Education, Social Movements and Environmental Learning

(from *Developing a Compassionate Sense of Place:*
Environmental and social Conscientization in Environmental Organizations,
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One may ask: why pay attention to learning in environmental organizations? For an answer, we begin with critiques of the field of education's ecological dispositions. These critiques suggest that looking for other avenues of environmental learning in contemporary society may be desirable. Sociological and learning theory point out that much learning is tacit and incidental rather than explicit and conscious. Accordingly, we consider "learning from experience" and place-based education. Social movements provide alternatives to the existing social system, and in some cases project transformation of that system. Therefore, this introduction concludes with a review of the literature on learning in social movements. Cumulatively, the review suggests that it would be productive to attend to how environmental practice is "learned" through involvement in environmental organizations.

Education, Place, and Experience

The Field of Education's Unecological Disposition

David Orr argued that all education is environmental education. By this he meant that our ways of teaching, and the subjects themselves, say something about the environment and the human role. This is not necessarily good. Orr (1994) stated, "If one listens carefully, it may even be possible to hear the Creation groan every year in late May when another batch of smart, degree-holding, but ecologically illiterate, *Homo sapiens* who are eager to succeed are launched into the biosphere" (p. 5). Environmental destruction – like Auschwitz said Orr – "is not the work of ignorant people. Rather it is largely the results of work by people with BAs, BSs, LLBs, MBAs, and PhDs" (p. 7). Education is complicit in ongoing environmental degradation.

Orr's focus is on ecological literacy – that humans know the ecology of their places just as standard literacy means that we know the mechanics of writing. Ecological literacy goes beyond environmental "awareness." As it is obvious that ecological literacy is not happening, Orr

strenuously criticized education of all levels. The problem is not *in* education, he writes, it is a problem *of* education (Orr, 1994). Our educational systems are simply not set up to teach the sort of knowledge that one needs to know how to live well on an imperilled planet.

C.A. Bowers is another well-recognized critic of present education and environmental education. In numerous books and articles, Bowers has criticized most education as exacerbating the environmental crisis. In Bowers' critique, education in the overdeveloped Western world, imbued with the cultural values that he says are part of the problem, cannot produce the literacy or ecological orientation adequate for an environmentally sustainable society.

Bowers' (1993, 1995a) critique began with the idea that we humans create and are shaped by cultural patterns, and that these patterns dispose us to certain ways of understanding and acting in our world. At least they place limits on what "makes sense" as we act, feel and think in the world. Most of these cultural patterns operate at the taken-for-granted level. Bowers described the dominant Western worldview in ways that are by now familiar: an emphasis on new ideas and technologies, universalized knowledge abstracted from context, newer is "progress" and progress defined as economic development. Other cultural patterns include a sense of time, identity as a function of material consumption, nature as commodified, the primacy of individualism over community, and notions of space, privacy, and corresponding dwelling size. These cultural patterns shape our dispositions and, consequently, the ways in which we live and the social structures we build. For example, with less experimentation with new ideas, we might more highly value traditional wisdom on how to interact with the land. If progress were defined as human development, we might favour simpler lifestyles, art or leisure.

Bowers described how culture tends to reproduce itself, encoding certain patterns of relationships between human and environment through mechanisms such as language (Bowers, 1993, 1996). Education is one of the most salient mechanisms of cultural replication. "By setting the socially sanctioned boundaries for discourse and reflection as well as communicating the myths and assumptions of the dominant worldview, the curriculum performs an important social control function" (Bowers, 1993, p. 9). Thus, the standard curriculum has the effect of decontextualizing humans from the rest of the earth. Bowers' frustration further showed when he stated,

> That most subject areas continue to teach a destructive form of environmental education (or an attitude of indifference) can be seen in how little the nonscience areas of the curriculum have changed in the face of the constant stream of media coverage about our deepening environmental problems. (Bowers, 1996, p. 9)

Nor has the science curriculum changed much, still encoding Enlightenment faith in progress, technological management, and confidence in human ability.

Like Orr, Bowers suggested that education as currently practiced is fundamentally anti-ecological. However, Bowers (1993, 1996) extended Orr, especially by implicating the Enlightenment heritage of liberalism. He finds three strains of liberalism in education which he labels technocratic, romantic, and emancipatory liberalism. Technocratic educational liberalism serves primarily to train members of the social order as workers for the system. Its orientation toward the earth is one of technocratic management and utilization; the earth becomes something to be controlled and used. Romantic educational liberalism acknowledges the role of learners in creating their knowledge and values, thereby reinforcing individualism and humanism. Its orientation to the earth is one of human-centredness, heroism and romanticizing "nature." Emancipatory educational liberalism (represented by Freire, Dewey and others) focuses on critical inquiry, rational discourse and transformation of consciousness on the road to replacing oppressive social orders. Critical pedagogy's orientation to the earth has been one of benign neglect and, again, a human-centred focus inadequate for environmental restoration. In addition, the emphasis on rationality leads to managerial hubris.

Bowers also criticized most so-called environmental education as being piecemeal, scientistic, unlike that done in ecologically sustaining cultures, and embedded with the rationalistic, individualistic, managerial, technocratic and *progress*ive [sic] cultural values that are linked to environmental destruction. Even emancipatory pedagogy is unlikely to have the effect desired. In a recent book *Rethinking Freire: Globalization and the Environmental Crisis*, Bowers and collaborators developed this further (Bowers and Apffel-Marglin, 2005). They argued that Freiran pedagogy is founded in anthropocentric, individualistic, and rationalistic ways of being that are most predominantly a function of Western (European-derived) civilization. If Western ways of being-in-the-world are at the root of domination that surfaces as colonialism and massive global environmental destruction, then more Western-styled education – which these critics assert

is implicit in Freiran pedagogy – is unlikely to uncover alternatives to the current globalizing and anti-ecological path (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b).

It is this latter critique that led McLaren (1994) to dismiss Bowers as a "patrician critic" (p. 156). McLaren said many critical pedagogues are concerned about the environment, then suggested Bowers was over-concerned. McLaren seemed to have missed the point about ecological literacy and the consequent oppression of the earth by culturally conditioned anthropocentric education. In "rethinking" Freire, Bowers does seem to have moderated his views on critical pedagogy a little. Gruenewald (2003a) has effected an interesting synthesis of critical pedagogy and place-based education (or place-conscious education as he prefers to say, in order to avoid the implication that other forms of education are not somehow embodied or emplaced) that draws heavily on both approaches (and both McLaren and Bowers).

Bowers (1995a) described his fruitless efforts to get the mainstream teacher training establishment to address these issues,

> Even educational theorists who have been writing for the last twenty years about how schools continue to reinforce economic and political disparities between social classes have ignored the impact of the dominant economic, [cultural,] and technological practices on the environment. (p. 81)

Teacher educators have responded poorly to the ecological crisis (Martusewicz, 2001). Morgan (1996) argued that educational institutions "actively maintain the divide" between humanity and the natural world. "Education is still considered a strictly social process that takes place essentially apart from and in opposition to the non-human environment. These are the assumptions that have left educational philosophy largely unresponsive to ecological thought" (Morgan, 1996, n.p.). Teacher-training reproduces thought patterns that are unecological, and maybe even anti-ecological. For example, educational institutions have fragmented knowledge into disciplines, when a holistic knowledge base is needed for ecological problems, and societal problems as well.

Stables (2001) called environmental education a modernist response to the crisis of modernity. Stables and Scott (1999) made the point that modernity – implicated both as an historical period in which environmental destruction has occurred and as a "grand narrative" with defining institutions of capitalism, faith in empirical science and social progress, and rejection of

the metaphysical – is underlain by Western cultural and philosophical humanism. Humanism is "sets of belief which are anthropocentric" (p. 146), leading to "an overriding concern with human experience in scientific enterprise and artistic subjectivity" (p. 147).

Ironically, although Stables and Scott critiqued the humanist tradition, they also replicated it. Although they critiqued the critical social pedagogies and schools, they also suggested that "critical environmental literacy" is needed. Although they described how our language itself reproduces alienation from the discourses of the natural, their own language was schooled in the elitist (and alienating) discourse of the academy. Although they described the humanist tradition as overly rationalist and reliant on human experience, including thought, the authors dropped a potpourri of names and notions from a wide set of disciplines. Little in the article actually called the reader to rediscovery of alternative ways of knowing, or alternative formulations of the human-environment/earth/land/nature/land community relationship.

On this analysis then, environmental education – notwithstanding that it is having little impact on the dominant dispositions of the education field – has missed the point. Societal constraints have a large impact on the construction of knowledge. Efforts to teach individuals are weak or partial successes at best, because of the root metaphors and social structures of our society that mitigate against ecologically applicable lifestyles. Bowers noted this when he asserted that alternative models are needed because in these culturally alternative settings we have an opportunity to re-code our dispositions. This is the impetus behind Bowers' (1993, 1995a; Bowers & Apfell-Marglin, 2005) insistence on considering different cultures and these worldviews and practices vis a vis the land. Urban Canadians will not take on the concrete practices of the Kukoyon, the Balinese or the Inuit, but cross-cultural awareness does generate the sociological consciousness that our taken-for-granted is not the only way. It disrupts the normalized practices that solidify personal dispositions. The anthropologist Kay Milton (1996) made the same point in her review of cultural interrelations with the environment, although she is clear that anthropological research does not give any society the "best sustainability" award.

These alternatives may be too far removed from the experience and structure of contemporary modern societies to be taken seriously by most people, or else romanticized into idealism (Krech, 1999). Therefore, it is within contemporary social forms that we must look for

opportunities to reimagine socio-ecological practices. In later chapters, I will argue that environmental social movements may produce social learning outcomes that can lead to the goal critics have argued is lost to contemporary education. But, given the emphasis in some environmental thought about place-conscious education, we will look at that first.

Place-Conscious learning

A solid body of research in human and cultural geography has investigated the role of meaningful locales in fostering a "sense of place" (Cresswell, 2004; Hay, 1988; Relph, 1976). According to Sack (1993), three realms influence the construction of placeness – the physical world (including built and natural objects, nonhuman and human others), the social world (including social, economic, political, race, class, gender and bureaucracy), and the realm of meaning (the ideas, values and beliefs that make up the forces of the mind). Thus, "places" are locations that are specific, distinct, and have a particular identity. Place is a human construction of a location; these characteristics are constructed through intersubjective human experience of the location itself, and not simply appropriated as if there is a singular essence of a place. For Escobar (2001) "place" meant "the experience of a particular location with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries (however, permeable), and connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed" (p. 152). However, an emphasis on "rootedness" or long-time living in a place in the development of a sense of place has been supplanted by the recognition that everyone has their own sense of the place, and if the place does not have a singular identity, duration of inhabitation will only generate changing senses, but not "correct" ones. Furthermore, recent scholarship has begun to emphasize how specific places and senses of place are associated with other places and larger scales (Cresswell, 2004; Escobar, 2001; Massey, 1997). While many contemporary environmental problems are global in scope, the local variability in their manifestation can be significant: global temperature rise, for example, is greater in northern latitudes where ecosystems are also less resilient. Attention to global environmental phenomena, perhaps counter-intuitively, draws the researcher toward the limits of universalizing tendencies within globalization discourse (Escobar, 2001). Specific places are affected by extra-local relations, but they also recursively shape these extra-local "connections,

forces and imaginations" into particularized forms (Gille & O'Riain, 2000). For environmental scholars, it is very important to include ecological factors in places and their extra-local relations.

Many works of writing in environmental studies begin or are based upon personal recollections and anecdotes about meaningful places (Elder, 1998; Sauer, 1992). Similarly, many environmental educators insist on the importance of grounding environmental education in specific places, and often in the experience of the natural world (Gruenewald, 2003a, 2003b; Hutchison, 2004; Nabhan & Trimble, 1995; Orr, 1994; Schlottman, 2005; Woodhouse & Knapp, 2000). Advocates of place-based education recognize that leaning is an action on the part of the learner. They establish that there is a link to be made between knowledge and a specific context, both in terms of content and the learning process (Bowers, 1995b; Sobel, 1998). This place-specific learning "aims to work against the isolation of schooling's discourses and practices from the living world outside the increasingly placeless institutions of school" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 620). Grounded in the personal, experiential process of learning, "knowledge for" would presumably be better than decontextualized "knowledge-about." Place awareness, in this formulation, is seen as necessary in developing this link in a way that eventually becomes environmental awareness. Place-based education has been linked most frequently to rural education, outdoor education and environmental education (Haas & Nachtigal, 1998; Theobald, 1997; Woodhouse & Knapp, 2000).

Descriptions of place-based education have tended to focus on the type of program that Hutchison (2004) labelled as "community studies."

> Community study advocates argue that learning how communities function as ecosystems can help students to appreciate more fully the biological and cultural interdependencies that sustain their living space and the living space of others (including other species). To know one's place is to have an intimate knowledge of the local environment (both natural and built) and the various professional roles, shared histories, and interdependent relationships that sustain the community over the long term. (pp. 41-42)

The problem is that most place-based descriptions have a simplistic concept of "place" that does not begin to approach the complexity of research on place in cultural geography, sociology and phenomenology (Ardoin, 2006). "Place" is a deeply experiential thing, filled with diverse and contradictory meanings that may vary widely among people (Cresswell, 2004). Many writers on place-based education seem to idealise place and community, and

valorise a view of space based on a conception of the local as bounded place, and with that a stable and bounded identity. In many ways, this is a particular view of traditional society disrupted by the modernising process of industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalism and out of which emerged discourses of alienation, isolation and anomie. (Usher, 2002, pp. 45-46)

David Gruenewald (2003a, 2003b) is one of the most deliberate current advocates of place-based or place-conscious education. In his synthesis with critical pedagogy, Gruenewald (2003a) observed that both orientations focus on the situatedness of learners. He also noted that educational theory that integrates both ecological concerns and social justice is still early in development. He commented, approvingly, that in their overview of place-based education Woodhouse and Knapp (2000) observed that "many current approaches to place-based education emphasize the ecological dimension and lack a cultural studies perspective" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 648).

For both Hutchison and Gruenewald places are meaning-full, composed of physical and cultural characteristics. In addition, places operate back on us – they "teach" us and "make" us – in a non-deterministic sort of intersubjective encounter. While Hutchison emphasized personal and social meaning and experience as he uses "place" to analyze education trends, Gruenewald drew a more complex conceptualisation.

Gruenewald explained that places are complexes of perceptual/phenomenological, sociological, ideological, political and ecological aspects. He acknowledged that "the meaning of place will shift and blend, from cultural formation, to personal experience, to ecosystem. No matter what terms we use, human experience of geographical contexts is fluid" (Gruenewald, 2003b, p. 647). Places are not unproblematic, he pointed out; "diverse social experiences produce diverse and sometimes divergent perspectives" regarding the components and processes involved in places (Gruenewald, 2003a, p. 6). He pointed out that particular experience may legitimate particular forms of place.

> For example, although a farmer may be connected to the land, his or her experience of it may legitimate patterns of land use that are highly problematic, such as the application of pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides; promotion of erosion; compaction of the soil; and use of genetically modified organisms. Urban dwellers learn through experience the legitimacy of other forms, such as the ubiquitous pavement and all the extraction, consumption, and waste that it facilitates. (Gruenewald, 2003b, pp. 647-8)

Thus, place-conscious education must be conscious of all the discursive, political and economic forces involved in the place, and the relationship of particular places with other places, regions and the globe.

Haas and Nachtigal (1998) offered yet another framework for understanding place and "living well in place." However, I found the literature they reviewed to be predominantly rural-based and reliant on maintaining "community" as homogenous.[1] In particular, I question whether Haas and Nachtigal's framework alerts us to enough of the drawbacks of place-boundedness and response to difference (Young, 1990). Gruenewald (2003a) notes the lack of multicultural awareness as a deficiency in most place-based education and a benefit of critical pedagogy. "Wherever one lives, reinhabitation will depend on identifying, affirming, conserving, and creating those forms of cultural knowledge that nurture and protect people and ecosystems" but not in exclusionary ways that privilege rootedness and tradition alone (Gruenewald, 2003a, p. 9).

Although we have complicated the notion of "place," there seems to be an important role in the development of environmental awareness for specific places themselves, based on the research into "significant life experiences" of environmentally active people (see the special issues on this topic, *Environmental Education Research*, 4 (4), 1998, and 5 (4), 1999).[2] Over and over in the environmental literature and among environmentalists, the importance of places and experiences in them is presented. For example, a longtime friend – a wildlife biologist turned professor of philosophy – commenting on my work, wrote,

> The subject ... intrigued me because of the importance my experiences of the natural world have had in shaping me. Some of my earliest memories (from ages 3-4) are of accompanying my dad to the marsh to hunt ducks and geese. I grew up with a deep sense of awe and wonder at the beauty of these places and the animals we hunted. (Personal

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[1] Such constructions of "social cohesion" founded upon notions of shared values and commonality are extremely problematic and can reify differences themselves as the cause of problems, rather than our response to difference as the cause. This was a core conclusion in my research on racialization in Thunder Bay, Ontario and why it is important to problematize certain forms of community and social cohesion (Haluza-DeLay, 2002, 2006a).

[2] These two issues are the original special issue on "significant life experiences" and a subsequent issue critical of that approach. I should be clear that there is no singular version of environmental education. Some EE is critical, some is not – probably most of what is actually conducted is not. Some focuses on nature, some on science, a little includes art or social studies. I observe that in practice a great deal of EE focuses on nature study or environmental science, without the societal analysis that I have increasingly come to see as crucial. Thanks to Dr. Connie Russell for pointing out that I may be setting up a straw figure of EE, the easier to knock down with criticisms.

communication, Peter Bergeron, November 9, 2000)

Kids will play, and find somewhere to do it. Pyle (1992) and Nabhan and Trimble (1995) represent the many writers that believe that with the loss of natural areas in which children can hunt frogs, build dams, and play freely, there occurs a general "extinction of experience" (Pyle, 1992, p. 61).[3] Nabhan and Trimble provided an accessible account of the value of special places in their collection of essays by two fathers reflexively considering their children's relationships with the natural world. Noting the significance of special places, these fathers described an essential role for direct experience of natural settings in the later development of environmental awareness. The importance of place on us as individuals is being demonstrated by the growing field of environmental psychology, as well as cultural geography. The question is whether it is places in which nature dominates, as Preston (2003) argues vociferously, or special places of any sort.

From this brief review, I make several observations. First, we live somePlace [sic]: "no one lives in the world in general" (Geertz, 1996). Second, Place is the ground of human experience; experiences shape our understandings and our practices. Third, Place is relational: a realm of actors, connections (including connections to other places), processes, and ideas and imaginations (Gille & O'Riain, 2002). This asks for theories of human ontology and being that are responsive to all relations in a place. Fourth, Place is deeply socio-cultural: a place is constructed, shared, and contested. Fifth, how then can we "live well in place" in such a complicated Place?

Experiential learning

Like place-conscious learning, experiential learning has been undertheorized, especially that which takes place outside formal schooling. Recently, Dillon (2003) complained about two aspects of Rickinson's (2001) review of environmental education: that Rickinson (and EE generally) ignored learning theory(s) and that he ignored "so-called" informal education. That experiential learning was relatively untheorized still in 2003 is of interest; motivated by the same concern seven years earlier, I had written an article on constructivist learning theory as the basis for experiential education (DeLay, 1996). Experiential learning is a learner-centred pedagogy,

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[3] Another factor in the 'extinction of experience' is the increased perception of risk in society, such that children are less allowed to wander freely away from fenced backyards (Louv, 2005).

presumably built upon the primacy of learner experience in the forming of knowledge; constructivism highlights the active role of the learner in constructing her or his knowledge. Among the reasons for the ineffectiveness of environmental education is that its pedagogy has been theoretically uninformed, often focused on teacher-driven transmission of facts rather than either a constructivist-like learning process or a more comprehensive socio-cultural analysis (Gigliotti, 1993; O'Sullivan, 1999; Robottom and Hart, 1993; Robertson, 1994; Russell, 1997).[4]

It is a commonplace to say that we learn from experience and that a great deal of learning occurs outside of formal institutions of education. Most of our beliefs, behaviours, thoughts and practices have been learned somewhere/somehow since birth, in a "time-consuming, cumulative process" (Falk, 2005, p. 269). Falk advocates more attention to "free-choice learning," those circumstances when the person has a motivation or interest, which can occur in a range of settings from formal education to the incidental. For creating effective learning situations we need a better understanding of how that learning occurs. Nevertheless, my intention here is not to extensively review theories of experiential learning; it is to lay out what resources can help us understand "learning" of socio-ecologically oriented relations or learning through social movement involvement. For the most part, such learning will not be formally educative. The learning is likely to be highly contextual, and the knowledge shaping will not necessarily have a pro-environmental orientation. Since my desire is toward developing the ecological society, useful learning theories have to be able to correspond with sociological theory, or inform development of the latter, rather than be individualistic.

Finally, since much of life's practices – toilet-training, reading comprehension, social interaction, recycling, not-littering, kissing – were once learned, then routinized and in a sense "forgotten" by the mind (but not the body), we need a notion of learning that does not rely only on thought. This latter point is one of the criticisms of constructivist theories of experiential learning, which are usually based on cognitive reflection focusing the learner's attention to that which is being learned (Fenwick, 2000). Furthermore, while no one would completely deny a role for cognition, since many of our practices operate at a routinized or "pre-logical" level

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[4] I do not dispute that there are some good environmental education strategies – such as the action oriented one espoused by Stapp, Wals, & Stankorb (1996) – just that much EE has been superficial and inadequate in practice.

(Wacquant, 2004), there must be room for other processes than reflection.

As should be clear by now, I maintain that there is no point to making a distinction between such types as formal, informal, nonformal, or incidental learning. These refer more to the site or provider of learning opportunities than the learning itself (Falk, 2005; Le Cornu, 2005). "Stated bluntly, there is no convincing evidence that the fundamental processes of learning differ solely as a function of the physical setting or the institution supporting the learning" (Falk, 2005, p. 271). It is a focus on the learner that we want, not the setting. In fact, the settings can be myriad and take all forms. The source of much learning is impossible to pinpoint. With this in mind, we move rapidly from Orr's "All education is environmental education" to "all life is environmental education," and closer to Bourdieusian insights about how our internalised and routinized orientations are learned in the social context of social conditions in which they "make sense." For this reason, Marsick and Watkins (2001) referred to "incidental" learning – learning as a byproduct of another activity – as a productive avenue.

In a similar fashion, Le Cornu (2005) built a model of experiential learning that emphasizes the process of internalisation. In all the experiential learning theories she reviews, "reflection" is invoked. Yet research shows that learning is multifaceted and complex, that it is not a sequential or linear process, and that we "learn" or are affected by all experiences, whether we think about them or not. So, whether conscious or unconscious to the learner (who is, by the way, fully immersed in a social context and not an independent, autonomous thinker of the Cartesian variety), learning "must be understood as the gradual transformation of knowledge into *knowing*, and part of that transformation involves a deepening internalisation to the point that people and their 'knowing' are totally integrated one with the other" (Le Cornu, 2005, p. 175, emphasis added). Much of what we know is part of our bank of tacit knowledge. This has considerable implications for the development of a routinely environmentally attuned lifestyle.

Le Cornu's focus on internalisation demonstrates that there are other theories of experiential learning than the reflection-focused, constructivist versions that predominate. Fenwick (2000) did a masterful job of comparing and contrasting constructivism and four other contemporary perspectives on experiential learning. It is not necessary for us to review these approaches here; a summary will suffice as Fenwick concluded that all help explain portions of the

experiential process and "producing a synthesis of these five perspectives in terms of their implications for educators is both impossible and theoretically unsound" (p. 265).

A *constructivist* perspective is the cognitive work of the (generally) autonomous learner, generally divorced from social context. A *psychoanalytic* perspective involves the "interference" of conscious, unconscious, emotion and thought so that learning is done by desire "working through these conflicts" (Fenwick, 2000, p. 251). The perspective of *situated cognition* is that all learning is contextual-dependent and communal (even if others are not present, social norms, conventions, and beliefs are), that we do not learn *from* experience, we learn *in* experience (p. 254). The emancipatory or *critical cultural* perspective "centers power as the core issue" (p. 256) under the view that without critical analysis learning would be oppressively conditioned by discourses and cultural capital that are accorded dominance as the appropriately "high-status" knowledge.[5] Finally, the *enactivist* perspective corporealizes knowledge, taking it further than mere situatedness. The learner and setting are co-emergent, individual ego is dissolved "for human processes apparently bounded by the individual body... can be considered subsumed within larger systems" (p. 262).

What this review of experiential learning shows is that ultimately we are embodied creatures, who do build knowledge upon the core of experience, and may incorporate it into our lives. Furthermore, learning is very complicated. And it does further validate the notion that learning can occur through something as informally educative as a social movement or involvement with an environmental organization. Insights from experiential education useful for this study are the significance of incidental learning, learning that is not reflection-driven, and knowing as an active and ongoing process rather than endpoint.

Social Movements and Learning

Social movements are often considered an important source of new thinking and a site of learning (Conway, 2004; Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Finger, 1989; Foley, 1999; Holford, 1995;

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[5] I have intentionally used this term from Bowers' voluminous writing, thus placing him alongside this perspective despite his extensive criticisms of emancipatory and Freiran education. Methinks he doth protest too much sometimes (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b).

Holst, 2002; Jarvis, 1998; Kilgore, 1999; Mayo, 1999; Welton, 1993). Oddly, this has been an under-researched area, particularly for social movement scholars, although a few adult educators have begun to examine it (Hall & Turay, 2006). In this research project I conceptualize social movements as "insurgent realities" (Lofland, 1996). The research draws on both the concept of social movements as "cognitive praxis" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991) and recent use of the sociological concepts of Pierre Bourdieu (1990a, 1990b) to rework social movement theory (Crossley, 2002) and environmentalism (Smith, 2001).

Social Movement Theory and Environmentalism

Social movement theory is varied (Della Porta, 1999; Yearley, 1994).[6] The term "social movement" has come to refer to a distinct process over time to alter perceptions, attitudes, and even laws around a specific theme. Social movements refer to broad sweeping trends. They aim to bring about change in a political or social sphere, and are typically more or less organized around a particular issue, often consisting of networks of interest groups, social movement organizations, and individuals. Examples include nationalism movements, the civil rights movement, women's and indigenous cultural movements, family values, labour and even self-help movements. Social movements are often "protest" movements that propose alternatives or resistance to socio-political hegemony. Although often seen as progressive, the examples above show social movements span the socio-political spectrum (Lofland, 1996).

A number of theories regarding the development and function of social movements have been proposed (Crossley, 2002; Della Porta, 1999). Now out of favour, collective behaviour theories involve the convergence of like-minded people, often motivated by social strain to protest for alternatives. Resource mobilisation theory focuses on movements as rational weighing of benefits and costs (social change versus marginalisation). Political opportunity theory focuses on social movements as contentions with authority in ways that fit the existing opportunities. New social movement (NSM) theorists argue that older social movements tended to be organized around class or direct political action (e.g., labour) while NSMs coalesce around symbolic

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[6] This and the following paragraph are taken from Haluza-DeLay (2003).

construction of identity (e.g., multiculturalism, feminism). Some theorists argue that there is little "new" about NSMs except the involvement of new actors, especially women and people of other cultural backgrounds. One difference is that there is less expectation or attempt by organizations labelled as NSMs to try to capture political power as there was by organizations seen as old social movements.

Environmental groups are generally classified as NSMs, and some theorists have asserted that sensitivity to environmental concerns is a fundamental part of most current NSMs. As an example, Watts' (1998) case study of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria – founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa who was later hung by the Nigerian government – showed that environmental action was used as an organizing strategy in a way that incorporated cultural, political and social concerns that "far transcend even the most catholic sense of environment" (p. 261). Welton (1993) explained that NSMs react to incursions into the lifeworld, often supported by colonisation efforts of advanced capitalism, and that Nature has been most clearly colonized for the longest period of history. Other scholars have noted the "impressive staying power" of environmentalism and suggested it as a contemporary social movement with a high level of public support (Kempton, Boster & Hartley, 1995; Mertig & Dunlap, 2001). Several scholars have suggested that NSMs generally and environmentalism particularly have arisen in "post-material" societies. In this thesis, Inglehart (1990) proposed that societies shift from the promotion of material well-being as they develop economically to higher order "post-material" values, such as protecting the environment and quality of life. Some studies have shown that supporters of environmentalism (defined and measured variously, such as membership in environmental organizations, recycling, attitude toward recycling, willingness to pay higher prices for goods, support for protected lands, and so on) tend to be middle income, white, well-educated and in white-collar occupations. From this perspective, environmentalism is a social movement of knowledge-oriented societies or value systems that no longer have survival needs as a primary focus. However, recent survey data from Mertig and Dunlap (2001) showed little support for this thesis. Much of the earlier survey research may have been limited because of how the researchers ascertained environmental support. Furthermore, environmental justice campaigns have expanded what has been socially constructed as an "environmental" issue and

brought more people of colour or low income into "environmentalism" (Agyeman, 2005; Pulido, 2000; Taylor, 2000). Finally, environmental social movements in the developing world (such as MOSOP) also call this thesis into question (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans, 2002; Watts, 1998; Yearley,1994).

Most social movement theorizing has focused on what social movements do – exploit opportunities, mobilize resources, coordinate collective identity, frame messages – rather than the substantive components of what the movement stands for or what changes are specifically sought. Aberle's (1966) typology is still relevant (Lofland, 1996). The typology is organized according to the degree of change sought (partial/total) and the target of change (individual/group or society) (Figure 1).

Different forms of environmentalism fit into each of these categories. That which targets personal behaviour change, such as recycling, is *alterative*. Advocates of individuals going "back-to-nature" would be a *redemptive* movement. Proposals for "ecological modernization" of current practices, such as a carbon-tax, or car-free zones in cities, would be *reformative*. Paradigmatic change leading to revolutionary restructuring of social institutions,

		Degree of change	
		Partial	Total
Target of change	Individual	*ALTERATIVE*	*REDEMPTIVE*
	Society	*REFORMATIVE*	*TRANSFORMATIVE*

Figure 1. Aberle's (1966) typology of social movements.

such as deep ecology or the novel *Ecotopia* (Callenbach, 1973) would be *transformative*. As already noted, I believe that the degree of ecological impact being seen in the planet indicates that transformative change is necessary. Partial changes seem unlikely to be adequate to alter the rapacious practices of global capitalism. Furthermore, without "dropping out" it is hard to redeem an individual in an untransformed society. This becomes another reason for looking for theory that

can bridge the agency-structure divide in sociological theory and for pursuing the learning potential of social movements. Yearley's (1994) conclusion is that given the vast heterogeneity of collective actions that can be classed as "social movements," description rather than definition is more meaningful.

Among the numerous approaches to social movements, Lofland's (1996) perspective is that social movements are "insurgent realities" that provide "collective challenges to mainstream conceptions of how society ought to be organized and how people ought to live" (p. 1). Social movements engage the social field (or fields), to contest what is dominant and communicate their alternative. Lofland quoted Blumer (1957), "A movement has to be constructed and has to carve out a career in what is practically always an opposed, resistant, or at least indifferent world" (p. 370). Blumer listed a number of characteristics of movements, including "the intelligent translation of ideology into homely and gripping form" (quoted in Lofland, p. 370). By this description, social movements are engaged in pedagogic activity as they teach their version of the "better" reality and its knowledge. The pedagogical activity is several fold – with the membership as the committed, the supportive and the mildly interested learn more about the insurgent reality, with the general public outside the association of the social movement, and within the fields of power which the social movement engages. As Lofland (1996) explained,

> In asserting realities that challenge mainstream constructions, SMOs are highly intellectual affairs. They must develop rationales, defend against detractors, spell out preferred courses of action, and so on through the range of matters entailed in argumentation on the true, the moral, and the reasonable. (p. 39)

However, social movements do not incorporate theories, they incorporate discourses: "ways of conceiving of and talking about social experience that are often fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and frequently founded on only partially conscious assumptions" (Thayer, 1999, p. 208). Furthermore, learning goes beyond the framing actions done by movement intellectuals. Thayer researched how the American feminist book, seminar series and organization/movement *Our Bodies, Our Selves* was taken up by Latin American feminist activists. Over time, the Latina activists developed a manner of using the material that was more appropriate for the particular context, and for the women with whom they worked. Discourses became social practices, for both activists and less involved participants; learning occurred. Social movement scholars would

do well to examine these processes.

Theorizing about Learning in Social Movements

Although social movements are sites of learning, there is limited research in social movement learning, especially environmental social movements. Foley (1999) asserted that educators tend to focus overmuch on individual learners, educational provision and formal content rather than the incidental learning more often present in social movements. Foley also asserted that politically oriented social movement scholars are not professionally attuned to the learning processes of transformative change. Holst (2002) argued that educational researchers generally dismiss learning through social movements. He provided three reasons: a) social movements are viewed as political rather than educative; b) educational research often ignores the informal learning that occurs in everyday life; and, c) trends in adult education, such as professionalization and workplace training, limit researchers' attention.

Academic boundaries also mediate research into learning processes in social movements. Kilgore (1999) referenced only three items (two very peripherally) from the social movements literature in developing her theory of learning in social movements. Similarly, social movement scholars, despite all their talk about framing, collective identity and cultural change, appear to have paid little attention to the adult education literature on learning in social movements. In a book on knowledge production in a social movement, Conway (2004) cites no scholars of learning or even the sociology of knowledge literature. Sociologists have paid attention to the ways the movement messages have been "taken up" by others, but without calling that learning. Research on the debate about climate change, for example, show the sometimes mis-educative processes, as scientific "facts" are contested in political and epistemic arenas and denial is fertilized with doubt. This highlights the social production of knowledge and the "learning" aspects of the contentions.

Among the few sociologists who take seriously the idea of social movements as incubators of learning are Eyerman and Jamison (1991). They have suggested that a distinction between social movements and "mere" pressure groups is that social movements engage in "cognitive praxis" with members and the public. By cognitive praxis, Eyerman and Jamison meant

"producers of knowledge," alternatives and innovations in thought and practice. In their analysis, social movements have particular ways for knowledge creation and dissemination, such that a social movement is its cognitive praxis. A key aspect of the movement, then, is the degree to which its ideas are "taken up" by the broader society. Movements are temporary, until their cognitive praxis is absorbed, coopted, rejected or splintered. If absorbed by the broader society, the movement will die out because it is not so different than the surrounding culture. If its cognitive praxis is rejected, the movement is reified in a marginal position. Therefore, social movements are not just sites of learning, but central to the development of society through the production of social innovations and ideas. One of the case studies used for demonstration is the analysis of the American civil rights movement. Another was the environmental movement. This process of knowledge production "should be seen as a collective process" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 43). Similarly, Kilgore (1999) asserted that collective learning is the means by which knowledge is produced in social movements, as does Conway (2004) in a highly informative ethnography of the anti-globalization movement in Toronto in the 1990s. Social movements are "epistemic communities" according to Eyerman and Jamison.

Eyerman and Jamison elaborated cognitive praxis as the production of knowledge in three dimensions. The first dimension was basic beliefs, which they term *cosmological*. The *technical* dimension referred to knowledge of specific social movement activities, such as protest or speaking with politicians. The *organizational* dimension includes different forms of social relations, and democratization of social structures and knowledge production. An important further characteristic of Eyerman and Jamison's approach was the recognition that the cognitive praxis of the social movement develops and changes, in reaction to the social field in which it engages. Finally, as noted above, this trajectory leads to a final disposition of the knowledge generated by the movement, whether it is absorbed or rejected by the broader culture in which it is engaged.

Several criticisms of the emphasis on cognitive praxis are important here. Holst (2002) criticized an overemphasis on knowledge production, arguing that knowledge is to be a tool for political praxis – knowledge production in social movements is to change the world. "The concept of cognitive praxis provides a framework for a theory of adult education in social movements, yet

it must be tempered by an analysis of the relationship between cognitive *and* political praxis" Holst wrote (p. 83, emphasis in original). However, it would appear to me that the instrumentality of the knowledge produced is apparent in the technological and organizational dimensions of Eyerman and Jamison's schema.

Holst is explicitly Marxist (even to the point of dismissing neo-Marxism). One of several key points in the book was the difference between the progressivism of "radical pluralists" and the revolutionary nature of socialists. Radical pluralists are those social democratic progressives who espouse incremental social change or who engage in peace or environmental or feminist or multicultural "campaigns of the month" (the New Social Movements, and critical cultural educators exemplified by such as Freire and Giroux). Holst continued,

> Adult educators who base their social analysis on radical pluralist theory are developing theories of education within social movements that address identity and cultural formation, yet their theories will remain inadequate while they fail to problematize relations of power based in political economy. (p. 87)

Nonetheless, traditional Marxist analyses may also be insufficient for an improved ecocentrism in the humanity-earth relationship, despite recent attempts to demonstrate an ecological legacy in Marxism (e.g., Foster, 2002). Marxism rests on the same Enlightenment humanism and paradigm that saw the natural world as primarily natural capital for the economic engine. However, Holst's materialist analysis reinforced the importance of focussing on material practices rather than discursive practices. Although Judith Butler (1993) has highlighted how discourse can alter the social relations that constitute social fields, discourse and language are, in my view, one type of social practice, not necessarily to be privileged over others.[7]

A further criticism is that Eyerman and Jamison focus overmuch on the cognitive element of practice. As we have seen, learning includes noncognitive internalisations. Cognition is only

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[7] This is the flaw in Kilgore's (1999) theorization also. Kilgore correctly identified that learning in social movements is a collective effort rather than the typical formation of learning theory as individually centred. However, this process of collective learning – based on what Holst criticized as the "radical pluralist" tendency of NSMs – comes down to the collective learning of a collective identity. Holst did not believe that collective identity is a strong enough counter to the class-based political economic forces powers that he considered far more powerful and oppressive. Similarly, Foley (1999) argued that any social movement learning that does not situate itself in an analysis of the political economic context will be inadequate to develop transformative knowledge. He argued that discourse oriented "post-structural" movements and theorists reduce complex historical processes to changes in language or ideas.

one aspect, and not always central.

A final problem with highlighting the intellectual efforts of social movements is an overemphasis on the work of movement elites. While "movement intellectuals" have a role in social movements and socio-cultural change, focusing on them runs the risk of ignoring the organic knowledge production and logic of practice of social movements. Holford (1995) picked up on Eyerman and Jamison's idea of movement intellectuals, but as Foley (1999) criticized strongly, distorted it into an elitist position. In response to Holford's suggestion that we need research on the educative function of such intellectuals, Foley insisted we would be better studying the informal learning that occurs in the activities and practices of social movements. "People's everyday experience reproduces ways of thinking and acting which support the, often oppressive, status quo, but... this same experience also produces recognitions which enable people to critique and challenge the existing order" (Foley, 1999, pp. 3-4). The challenge is to help people learn to recognize how the existing order co-creates their experiences, and gain the ability for both personal and societal transformation.

This will be even more challenging given societal trends that reduce the transformative potential of social movement learning. Such trends in late modernity include increasing privatization of the lifeworld (even in the face of advanced capitalist incursion) and individualism – the "myth of self-actualization" (Jansen & Wildemeersch, 1998). Holst (2002) repeatedly emphasizes the significance and necessity of a clearly thought out ideology or philosophy of praxis. My assessment is that environmental social movements seem to be in reactive, short-sighted, and fragmentary campaigns to which this grander vision of sociological change is the antidote.

Finger's (1989) proposals showed exactly this deficiency. Although he wrote, "Faced with unprecedented threats to the whole biosphere, new movements seek ways to overcome what they see as the crisis caused by the failure of modernity" (p. 16), his solution is too limited. For Finger, the educative value of new social movements is foremost for personal transformation, which may later cause societal change. The social movement educative role Finger postulates seems an unlikely route to successful social change because it focuses on transformation of individuals irrespective of any social context that may support maintenance of such transformation. Without

conscious analysis of the social structures and their internalisation, and without an alternative vision of society in which to embed the personal transformation, the project seems doomed to frustration.

Welton (1993) improved on Finger by refusing to separate personal fulfilment from collective action. He emphasized that the NSM quest for liberation and autonomy is intended to open up democratization and participation. The animal rights movements could be seen as opposing "speciesism" that de-voices nonhumans as it disallows their participation in human socio-political and ethical systems that have such consequences on individual animals, species, ecosystems and biosphere. "They are trying to unlearn an older form of identity inherited from the Enlightenment; an anthropocentric conception of humankind's relationship to nature and each other" (Welton, 1993, p. 157). Thus the contrast with "older social movements" is not that NSMs reject political action, only that seizing control of institutional politics is less of interest than the "personal is political" politicization that comes from innovating new ways of relating across differences or identities.

Still, Finger did point out some learning facets of NSMs. Participants experience an engagement that is both phenomenologically and pragmatically experiential. That is, they engage such that identity concerns "cannot be separated from a person's experienced life, nor from his or her social commitment" (Finger, 1989, p. 21), and they learn from the doing of social activism. He did not otherwise articulate processes by which this learning occurs. Neither did Welton, Holford or other educational scholars, so we are left with no better guess as to which of the experiential learning facets briefly sketched above are productive.

Other sociological trends are even more challenging for those who would be interested in deliberately structuring social movement activism for pedagogical intent. Among the lessons of this stage of modernity is that "planning, rationality and education are insufficient to produce the utopian vision of the future" (Jarvis, 1998, p. 71). Rationality itself is questioned. Sociologists have picked up on this in the theories of reflexive modernization – essentially that the conditions of modernity lead to a continuous, and ultimately unmanageable, process of reorganization and rethinking how to be (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). Furthermore, potential learners can access information much more directly via technology, bypassing educators. "It is now a learning society,

even if it is not an educative one," wrote Jarvis (1998). But "What is the learning?" one may question, as it is likely to be guided by the dominant and already embodied paradigms, as Bowers and Orr argued. Bombardment by commercial mass media, including advertising, "teaches" many falsehoods. I have already pointed out the "miseducative" effects of climate change reporting. "We all know" that actors on social issues promulgate knowledge that serves organizational goals rather than free and open decisions on the issues, thus increasing cynicism and distrust (Holford, 1995). In addition, this information glut does not necessarily lead to knowledgeable security, as per Beck's (1992) assessment of the (perceived or actual) precariousness of life in late modernity as the "risk society."

Research on Learning in Social Movements

I do not want to make too much of the lack of research that takes an explicit "learning" angle on or in social movements. There is research on the intentional education that goes on in social movements, such as workshops and popular education. More useful for this project is research on incidental learning as social movements go about their operations. Other researchers have considered the socio-cultural impact of social movements, although less so than the research on political outcomes (Earl, 2004). However, to speculate on the learning or knowledge production aspects would be inappropriate on my part in the absence of detailed data and a comprehensive theory of social movement learning. In this part of the review I will only look at literature that bears directly on learning/knowledge in social movements. The two best studies are Foley's (1999) treatment of several case studies, and Janet Conway's (2004) book-length ethnography of a social justice network in Toronto.

Foley (1999), an adult educator, reviewed six cases studies he had conducted over his career in order to form some understanding of "learning in social action." The cases included organizing for women's rights in Brazil, contesting colonial racism in Zimbabwe, fighting for a woman's shelter in the United States, and a worker's movement in Australia. Another chapter focused on environmental activists ten years after their fight to protect the Terania Creek rainforest. They described learning such things as how the political system worked, what human nature was like, how to create consensus and a different organizational structure among the

protestors and how to maintain one's energy and self-awareness. Foley did not categorize the learning, although made a list of nearly twenty types of learning, that he said roughly fall into either "skills and knowledge" or "conscientization" or "perspective transformation" (Mezirow, 1991.) Unfortunately, Foley made little attempt to go beyond mere description in this case, or to address paradigmatic learnings or the intentional creation of learning occasions. Nevertheless,

> These learnings are significant and empowering. They are also incidental to, or embedded in, the action taken by the activists... We are talking here about *informal learning in social action*, or to put it in a more political way, learning in the struggle. (Foley, 1999, p. 39, emphasis in original)

Through these case studies, Foley makes a number of observations about such learning in social movements. It is typically incidental, latent and usually not recognized as learning by the participants. Some of the learning was previously acknowledged, but this tended to be the technical skills or technical knowledge, such as forest ecology, needed to communicate with media, politicians or foresters. Therefore, the participants in the study were reflectively aware of the knowledge production process, but a great deal was internalized. Foley wrote that they were often "surprised and delighted at the learning that was revealed" through the research process (p. 3). Finally, Foley highlighted the crucial role for the learning process of engaging with opposition in the learning process in social activism. It seems that the experience of opposition set conditions for a *desire* to figure out what was going on, the social context for the learning that needed to occur, and a crucible to test the knowledge being developed. These observations seemed to transcend the cases. Nevertheless, Foley concluded that learning in the struggle will always be connected to its context, a context that includes the socio-economic and political forces and discourses that affect places and link places (and struggles).

Despite the overwhelming focus on knowledge production in the study produced by Conway (2004), the political scientist did not reference any of the adult education literature described above on social movement learning, nor refer to Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) work on cognitive praxis. Her research thesis was "Social movements such as the MNSJ [Metro Network on Social Justice] produce knowledges and in practice and through experimentation, these knowledges are forging post-neoliberal alternatives" (Conway, 2004, p. 2). The MNSJ was a coalition of activist agencies that organized in the City of Toronto against municipal and

provincial restructuring of government, programs and finances. Conway detailed the movement's deliberations about tactics, organization, message frames, and vision during the approximate years of 1994-1997. A distinct tension in the organization was between those who sought more mass activism, and those who wished for the organization to engage in economic and political literacy (EPL) education. For a while, the MNSJ ran a number of deliberately educational programs. These involved workshops that sought to educate those outside the movement, as well as advanced, in-house seminars for committed activists.

Social movement knowledge is "largely tacit, practical and unsystematic," Conway concluded (p. 8). While many experiential education scholars have highlighted reflection as the key to knowledge production, Conway's detailed analysis showed that activist culture led to certain forms of knowledge productions. For instance, the movement nearly splintered over the challenge to the conventional practices of protest politics that would have occurred by formally emphasizing the EPL work. While the EPL faction sought to build a long-term grassroots conscientization about the socio-political climate (framed as "neo-liberalism"), this was considered contrary to the never-explicit practices of the coalition as protest workers, not "passive" educators. The culture of activism appears important. Ross (2005) also noted his expertise, even that of a seasoned activist turned scholar, had no impact on the "embedded ideas" of activists, and Meyer (2005), reflecting on his own activism, observed "ideology, habit and superstition substitute for information" (especially when information is provisional or missing) for activists, himself included. Thus, experiential learning in a social movement will not be all about reflection; internalisation, represented by tacit knowledge, will be significant (Le Cornu, 2005).

> The practical implications of recognizing the nature and importance of tacit knowledge are enormous for understanding how social movements might more purposefully and effectively reproduce themselves and their politics, practices and knowledges beyond their immediate times and places. Recognizing tacit knowledges is also relevant for the nature of praxis within any particular activist context. (Conway, 2004, p. 164)

Conway pointed out that reflection occurred, and was important, but that it was "still very focused on the campaign at hand and on how to improve different aspects for future practice imagined in similar terms. There was little capacity or appetite... to tease out deeper implications" (Conway, 2004, p. 164). Even the understanding of the neoliberal frame of opposition was not particularly reflected upon, which made it harder for people with a social analysis that was

different than this political economic masterframe of the left to become consistently part of the movement (p. 223). This may have contributed to the persistent inability to attract "diversity" to the movement.

Despite the intentionally educative workshops, advanced seminars and so on, Conway found that movement knowledge was still "largely tacit, practical and unsystematic." I do not mean to suggest that this is inadequate or a poorer condition. This finding demonstrates that knowledge has a social character, and the social movement forms a field in which an activist habitus is generated, which in turn shapes the movement field.

Conway identified three distinct "modes of knowing" anchored in activist practice. First, the tacit knowledge produced from everyday practice; second, praxis, that is, knowledge arising from practices systematically reflected upon and utilized; third, movement-based interpretation of the world. It was this last mode of knowing, which served as the MNSJ's chief contribution to social knowledge, and, in Conway's analysis, was rejected by an increasingly neoliberal city. Knowing Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) work, we could call these the MNSJ's cognitive praxis. The movement dwindled as its cognitive praxis was effectively rejected and became further marginalized.

Learning in social movements operates in several forms, which each scholar has labelled differently. Conway's three modes of knowing are reminiscent of Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) three dimensions of cognitive praxis although there are differences. In fact, other research teams also proposed social movement knowledge systems with considerable similarity (Figure 2).

Eyerman & Jamison (1991)	Branagan & Boughton (2003)	Holst (2002)	Conway (2004)
Cosmological (basic beliefs)	Emancipatory	General	Movement-based interpretation of world
Organizational (altered forms of social relations)	Communicative		Praxis
Technological (movement specific activities)	Instrumental (skills development)	Technicist	Tacit

Figure 2. Comparison of terminology and knowledge types among social movement learning scholars.

self-learning in the Australian peace movement. They articulated three categories: *instrumental* (technical skills development), *interpretive or communicative* (people-related skills, such as communication, problem-solving and organizational), and *emancipatory* (changes to world view).[8] The latter category they compare to "conscientization" and "perspective transformation." Branagan and Boughton briefly referenced "situated cognition" as a learning theory, saying that it combines explicit knowledge with tacit knowledge of the context in which the explicit knowledge was learned, but they did not elaborate further. Presaging Holst's criticisms, Branagan and Boughton also argued that learning that includes all three dimensions is neither "pluralist, nor structuralist, reformist or revolutionary" and that these dichotomies are irrelevant, because such education is both.

Branagan and Boughton's categories were nearly identical to those developed by Eyerman and Jamison. Conway's categories were less about the content of the knowledge produced than the mode by which what is known is expressed. Therefore, since some learning was tacitly known and some was personally praxeological (practice reflected upon), Conway's categories combined categories used by others. Foley's case studies of learning in environmental activism tended to focus on what Eyerman and Jamison called the technological and Holst termed the technicist details of operating a social movement in protest and action. Holst did not elaborate on these forms of knowledge, but did emphasize that radical social movements must intentionally do technicist educating to enable the workers to manage the details when they gain power. For the most part, these categorizations refer to content of learning, and not to processes.

In the social movement literature, I'd like to highlight two chapters of a recent book that both address learning in ways that show the situation-contextual, incidental and multi-faceted nature of knowledge production in social movements. Feree, Sperling and Risman (2005) were engaged by a Russian women's network to help facilitate a conference and network development. Among the facets that the Russian federation wished to develop was a more participatory culture. The American academics realized that the existing culture of this group fell along lines of a

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[8] Interestingly, these three categories follow Habermas' three types of knowledge interests, although Branagan and Boughton do not note this. Habermas was also one of the earliest theorists to label "new social movements" (NSMs) and speculate on their role in contemporary late capitalism.

"culture of lecture" while they were accustomed to a "culture of conversation." The Russians typically did not listen to each other, cut each other off, used a referee's whistle to signal the end of a speech turn, monopolized the floor and lectured didactically during open floor sessions rather than engaging in a more dialogue-like manner. Feree, Sperling and Risman observed that civil society depends on developing democratic skills and participation, and that social movements can be a space in which to learn these. In fact, the seemingly autocratic whistle was intended to lead to more participation. The authors noted that social movement scholars may overlook the important role of "cultural resources" for social movement groups and that this would be detrimental for effective understanding of the movement and the member's operation and modes of knowing.

Charlotte Ryan (2005) was also engaged by an organization to help it develop techniques. In this case a Rhode Island network against domestic violence sought to better respond to current events and the media. Ryan developed ad hoc "media caucuses" at the organization; anyone available would take part for a short time whenever an event hit the news and collectively craft a response to the event. The results were several. First, it developed "a learning culture" in the organization. Second, a wider range of staff learned a wider range of skills through incidental participation in the media caucuses. Third, not only skills, but relational, discursive and ideological learnings took place. Fourth, the individuals forged a zone of "connected knowing" wherein "personal transformative and social transformative reinforce each other" (p. 132).

As Ryan assessed it, the process of collectively framing a message created a "counternarrative" that both presented a counter-hegemonic worldview, and established altered social relations, becoming a collective actor rather than collection of individual ones. "Tentatively, provisionally, participants in the framing process experience counterhegemony lived. Thus, the collective actor functions simultaneously within an existing culture and an imagined better world" (p. 133). Social movement learning is peculiarly collective (Foley, 1999; Kilgore, 1999).

There are a number of observations from this literature that move the present study forward. First, those scholars interested in learning in social movements have focused more on what was learned than how this learning occurred. Several types of learning have been articulated, including a paradigmatic component that may or may not include a critique of existing socio-

cultural forces such as capitalism. Second, there has been an attempt to grasp both formalized and informal modes of knowledge production in the social movements, especially that which has been called incidental learning. Third, the situational context, organizational culture or collectiveness of the learning process is part of the process. As some scholars have argued, social movements can serve as sites of innovations, or social experiments, or public spaces for the imagination of alternatives to the dominant ways of thinking or being. These cultural facets have a dimension of tacit knowledge, which points us toward interactions of social context and internalisations, especially as incidental learning in social movements. Fourth, the roles of reflection, tacit or incidental knowing, and internalisation are uncertain and clearly need further analysis. Finally, because of the social position of social movements, the significance of engaging with opposition is highlighted. This facet would seem meaningful for learning in social movements and might affect any of the other observations.

The disadvantage in all these studies is that they have for the most part focused on activists involved in campaigns, rather than the everyday learnings involved in a social movement, particularly an environmental one. The environmental movement has maintained that the everyday lifestyle of the citizen is part of the issue and part of the solution. And given the significance of the everyday habitus by which people's regular practices are organized, such learnings may be more important than the "heat of battle" environmental campaigning.

Conclusion

Socio-environmental stresses are substantial, yet much social theory has paid little attention to the environment in a substantive way, rather than as an off-shoot of social problems to be analysed as one might analyse any other mundane aspect of society. I have argued that education, as currently operating, is neither the only site for environmentally oriented learning to occur, nor the best site. Place-conscious, experiential and social movement learning were reviewed for understandings that may be useful in advancing a sociologically robust approach to the incidental learning that must precede the routinization of environmental practices.

A place-based approach has value because as human beings we are embodied and emplaced, rather than being disembodied thinking creatures (Preston, 2003). Place is the ground

of human experience and practice as we all live somewhere. Place is also a complex set of socio-ecological relations, meanings and features (Cresswell, 2004). Place-conscious education has taken many forms. Its chief benefit is its contextualizing of the learning process and the knowledge formed, but it runs the risk of being place-bound or simply inadequate for a globally interconnected world with highly mobile people, regardless of the potential importance of understanding the contextualization of ecology.

When coupled with an understanding of learning from experience, a place-conscious approach makes even more sense. Much learning is informal and incidental. Theories of experiential learning are generally "situated," with the social environment and context being important, rather than decontextualized knowledge. While most theories of experiential learning emphasize the role of cognitive reflection on experience, Le Cornu (2005) highlights the importance of internalisation. Since the intent of this project is to develop an understanding of routinized environmental praxis, this seems like a fruitful route. Recognition of learning from experience also validates the usefulness of researching other venues for learning, such as involvement in environmental groups or social movement organizations.

As insurgent realities, social movements are trying to educate about alternate realities with different values than the dominant habitus. This then is not a rational task because it does not depend on the reason of the prevailing logic of practice, or not a rational task only. In the words of Bauman, it is "not safe in the hands of reason," (quoted in Jarvis, 1998, p. 71). I suggest a need for transformative rather than individualistic or reform environmentalism.

Again, scholars have highlighted the often tacit nature of learning in this environment. This finding would seem to contradict Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) depiction of social movements as generative of a cognitive praxis, until we realize that cognitive praxis is at the level of the social movement while at the level of the involved member the cognitive praxis of the organization may very well be tacit (Conway, 2004; Foley, 1999). Scholars have described various types of knowledge forms produced by "learning in action" including basic cosmological beliefs, new organizational forms and movement specific practices. Implicit in much of this research is that learning is produced in opposition to dominant social paradigms and practices. The learning still occurs within the context of the "movement," including but not limited to movement

organizations. A weakness of much research on social movement learning is that the research has primarily focused on heavily involved activists, rather than "regular" environmentally active people. In conclusion, this review shows the validity of investigating social learning, or routinization of an environmental logic of practice, associated with involvement in environmental organizations. So, let's get on with it!

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