital that could be part of the political action of presenting environmental movement goals for changed personal and collective practices and institutions. This leads to the first of two major outstanding matters.

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[30] That two very recent publications (McGregor, 2006; England, 2005) both problematize caring as woman's work, but proceed to disparage or trivialize men's forms of caring, gives me little hope for wresting the word from its discursive frame.

Can a compassionate sense of place be politicized?

The main charge against the utility of compassion is that it is particular, and bound in specific, face-to-face relations. In addition, critics argue, compassion is nice, but not adequate as a more pragmatic approach to social organization able to address power and inequity. Ergo, compassion is not political.

Asked to describe their underlying orientations, many of the study participants acknowledged caring in ways that were reminiscent of the theoretical literature on the ethic of care. They spoke in terms of attention and responsiveness. Yet many care scholars have also begun to look at the political dimensions of an ethic of care (Curtin, 1999; Held, 2006; Noddings, 2002). Moving from the personal to the institutional in ethical deliberation is not new; ethicists have always been aware that social structures enhance or impede the ability to care for others or the opportunities for genuine human flourishing. Furthermore, religious ethicists have never limited moral prescriptions to face-to-face relations (e.g., Yoder, 1972). Caring is political, and must be seen as more than mere personal character and private practice if it is to affect conditions of social organization that may cause harm or reduce care.

As I have described it, a compassionate sense of place is based on three fundamentals that enable it to move toward such politicization. First, it is based on the relational nature of existence, reflected in the rejection of the autonomous individual by care theorists and sociologists alike. Second, a compassionate sense of place is an ethos, not an ethic. A logic of practice originates in the relations of the field and habitus. While we have seen that this will include cognitive thought and reflexivity, it culminates in actions performed in the place. Third, a compassionate sense of place is based on the inclusion of the full range of socio-ecological processes. While modernity's mental models are often dichotomous (e.g., culture/nature, reason/emotion), what we see as hybrid conceptualizations (such as "socionature") are ontological unities. These relational, practical and socio-ecological fundamentals are the reasons for calling a compassionate sense of place a "field of care." It re-places humans in relation with other actants of the place.

Bourdieu's sociological approach is thoroughly relational and geared toward practice. In it, the shifting operations of the field involve trajectories produced by marshalling, using, and competing over resources and positions. The choices of what to attend to or how to respond to inferred or professed needs are political choices. The strategies then used for response involve resources (social, financial, cultural, and symbolic capital) that have effects on the field. For Bourdieu's analysis, historical trajectories are important, as the configuration of the existing field is the product of historical struggles to constitute it. If habitus is historically mediated, then changing conditions will still be met by an old habitus, until rupture (or reflexivity) forces change (Lane, 1997, p. 194). These are political processes and can help us understand how caring and places are political.

Calls to "place" are deployed as symbolic capital as position-takers try to elaborate themselves as the most legitimate to name the appropriate practices in the field. I have referred to the contestation over who constitutes a "Northerner," and who therefore gets to speaks for northern forests – timber companies or local environmentalists. This is just one example of discursive representation with place-making as symbolic capitalization. Another example is Trees Thunder Bay doing a presentation to Thunder Bay City Council against a proposed development project. One city councillor told them the organization should stick to beautification work. Yet another example was the battle over Cloud Bay as wetland or as trailer park development. This incident led municipal governments along the Lake Superior shore to look more favourably on Ducks Unlimited's offer to help them develop proactive wetlands plans. These are contestations over place meanings; they are place making, in that they shift the trajectory of the field. The processes of these contestations eventually produce "environment" and reconfigure socio-ecological relations of a place.

Place is the site of the performance of practices deemed appropriate. Environmentally involved persons will argue practices need to be consistent with (what they perceive to be) the ecology of the place while other position-takers in the place will maintain their own versions of appropriateness, with different valuations (Trainor, 2006).

Daniel Kemmis (1990) is one of the most articulate proponents of a politics grounded in place. A long-serving Montana state politician and city mayor, he writes with the nuance of experience. He includes a vision of the conjoined processes of socionatures, although without using such language (and with hardly a mention of environmentalism either). The politics of place "includes some mixture of the natural and the altered... The willing of our common world then becomes a kind of joint venture in which humans will part of the world and agree among themselves to allow nature to shape the remainder" (pp. 119-120). In his description, translated into Bourdieusian concepts, place and its politicization have the recursive effects of field and habitus. "This politics, which takes as its task the deliberate common inhabitation of a specific part of the earth, would require virtuous citizens, but it would also be instrumental in creating them" (Greear, 2005, p. 344).

Calls to place have been coupled with other resources to be recognized as symbolic resources. For Bourdieu, symbolic capital is that naming that allows recognition or misrecognition of what is valuable by the particular field (Meisenhelder, 1997).[31] It is little stretch to opine that in our current society, ecological processes are not as valued as the economic or other processes of places. While ecological processes can be unrecognized, as they generally have been by most social actors according to the dominance of the modern social imaginary, they cannot be ignored forever. Ecologies of places – including such things as water quality, scientific evidence of chemical presence, resource decline from overextraction, visibility of impacts or change deemed unacceptable – eventually force us to pay attention. Ecological objects and processes are therefore actants in a place/on the field (e.g., Murphy, 2004).[32] The problem is that ecological

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[31] A substantial portion of determining the utility of Bourdieu's sociological tools for social movement scholars will be applying Bourdieu's forms of capital and field struggles to existing social movement theories of the mobilization of resources, or political opportunities. For example, framing of social movement messages is a contest over symbolic capital. What social movement scholars of framing have neglected so far is how such contestation is internalized by members, nonmembers, affiliates, and opponents. This, Crossley (2002) argued, will be the particularly productive use of Bourdieu's theory of practice for social movement scholars.

[32] This understanding would require reconceptualizing nonhuman agency, and extending Bourdieu's theory. I have tried to do that by extending field beyond Bourdieu's conceptualization of it as social space,

feedback is often of longer time scales than social feedback loops, reducing the mis-fit of an un-ecological *sens pratique* in a place. Environmentalists try to reconfigure place-attentiveness to include a wider range of space-time feedback, including environmental change and intergenerational sustainability.

Ecological thinking, in its situated focus on webs of life or systems in which things are nonreductively interrelated, is a counterknowledge to the dominant social imaginary of modernity (Bowers, 1993). Place-conscious counterknowledges are heterodoxies, particularly in respect to the decontextualized, abstract knowledge that derives from European tradition (Goonatilike, 2006). Human societies understand their environment in a wildly diverse range of ways (Milton, 1997). Such range emphasizes that the predominate ways that Euro-American societies (including its social scientists who have not examined their taken-for-granted assumptions) construct the human-earth relationship are not the only ways, and that if sociology were to be open to diversity of global epistemology, its own epistemic doxa would be called into question.[33]

Because the varying valuations of relevant factors involved in the construction of place result in a multiplicity of place constructions, there will be no objectively normative way of living well environmentally. The result, as Norton and Hannon (1997) proposed

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and bringing nonhuman and ecological processes into that field that shapes the ecological habitus. Bourdieu conceives of fields changing via the reconfiguration of capital accumulations and deployment. As he has conceptualized types of capital (social, financial, cultural and symbolic) it is difficult to see how these would relate to nonhuman actants who still have some effect on the field. However, since the logic of practice does not, as he argues, depend on the conscious intentions of the actors, one wonders if it can be applied to nonhuman agents, with agency that may not be teleological (Plumwood, 2002a; Walsh, Karsh & Ansell, 1994). This is considerably beyond the scope of this study, but I have emphasized such conceptualization in order to highlight that our academic habitus is thoroughly inscribed by its own assumptions, usually and unimaginatively drawing on modernist terms of reference (e.g., about nonhuman agency), and should itself be a site of reflexive analysis (Bell & Russell, 2000; Meisenhelder, 1997).

[33] Particularly trenchant counterknowledges include the diverse means by which indigenous peoples come to understand their lives as connected to the land. "Wisdom sits in places" wrote Basso (1996) in describing the practical worldview of southwest North American Apache. Most forms of indigenous knowledges dramatically contest the divisions of the modernized mindset. For many indigenous peoples, "living, non-living, and often times supernatural beings are not seen as constituting distinct and separate domains – certainly not two opposed spheres of nature and culture – and social relations are seen as encompassing more than humans" (Escobar, 2001, 151). See also Walsh, Karsh and Ansell (1994) for a Christian effort to take this perspective.

would be the formation of many locally-based sustainable ethics: What is to be done in Thunder Bay? And in Kenora? And in Toronto? But these would be better grounded in a practical sense that derives from an ecological habitus, rather than principles and rules alone (Smith, 2001), especially since Thunder Bay, Kenora and Toronto have different needs and different links to other places and scales. Place meanings are politicized. However we orient to the place will involve political choices also.

Another way of looking at the political dimensions of a compassionate sense of place is to consider the invocation of compassion by politicians. In recent years this invocation has been done most deliberately by George Bush and the Republican Party of the United States, in presenting a "compassionate conservatism." In this discourse, "compassionate conservatives rephrase the embodied indignities of structural inequality as opportunities for individuals to reach out to each other, to build concrete human relations" (Berlant, 2004, p. 4). In its best forms, compassion in this model builds relationships, albeit relationships between the privileged/resourced and the less privileged. And in this form, compassion converts itself into charity, rather than structural change. But as Berlant's contributors show, compassion often does not even take its best forms. Notwithstanding the high-minded ethical principles that surround caring, love and compassion, analyses of charity and social work consistently demonstrate that it produces its own forms of oppression (McKnight, 1995).

None of the generally liberal-progressive contributors in Berlant's collection are willing to reject compassion, but all have difficulty finding ways out of the resulting cul-de-sac. In part, this is because they follow contemporary social formulations of compassion as emotion. They also frequently highlight the way that it can allow hierarchicalization in the caring relation.

> The essays of this volume... understand the concept [compassion] as *an emotion in operation*. In operation, compassion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is *over there*. You, the compassionate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone else's suffering. (Berlant, 2004, p. 4, italics in original)

This way of positioning compassion as emotion is problematic. Emotions have less status than what is called reason. The perception of emotion as irrational and impractical (see

how reason and practice are conflated?) strictly limits its usefulness in public spheres.[34] Compassion is reduced to sentimentality. In addition, by asserting compassion as reproducing socially unequal relationships between cared-for and carer, Berlant and contributors see it as automatically setting up conditions of dependency, which is to be avoided in a world that prizes autonomy. Ethical individualism is the tradition of liberalism (Noddings, 2002; Plumwood, 2002a). Another of Berlant's contributors describes the ethical cul-de-sac,

> The problem is this: Given a shared practical orientation that treats the individual person as the fundamental unit for ethics, how ought one to respond to a man-made [sic] injustice that is neither any one person's fault nor the sort of thing that any one person can remedy? (Vogler, 2004, p. 32)

In this liberal world, Meyers (1998) showed, when one is in need of compassion, power is given to the one able to express compassion to decide how to provide.[35] The way out of this cul-de-sac is to acknowledge interdependence and reject the illusion of the autonomous individual actor, which is both a sociological and ecological verity. "Our interdependence is part of the original condition and in no way a product of some social contract" assert care theorists like Noddings (2002, p. 235).

Garber (2004) and Woodward (2004) both constructed genealogies of the word "compassion." Compassion has two senses, both building on the components "com" (with) and "passion." An older sense, that of "suffering together" has long fallen out of use.[36] In the second sense, compassion means "emotion on behalf of" or "fellow feeling,"

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[34] Edelman (2004) points out that Kantian-inspired ethics mean that "love as a feeling cannot be imposed upon us as duty, since what we do by constraint of duty is by definition not done from love" (p. 170). Therefore, love or caring is erased from public ethics and enclosed within private relations (because it is conceived as feeling rather than reasoned act or choice of the will).

[35] For Bourdieu, this situation becomes an example of "symbolic violence," that of how dominant discourses are applied to generate misrecognition of the hows and whys of lived experiences of marginalization. That the "poor" are called "rich in spirit" or told they should be grateful for the largess of the rest of society are further examples of the oppression of symbolic violence.

[36] In this usage, "passion" conveys suffering, as in "the passion of Christ" during crucifixion. Mel Gibson's recent movie, *The Passion of Christ*, has been criticized in that its graphic depictions of Jesus' suffering missed the point of that suffering. Suffering is itself not redemptive or "good" although some good may come from tribulations. It is not to be sought. Similarly, evil is not to be done so that good can

which has degenerated into individualisms of emotion and response (Garber, 2004). Woodward pointed out how the second sense of compassion as "emotion turned toward one in distress" implies pity, and superiority, thus working against relationships involving justice, equality and care. Compassion becomes sentimentality again, and will be unable to interrogate power (Meyers, 1998; Yoder, 1972).

Woodward began to show a way out however, by drawing on Martha Nussbaum (1996) who has made a similar criticism of compassion. Nussbaum argued that any response to needs of others requires understanding first. Compassion is not a feeling, or not only; nor do attempts at understanding require any fellow-feelings. Nussbaum considers compassion a certain sort of reasoning about the well-being of others, which implies cognitive deliberation but also a situational "moral sense" more than pure ethical rationalization. Thus we are retuned to care theorists' emphasis on caring as response to need, which puts the onus on the carer to accurately apprehend the needs of the potentially cared-for. This is why Tronto (1993) insisted caring must be competent besides being attentive and responsive.

The point is that compassion can have a politicized dimension. Should we believe that people are situated within a web of socio-ecological relations, such a status means that the conditions of human lives are structured from without even as people act within them. Therefore, the professed needs of people are to some extent created by structural conditions that will need to be addressed, which is a political act (Mills, 1959). Noddings (2002) observed that a sense of justice is part of caring-about. Sociologically informed caring leads to the addressing of structural conditions that impede so that caring can proceed and human and nonhuman inhabitants can flourish. It is no stretch to extend the same practice to places and nature as does a compassionate sense of place. Therefore, a compassionate sense of place is inherently politicized or it is no genuine compassion and

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prevail. Nazi atrocities taught the human species a great deal about the evil of which we humans are capable in authoritarian structures, but that does not make those atrocities good, or to be replicated so that the lesson can be relearned (Nelson, 2004). Furthermore, imitation of Christ and love of neighbour and enemy lead to the duty of pacifism and nonviolence (Cady, 1989; DeLay, 1996b; Yoder, 1972). This is a difficult act of the will, no mere feeling or sentimentality.

only a limited sense of place. A compassionate sense of place situates us, such that such things that come into prominence are those things that affect place, deleteriously and otherwise. Caring takes particular forms when it is linked to place-awareness that includes an intersubjective social *and* ecological orientation.

Caring was seen by the research participants as a higher-level moral orientation – deeply authentic – and disposed to action, yet considered an ineffective frame for environmental improvement because of its construction as an emotion, as impractical and weak, and its devaluation in the modern imagination. This is the ecological care dilemma, as constructed by our societal understanding. We need better language for caring, says Noddings, just as we need a better language and way of understanding how to describe the intimate connections of social and ecological relations of place.

Fortunately, an environmental logic of practice included reflexivity. A compassionate sense of place *must* have an analysis. Caring requires attentiveness to lived experience, including experience of institutions, social practices, and the effects of ruling relations. In particular, resolving the ecological care dilemma will include learning how to do care for that which does not communicate responsiveness, attentiveness, or reciprocal caring for us. Plumwood (2002a) argues that nature *is* responsive and communicative, but that we are socially trained to hear human-style communication and little able to infer nature's needs. In many parts of the world the community includes more than just humans (Curtin, 1999; Milton, 1997). An ecological habitus in the North American context could learn from those worldviews (Basso, 1996; Bowers, 1993; Goonatilake, 2006). "Habitus' non-reflexiveness does not entail that it absolutely cannot surface to awareness" (Lau, 2004, p. 376). However, reflexivity *plus* imagination is needed to overcome habitus' conservative acceptance of the existing doxa (Karakayali, 2004). So while habitus involves internalisation, the element of self-awareness or reflexivity provides an entry for more deliberate learning, especially if the movement organizations frame their organizational praxis in ways that facilitate both reflection on and internalisation of an ecological *sens pratique*. A compassionate sense of place could to be taught (or better yet, caught) by environmental movement organizations, if environmental social movement

organizations will envision themselves as communities of practice (Fenwick, 2000; Lave & Wenger, 1991).

Educating for a compassionate sense of place

All that remains is to consider how to educate for a compassionate sense of place, and especially, how social movements can deliberately constitute themselves as fields within which an ecological habitus can form. While social movements can be intentional about their educative efforts, this project has focused upon the incidental learning that may also contribute to such conscientization. *The practice of environmentalism* theorizes incidental learning in social movements through movements as impacts upon the habitus, while *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists* provides further support through empirical analysis.

As presented in *The practice of environmentalism*, learning of an ecological logic of practice involves four components. First, it requires details for ecologically sound lifestyle practices that reduce impact and reinvigorate ecosystems. However, insofar as any sort of environmental education stops at such details, even if in accord with the socio-ecological place, environmental transformation will remain stunted. Consequently, second, it requires a critique of the social structures that inhibit an ecologically sound lifestyle. We need an analysis of the specific ways that social structures impact efforts to be more environmentally appropriate, such as the treadmill of production (Schnaiberg, 1980).

Third, education for an eco-logic of practice requires coming to understand how social conditions of the field and internalised dispositions co-generate one's lived experience. I have claimed that it is difficult to live consistent with environmental beliefs because the un-ecological social field structures the habitus and a habitus not aligned with the social milieu will experience discomfit. By so understanding these forces, we will better understand and resist the effects of "structuring structures" (Bourdieu, 1990). In other words, a sociological consciousness is a necessary support for the transformative imagining of a compassionate sense of place.

Finally, an ecological habitus will thrive only in a field that supports its maintenance. Individuals need to find, or organizations need to create such fields. Environmental social movement organizations would do well to consider themselves as communities of practice in accord with what we now understand about Bourdieu's theory of practice applied to environmental praxis. Learning communities in which internalisation of the heterodoxy of environmental praxis is supported are in accord with learning theory that emphasises the socially situated character of learning.

So far, however, these four components say nothing about the specific forms of environmental praxis. A compassionate sense of place is about "living well in place" or living in accord with the socio-ecological parameters of a place. As documented in *Caring for place?*, in the *sens pratique* of the environmentally-active participants of this study, place and caring were experiential, practical and performative. Education for these things should be compatible with the character of its content (DeLay, 1996a), that is, experiential and wherein learners have opportunities for practicing actual caring. In this research, place and caring were problematic in that both are particular, therefore both are devalued by the modern social imaginary.

Since both caring and place are experiential and practice-based, we will start with experiential learning. One can hardly talk about experience without discussing place. This is what Doug expressed in a comment on why he believes southern Ontario should recycle, but it does not matter in Thunder Bay.

> Is society different in the North? No, [it is] circumstances. Circumstance drives society's values... I've [been] thinking – does place drive society? To some extent you're investigating society's value of place, and I'm suggesting that... place/circumstance *defines* [emphasized] people's values, to a large extent. There's this phenomenal difference between Northwest Ontario and Southeast Ontario, and not that the people are different, but the circumstance and place are different. (Doug, Interview)

By conflating place and circumstance, Doug asserted that experience is contextual to a locale, and that such contextualization mattered greatly. Experiential learning is based on the assumption that we are embodied creatures who build knowledge upon experience that is related to both thought and embodiment (Fenwick, 2000; Preston, 2003). While much

experiential learning theory assumes a process of personal reflection, Le Cornu (2005) demonstrated the importance of internalisation, which would be the process by which the habitus is shaped and reshaped. That we are embodied means we are also emplaced. Although all education takes place somewhere, place-conscious education puts emphasis on local places as at least part of the content and process of education (Gruenewald, 2003). Place-conscious education is experiential.

Within that experientialism, the study participants acknowledged that their place awareness recognized Thunder Bay's links to other places. Any place awareness that does not attend to the mobility of the contemporary world is foolish. The research participants said that, for them, an environmental awareness led from "this place matters" to "this place matters environmentally," rather than starting with place and moving toward environmental attentiveness. The linkages and fluidity of place in the global cannot be denied. Even bioregionalists acknowledge this. In an excellent analysis of "bioregional possibilities" in Vermont, Klyza (1999) observed, "Without serious attention to these trends toward globalization, moving in a bioregional direction in any given locale will have inconsequential results" (p. 92). Similarly, Thomashow acknowledged that "Strong communities allow for permeable boundaries, and recognize the connections between places as intrinsic to the well-being of any one place" (Thomashow, 1999, p. 129). Therefore, place attentiveness – the "conceptual skills to juxtapose scales, the imaginative faculties... and the compassion" – can be part of a "cosmopolitan bioregionalism" (p. 130). It seems possible that a place attentiveness can travel between places, leading to responsiveness and competence not bound to any specific place (Cuthbertson, Heine & Whitson, 1996).

These are among the reasons, Gruenewald (2003) linked place-conscious education and critical pedagogy. Place-based education has tended to be rural, and nature-oriented. However, and crucially, since most Canadians (80%) and most of the world's human population (50%) now live in cities, we need a sense of place in human-dominated environments too. In an early articulation of a compassionate sense of place, I called this the task that of "remystifying the city."

> To remystify the city is to reawaken a sense of wonder and to alert ourselves to the marvels in familiar things. It is to blur the mental boundaries between "Nature" and "Civilization" so that we have an understanding of ourselves and our human-built environments as part of the natural world. It is to understand that human activities are founded upon the earth's systems, that cities are not isolated islands where these processes are not in operation. It is to instill a compassionate sense of place that consciously links care of self and the broader world, both human and non-human. Remystifying the city and connecting to the place we live is a beginning in learning to live with the land. (Haluza-DeLay, 1997, p. 5).

That this idea resonates with others is evidenced by the number of reprints of the article, and that it has been translated into French and Spanish and is often downloaded from the *Green Teacher* website.

Gruenewald (2003) continued by characterizing critical pedagogy as being primarily urban-based, with little attention to the environment (at least in the American context, although the Canadian, British and Australian literature is different, he says). Critical pedagogy has focused mostly on human oppression, multiculturalism, colonization, and other dimensions of social justice. These characteristic differences need not be, Gruenewald argued: place-conscious education and critical pedagogy have "clear areas of overlap, such as the importance of situated context and the goal of social transformation" (p. 4). This "critical pedagogy of place" would do the best of both worlds. It would lead to conscientization, that is, "becoming more fully human through transforming the oppressive elements of reality" (p. 5), and foreground the study of place as "politicized, social [sic] constructions that often marginalize individuals, groups, as well as ecosystems" (p. 7). Ultimately, argued Gruenewald, this approach would lead to attention to the complex of socio-ecological processes of places (what he terms "reinhabitation") instead of decontextualized knowledge abstractions, and recognizing, addressing and reconciling exploitation (which he calls "decolonization").

There is a long way to go toward creating this mix of just and caring social and ecological relations of place. In this study, while Aboriginal peoples make up a considerable portion of Thunder Bay's human population (and larger proportion across Northern Ontario), there was little attention to them within environmental groups, little

participation by Aboriginal peoples in ENGOs, and, it seemed, little awareness of the complex and ongoing history of Canada's colonial interactions. Environmentalists, perhaps still subsidized by the idealization of "the ecological Indian" (Krech, 1999), seemed to see Aboriginal nations and agencies exclusively in terms of allies for environmental preservation, rather than actors in their own right with different sets of intentions and needs (see also, Ballamingie, 2006 for a very focused analysis of this process in a different part of Ontario).

For this reason, I see Gruenewald's "critical pedagogy of place" as an important part of the theoretical language of a compassionate sense of place. We need better analyses of the intersection of environmental concerns and social and spatial marginalization. Despite my effort to observe conceptions of place that reflect contemporary realities of mobility and globalization, place attentiveness is still about locales, albeit with extra-local connections. A compassionate sense of place will notice histories still present on the land, and those who have been marginalized. Remember that in Bourdieusian sociology a field is constituted by historical trajectories manifesting in current albeit shifting positions, and that I have already observed that sociologically informed caring leads to the addressing of structural conditions that impede so that caring can proceed and human and nonhuman place inhabitants can flourish. Caring and justice walk hand in hand. A "critical pedagogy of place" synthesizes diverse but complementary methodologies in concert with a genuinely and powerfully compassionate sense of place.

Gruenewald (2003) made a link to compassion, saying that for children to flourish and for the environment to be valued, they must learn to love the earth (p. 8). He emphasized that place attentiveness involves building relationships with places and their component parts and cultivating empathy. Critical pedagogy is analytic, while place-consciousness is relational, which is why compassion is productive as it includes analysis but goes beyond it.

Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that critical pedagogy has *become* analytical. Darder (2002) calls Paulo Freire's work a "pedagogy of love." Freire wrote extensively and deliberately about love, as grounding revolutionary praxis and the dialogical model of

education.

> Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for men [sic]. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself.... Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other men. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause – the cause of liberation.... As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental.... It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love.... (Freire, 1983, pp. 78-79)

The point is not that compassion tells you what to do – that would be the "banking model" of education – but that it provides an orientation – toward relationships and for action. For Freire, a pedagogy of the oppressed is a pedagogy of hope, freedom, love, humility and faith that frees the oppressor as much as it frees the oppressed.[37] These are acts of the imagination. Karakayali (2004) acknowledges the value in Bourdieu's sociology, but feels that only by linking it to Adorno's critical attentiveness can the imagination be freed to envision alternative relations. Imagination is central to understanding an other, which is key to attentiveness and competent response.[38] Such imagination is even more important when relationships are extended to places and nonhuman others.

We need "practice in caring," that is, we need practice in listening in order to be attentive, and practice in responding, assert many theorists (Meyers, 1998; Noddings, 2002; Ortega & Ruiz, 1999, 2001). Caring people can become global citizens who consider whose place will be affected, if not-in-my-backyard, then not-in-anyone's-backyard (Norton & Hannon, 1997). A local sense of place could expand into a global sense of place (Massey, 1997) and compassion can assist this process (Bratton, 1992).

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[37] Roberts (2000) claims that for Freire "critical consciousness [conscientization] not only implies an ability to transform the world, but a *self-conscious, reflective, rational* process of change" (p. 48, italics in original). He gives little notice of the love, humility, hope and so on that Freire placed at the centre of dialogical education in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Perhaps this is typical of later critical pedagogues. Roberts is one of the few who seem to directly address Bowers' criticisms of critical pedagogy and Freire himself head on. While Bowers repeatedly criticizes the colonization of other epistemologies by Western liberalism even in Freiran emancipatory education (Bowers, 1993; Bowers & Apffell-Marglin, 2005), Roberts himself emphasizes Freire's system of rational and cognitive deliberateness.

[38] Ortega and Minquez (1991, 2001) also draw on Adorno to present compassion as the only effective ground for a just and globally aware moral education.

Noddings (2002, 2005) also emphasized place attentiveness in her view of educating for the caring response.

> The problems are complex and require complex solutions, but solutions are unlikely to be found unless our young people become global citizens in the truest sense. They have to *care* about their homeplaces and *those of others*, and they have to *care enough to engage* in serious study of both natural and political problems. (Noddings, 2005, p. 66, emphasis added)

Place-conscious education is a form of educating for caring because of its focus on paying attention and responding appropriately to the circumstance. In contrast, educating in the decontextualized form that predominates – educating for anywhere – is really educating for nowhere (Noddings, 2002, p. 171).

Still, McGregor (2006) questioned whether “care” is adequate for ecological citizenship. This is primarily because of its association with women. Since women currently do a disproportionate amount of the sustainability work, McGregor worried that this will increase that load. In addition, she questioned whether an ethic of care can interrogate power, a concern that I have tried to allay above. I assert, as McGregor observed, “The way to challenge the fact that care is ‘irrelevant to the moral life of the powerful’ (Tronto, 1993, p. 89) is not to claim it as women’s special gift but, rather, to assert it as a political ideal that no democratic and sustainable society can do without” (p. 235).

Caring-for becomes more difficult as relations are more extended. The size and interrelatedness of the global world is too much for a form of individuated caring. Even the complexity of the total of socio-ecological relations of a local place is too much for individuated caring. “The better solution is to spread caring, like literacy, over the whole population” (Noddings, 2002, p. 124). In this way, I see caring as disposition, which manifests in practice, and argue for environmental organizations and others to actively engage in reshaping the existing habitus that undermines caring practices and place-attentiveness. Caring and place are both experiential and practical. Education systems and social movements would do well to keep this in mind. Educating for caring will lead to caring as central to this self (what Noddings called the “habitual self”). Research

consistently shows that learning to care seems to require experiences of being cared-for, as learning to attend to places seems to require relationships to animals, places or pieces of nature, perhaps as early childhood experiences.

Theories of learning, even those of experiential learning, can overemphasize the cognitive dimension of learning (Le Cornu, 2005). In her view and mine, learning should be understood as "the gradual transformation of knowledge into *knowing"* (p. 175), wherein explicit knowledge becomes tacit knowledge. The routinization of environmental praxis – "living environmentally without trying" (Bell, 2004, p. 248) – via an ecological habitus, involves "a deepening internalisation to the point that people and their 'knowing' are totally integrated one with the other" (Le Cornu, 2005, p. 175). This would mean that un-environmental practices – on the job or at a music festival or in someone's home – would sit uncomfortably. As shown in *Habitus and cognitive praxis among environmentalists*, feedback from this mis-fit was apprehended by the habitus and felt bodily, generating reflexive analysis. Such analysis associated the person with the environmental movement (although it did not necessarily lead to a self-identify as an "environmentalist"), all of which fed back into the habitus, future practices, and more reflexive attention to situated practice. Environmental organizations helped put caring into practice. This helped create further conditions for more caring.

This study presents support for the view that environmental organizations can enhance such incidental learning by construing themselves as communities of practice, or fields upon which ecological habituations are strengthened, maintained and supported in an unecological society.

Researchers have noticed that much learning in social movements is tacit. Most research has focused on learning in activist campaigns, where crystallizing events may provide transformative learning and strategic deliberation. Yet everyday involvement of the non-activist kind is also experience that shapes internalisations. There was learning in the environmental involvement, although it was difficult to assess or illuminate precisely. These processes, however take place over long periods of time (longer than the study period). Furthermore, their environmental involvements are only a portion of total

personal involvement with diverse fields in Thunder Bay, all of which have effects on internalized habitus. Learning in involvement with environmental organizations was incidental rather than deliberate, often consisting of structuring of the habitus rather than focused on cognitive processes. By associating with different people, facts, and ideas, and entering into different sets of relations with a fuller range of socio-ecological actants, people who join environmental organizations may gradually alter their own logic of practice.

However, this study is open to criticism similar to the literature on social movement learning. Like most of that literature, this study also does not clearly show processes of learning in action. The "action" – of both social movement involvement, and of learning – was dilute. "The study of the consequences of social movements is one of the most neglected topics in the literature" (Guigni, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999, p. xv). As noted, many potential outcomes are hard to make visible with surety; this is especially true of personal or cultural change *in process*. Easiest to see are political achievements, which is why so much social movement research has focused on politics in contention.

On the other hand, in its articulation of habitus in social movements, this study has contributed to the literature on social movements. It also lays a solid foundation for further research for myself or other researchers, by providing a conceptual basis for incidental learning as the interplay of habitus in the field created by movements and other actors. Future research could attempt to follow those persons who encounter movement organizations, beginning early in their encounter. Such research should focus more deliberately on incidental learning, perusing the literature for methodological advice.

Movements aim to create social change, not just engage in political contention. That this change is not solely cognitive is evidenced by research on learning in social movements. This literature highlights the often tacit character of learning. That observation and this research lend support to utilization of Bourdieu's theory of practice: specifically, that social movements can be the field within which dispositions consistent with the new reality promulgated by movement framing can form and take root. Therefore, Bourdieu provides a robust theoretical framework for movement organizations

to be more intentional about their field-based learning strategies. Ultimately, the goal of environmental social movement organizations is an ecologically sound logic of practice, underlain by the routinization embodied in an ecological habitus.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this research is clear: a compassionate sense of place is something to be caught not taught. In an unecological society, existing habituations need to be shaken, not merely stirred. Ecological lifestyles and altered social structures will be an ever-so-difficult proposal in the existing conditions of the social field. This situation strongly emphasizes the need for transformative, experiential pedagogy to be part of environmental social movements. The pedagogy – to change habitus and impact fields – must do more than chip at private social practices. Most importantly, environmental movements cannot cause change if a pedagogy is not in place to create conscientization in members and the public. Environmental movements, then, must see themselves engaged in an effort at education for ecological praxis melding theory, lifestyle, habitus, community, structure, agency, reason, and habituation to form a new habitus.

A compassionate sense of place links the person and their surroundings. From it flows a desire to make relationships more full and genuine, including relationships with the whole earth, linking ecological sensitivity and social justice in a web of concerns. Care for others logically includes care for the air we all breathe, or providing healthy, unpoisoned food and water for others to consume, or to redress the inequalities that reduce both social and environmental flourishing. A compassionate sense of place goes even further to extend moral consideration to the planet upon which we depend, and an active response to improve the complex of social and ecological relations of all.

In conclusion, more than a logic of the social world is needed to develop a new and ecological habitus. The world, being historically and materially situated, is constructed and reconstructed by the dominant habitus, which is unecological at best. The purpose is to take what we know to be the existent logic of practice and analyze it with a belief that change needs to happen. It is to take alternative, even liminal, perspectives of

ecologically sound habitus and couple them to a new logic of practice that can point to ways of doing life in this place better. It is to move beyond a sociological consciousness to a compassionate sense of place. The task here has been what Bourdieu (1998b) argued for in his later writings: for social scientists to be involved with social movements and create new forms of symbolic action. My imagined result is that this can translate into the altered habitus that is necessary for adequately addressing our world's environmental and social problems.

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Appendix A: Interview Questions

1) Tell me a little bit about yourself. Why are you interested in environmental projects?
2) What topics or issues are you currently working on, or what sorts of things are you doing or thinking about in your personal life?
3) To What extent do you feel the environmental movement's message has caught on with the public?
4) What is it going to take to really change things in an environmentally-sound way?
5) Do we need major change or incremental progress?

PLACE

6) To what extent is your environmental activism because of being here in Thunder Bay?
7) Many environmental activists and writers talk about how important it is to "know your place, and from there we begin to care about it and care about the earth" (E.g., David Orr, Wendell Berry, most of the nature writers)
   I want to explore this - how important do you think "knowing your place is?"
8) What part, if any, has living here played in your involvement in environmental issues?

If link Place to Env Action

9) You have linked place and sense of place to environmental action - Do you really think everyone who comes to know their place or develops a sense of place, becomes concerned about the environmental protection of it?
10) What does it take for people to move from "this place matters" to this place matters environmentally"?
11) Many environmental concerns transcend boundaries of places - how does that relate to this link you just made between knowing your place and being concerned to take action for the environment?

CARING

12) Which better describes your perspective in your environmental work:

To make sure we avoid hurting the natural world (environment)?	To help us be part of the natural world (environment)?

Which is more important in your environmental work:

Respect for the Earth/environment	or	Justice for the earth/environment
Respect for the Earth/environment	or	Caring
Justice	or	Caring

13) Do you use the notions of "caring" or "compassion" in your environmental work?
14) Are these even relevant?

In terms of moral psychology/moral development, there are considerable discussions between what appears to be an "ethic of justice" or an "ethic of care."

(Optional)

- 15) What do you think other people in the general community would say about the environmental work that you have done?
- 16) What do you think they would say about whether it contributes or detracts from the community?

17) How has your involvement in environmental stuff shifted your understanding of yourself and the world?
18) Is there anything else that you think is important?
19) Ok, pretend I'm not from here, tell me, what is it like to be *an environmentalist* in Thunder Bay?

Appendix B: Environmental Organizations in Thunder Bay (2002)

List of organizations that participate in recognizably environmental activities in Thunder Bay. These are the predominant ones active in the community or region of Thunder Bay in 2002. Other organizations which may have an environmental interest could be listed, but were not visibly active on environmental topics during this time. What constitutes an "environmental" issue is indeterminate. Each of these organizations were mentioned as being or potentially being involved in "environmental" concerns by people participating in other recognizably environmental organizations.

Each organization is accompanied by the number of employees, and , and involvements by interview participants, in terms of employment, or current or past involvement with this organization.

* represents those groups that have a close affiliation or are chapters of a larger body (provincial or national).

<u>Environmental Groups in Thunder Bay</u>

Thunder Bay Field Naturalists (TBFN)*– no employees; 4 interview participants involved.
Thunder Bay Remedial Action Plan – 2 interview participants involved.
Ontario Healthy Communities Coalition* – 1 employee, who was interviewed.
Environment North* – 3 interview participants involved.
EcoSuperior – 4 full-time, numerous part-time/contract employees; 4 employees interviewed; 6 interview participants involved as staff, Board of Directors or volunteers.
Earth Home – 3 interview participants involved.
Trees Thunder Bay – 1 interview participants involved.
Zero Waste Action Team – 1 interview participant involved
Food Action Network – 2 interview participants involved
Friends of the Kam [Kaministiqua River] – 1 interview participant involved
Friends of Sleeping Giant Provincial Park
Lakehead Regional Conservation Authority
TransCanada Trails*
Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce Environment Committee - 1 interview participant involved.

<u>Provincial/National organizations with local activity</u>

Green Party (Thunder Bay)* – 3 interview participants involved.
Lake Superior Binational Forum (US and Canada)* – 1 employee, interviewed; 4 interview participants involved.
Ducks Unlimited (US and Canada)* – 1 employee, interviewed.
World Wildlife Fund – 2 contract employees interviewed.

Ontario Environmental Network – no local employees, 2 interview participants involved.
National Wildlife Federation (US)* – numerous employees; one full-time regionally based employee interviewed.

<u>Other organizations with “conservation” interests</u>
Northern Ontario Sportsman Association
Northern Ontario Tourism Outfitters
Hunting groups - **Trout Unlimited**, **Steelhead Association**